THE METHODOLOGY OF REGIONAL PLANNING, THE CASE OF THE GALIL, ISRAEL 1975-1986.

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ABSTRACT

The "Achilles heel" of regional planning in the past has consistently proved to be the failure to achieve success in implementing plans. Most scholars acknowledge this reality, but disagree over its explanation, thus, the inadequate theoretical base for planning practice.

The essential question behind this dissertation is: What makes decision-makers adopt and implement a given planing product? This concern is based on the perception of planning as a process that depends not merely on the plan's content and competency, but on the way planners choose to integrate their proposals into the decision-making environment within which they operate. Since a plan's approval does not necessarily imply its implementation, it is in the interest of planners to promote implementation. Accordingly, this dissertation proposes a methodological framework to guide planners in creating a highly implementable product.

The framework encompasses three elements: **the region,** with its perceived relative condition guiding the determination of its expected future; **the decision-making environment,** and the potential to exercise different planning functions within it; and **the planning approach** which is forged into a strategic perspective that integrates planners' skills and imagination, creating a firm basis for guiding the integration of a planning product into a specific decision-making system, as a means to promote its implementation.

The framework is tested through the examination of a particular planning experience in the Galil region of Israel. These two parts, when put together, enable planners to apply prevailing knowledge and skills so as to bridge the gap between plan-making and implementation.

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Chapter 1: OVERVIEW

This dissertation is concerned with the subject of regional planning; its task is to propose a planning approach that can lead to a highly implementable planning product, one with a potential for promoting actual actions.

This area of concern is marked by its very rich base of theoretical positions and research studies grounded in a wide variety of social science disciplines. Indeed, the literature developed over the course of the past 40 years has much to offer to the understanding of different aspects of regional systems and planning functions - the way they are structured and operate, the means by which to analyse historical processes, and future prospects. Whereas during the 1950s and 1960s regional systems, planning processes, and regional planning were approached from rather unified perspectives (design-engineering and social-welfare oriented perceptions, each for a time dominant), the last two decades are marked by a great diversity of theoretical approaches and practical considerations of both "regions" and "planning". This change is thought to be a result of the combined effect of changes in the socio-economic, political, legislative, and technological environment of planning practice on the one hand, and an accumulated worldwide experience with planning practice on the other (Maclenan and Parr, 1979; Kelman, Clevel, Forester, Goldsmith, 1980; Healey, McDougall and Thomas, 1982).

Regional analysis in the past two decades fundamentally has held to a consistent view of "regions", according to

which the region's spatial system is a concrete expression of social, economic, and political processes that are an integral part of a wider system(s) placed in a certain historical context (in contrast to the pre-1970 belief that the description of the spatial distribution of components was a sufficient base for regional analysis). This basic attitude is applied in the analysis of regional systems from different perspectives - physical, environmental, social, political, or economic, all subject to the purpose of the research and the analyst's objectives.

Unlike this fairly unified theoretical and practical approach toward regional analysis, planning is subject to a diversity of theoretical positions and a general disagreement over which aspects and indicators are most important for planning theory and those forming the essence of planning practice. This diversity brings to mind the case of the blind people describing an elephant - the question of what an elephant is depends on the part they actually touch: examination of the tail, the legs, or the trunk, each leads to a different "elephant". Nevertheless, the literature related to planning issues has much to offer both theoreticians and practitioners. Therefore, it is important and useful to integrate an analysis of accumulated planning experience and the widening theoretical debate into future planning practice and analysis.

Broadly speaking, among the great variety of aspects that the literature reveals, several normative and practical questions are discussed that are of particular relevance for this dissertation (the following is a limited selection of

the issues addressed by scholars, and by no means a conclusive list of available studies and scholars that have contributed to planning theory and practice):

How should the planning product be formulated? (Faludi, 1973; Lindblom, 1959; Etzioni, 1967; Friend and Hickling, 1987). How do and should planners actually operate in the social-political system? (Davidoff, 1965; Gans, 1968; Eversley, 1973; Duleavy, 1980a; Bilski, 1980), and whose interests do they serve? (Altshuler, 1965; Castells, 1977; Massey and Cataleno, 1978). What should the planning product look like? (RTPI 1980 conference). What are the various aspects of the environment within which planners operate that deserve attention: the institutional context of planning practice (Dennis, 1970; Friend, 1980), the legislative base for planning practice (McAuslan, 1979; Jowell, 1977), the conflicts structuring the wide socio-economic system (Gans, 1968; Poulantzas, 1973; Dunleavy, 1980a), and the interrelations between social and spatial structures? (Harvey, 1973). What is the effect of the crisis of the modern state economy (Stilwell, 1980; Sawers and Tabb, 1984), and the importance of worldwide economic changes and multinational corporations? (Holland, 1976). Finally, what is the relevance of interpersonal interactions in planning practice (Friedmann, 1973), the availability of multidirectional flows of influence within socio-political organisations (Dunleavy, 1980a), and planners' expectations derived from their profession and role in social administrative organisations? (Baer, 1977; Broadbent, 1977; Baum, 1980).

Nevertheless, when we come to the assessment of planning practice, most perspectives are united along the idea that planning practice is problematic. Regional planning, according to this rationale, represents the extreme case of the difficulties embodied in planning - complicated systems subject to planning initiatives (that often express rather ambitious goals) that do not create "easy" grounds for planning practice. Although different types of planning initiative influences can be identified in both Western and Third World countries, and although the extent to which plans are considered to have achieved their goals may vary according to the analytical criteria chosen for such assessment, the "destiny" of plans is mostly accepted (either purposefully or by implication from reality) to be an academic exercise. As noted by Friedmann (1979), "the failure to score significant success" (p. 1) is the "Achilles' heel" of planning practice and theory of the past two decades (to say the least).

My interest in planning and implementation stems from my work experience as a planner, during which time I became aware of a certain gap between two "segments" of "planning": formation of plans, on the one hand, and their implementation (or their actual use in decision-making processes related to the object of planning) on the other hand. I gradually became aware of three conflicting trends that dominate the reality of planning practice:

a. Numerous plans do not reach the stage of materialisation, or even that of being considered for carrying out. Some plans simply appear irrelevant by

the time they are concluded and published; others may be stopped with the excuse of being "politically dangerous", or due to spending cuts. Above all, even in cases where a plan was initiated for a specific customer, its implementation is by no means guaranteed, and in many cases plans are utilised to justify decisions and actions that are already taken.

b. The vast majority of plans, and especially regional plans, are very similar, both in their basic objectives and the way they are articulated. Most plans contain elements of long-run elimination of regional economic inequality, population dispersal, and decentralisation of large urban-metropolitan areas. Moreover, plans tend to be structured according to the principles of the rational problem-solving approach, presenting their proposals in an analysis-goals-means-ends order, to the extent that in many cases only specific data and informative details serve to distinguish between them. This planning approach is still seen in spite of the fact that most practitioners' training over the last two decades has been critical of this "rational-comprehensive" approach.

c. Although regional plans are implemented insufficiently and planners face immense difficulties in promoting implementation, the planning function persists. Planners have a role in public regulatory organisations, they operate in private consultancy offices and as consultants to public decision-makers

and private organisations, they form an officially accepted research discipline, and they are involved constantly in academic training. At the same time, the planning profession is said to be "in a state of malaise" (Baer, 1977), and planners themselves suffer from a certain lack of confidence, especially those who question the relevance of the available theoretical base and its links to practice.

These observations are echoed by various scholars, many of whom seek explanations and means to change the situation. Their attitude varies from a call to increase planners' legislative authority and available resources (Inbar, 1980), through proposals to improve the deficiencies of planning theory (Healey, McDougall and Thomas, 1982), to a rather "fatalistic" view of planners as unable to contribute to the establishment of fundamental socio-economic changes as long as they operate in accordance with the principal rules of the modern capitalist state apparatus (the neo-Marxist approaches).

This reality of regional planning raises two lines of interest. On the one hand, there are normative questions regarding the essence of the planning profession (such as the goals of planning in general and regional planning in particular, or the justifications of planning practice and planners' expectations); on the other hand, there is the pragmatic question of how this reality can be changed - how should planners improve their performances, regardless of the competence of the ideas expressed in the planning

product that stem from planners' perceptions of the above normative aspects. In view of the richness of planning discussions and theoretical insights into the normative questions, the concern with planning performance becomes a matter of bridging the gap between the two practices: plan-making and plan implementation. Indeed, it is our task in this dissertation to propose a methodological framework that enables this gap to be bridged by establishing a coherent framework for actions that is relevant to concrete cases. This dissertation, then, is essentially concerned with the question of what makes the output of planners' strategic initiative be adopted and actually implemented by decision-makers.

This dissertation rests on the premise that planning practice is feasible, and that it is not a matter of merely academic concern. It is further assumed that planners are equipped with a wide theoretical knowledge and the technical tools that provide them with the skills necessary for the promotion of plans' implementation. Finally, it is acknowledged that planners are not in direct control of the decision-making processes that prevail in specific contexts. By implication, planning practice is largely a function of the way in which planners integrate the planning product into the existing political, economic, and social system. This, in turn, is a function of two elements: the extent to which a certain system enables planners to penetrate into the decision-making process, and the extent to which planners' professional and personal attributes enable them to gain access to the major decision-making apparatus.

In practice, therefore, planning analysis should treat the way the planning product is proposed to function in the field (or, interpreted to practice) as a matter of equal importance to its content. The latter aspect is thoroughly discussed in the literature, as noted above. The considerations given to the practicalities of planning currently are insufficient, as reality shows.

Accordingly, how may planners integrate the planning product into the environment they wish to influence? What are the tools required for operating in such an environment? How should planners make the most of the tools they are basically equipped with? These are the main questions this dissertation tackles.

The answers to these questions are expected to contribute to an improved performance of planning processes, while permitting the planner's individual input to affect the type of process he wishes to influence, the determination of the theoretical and ideological justification for his actions, and the establishment of the environment within which he wishes to operate.

This dissertation consists of two major parts. Part one sets up the methodological principles of the proposed planning approach; the way "regions" should be viewed and the components of regional systems most relevant to the promotion of its competitive advantage are discussed in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 is concerned with identifying the decision-making determinants vulnerable to planning practice, and the types of responses planners may derive from their "partners" in the planning process. Chapter 4

presents regional strategy as a practical tool that can enable planners to integrate skills and establish a framework for influencing decision-making regarding the regional processes in question. This strategy should embody planners' attitudes toward vulnerable decision-making determinants, and assessments of the region's relative strengths (with both enriched by planners' imaginative and analytical skills). It should also be interpreted to concrete and manageable set of proposals. Finally, although parts of the strategic perspective or the strategy in all my be distributed, the overall effectiveness of the planners' performance rests on the combined effect of their strategic perspective and their active attempts to promote its integration into a concrete decision-making system.

Part two of the dissertation presents an analysis of the planning experience in Western Galil, Israel, during the years 1985-1986, under the aegis of the planning system of the Rural Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency for Israel. Even though the proposed framework was not in place at that time, the relevance of this specific case study seems quite clear. Over a long period of time, Western Galil has been the subject of various planning initiatives, some of which actually reached fruition but most of which flowered only on library shelves. Clearly, the difference between the former and the latter are of interest. What is more, among the several plans that were implemented during the past 40 years, the Segev and Region 2000 plans deserve special attention by virtue of their continuity over time and the evolution in the planning approach that occurred during the course of implementation. At the commencement of

this dissertation, decision-making processes related to Western Galil seemed closely linked to planning practice, such that planners gained an important status within the Rural Settlement Department and even beyond, extending to "Fellowship 2000", the ministry of Economics and Planning, and to the municipality of Karmiel. Unfortunately, at the present time, the outlook for this planning practice is more gloomy, but it still deserves attention. Indeed, it is precisely because of this change that this particular experience may contribute to planning performance by indicating how it may be improved. Indeed, the choice of this particular case study was strengthened by virtue of the changing environment which influenced the evolution of the methodological framework that will presently be proposed.

Accordingly, chapter 5 briefly describes Western Galil region, emphasising those characteristics most important for the understanding of the planning process, and chapter 6, then, presents the planning initiatives themselves. Following that, chapter 7 focus on the institutional conditions within which planners operated, and chapter 8 presents an analysis of the actual impact of the planning process - the changes in Western Galil that can be associated with the planning process, and the way planners operated.

To conclude, chapter 9 emphasises the important principles planners should integrate into their practice, the areas where planning practice, evaluation studies and planning education should be modified in the anticipation for improved performance on the part of planners. Finally,

we raise several areas where further research is required and desired.

It goes without saying that the availability of information, including documentation of the planning process while it was underway, contributed to the possibility of analysing the planning process not merely from the point of view of its actual impact, but also from point of view of the process of formulating the planning products. As a former employee of the Rural Settlement Department, I enjoyed free access to the Department's archives, working files of its Planning Unit of the North Region office, data bases, the private files of Prof. Katzir, and the documents of several government ministries. The official government data-base also was fairly accessible; given the fact that Western Galil falls within the administrative definition of "natural areas", and the fact that the statistical data-base of the Central Bureau of Statistics is fairly comprehensive, the usefulness of this data-base is obvious.

Before proceeding further, it may be useful to define several terms that will appear frequently in the course of this dissertation:

* "Planning" is basically composed of three elements: the planner, the partner, and the planning product. The interaction between these elements creates the planning process, which takes place within a given context of time and socio-economic environment.
* The planning process incorporates three dimensions: production, marketing, and implementation, all

occurring within a specific time-issue-space context. Planners, through their interactions with a concrete decision-making system, attempt to establish their "niche" in the decision-making processes related to a concrete regional (in our case) system. It is distinguished by reference to concrete "issues", be they a certain process, a certain feature of the socio-economic system, or a concrete set of components of the planning object identified by planners as deserving their concern or utilised to attract attention of others (political decision-makers in particular, but others as well). The process of creating "issues" as a means of encouraging or discouraging attention is by no means "planning"-specific. Planners may therefore refer to "issues" created outside their control, as most often is the case. Among the wide range of variables that form a certain issue, planners should limit themselves to those variables that are relevant to their tasks. The concrete combination of variables chosen for concern is often referred to as the planners' area of concern, expressed, for example, in terms of physical, spatial boundaries, or the level of an organisation's administrative hierarchy.

* A Planning function comprises the entire structure of the features performed by planners. These may consist of any of the dimensions of the planning process - activities such as analysis of a certain socio-economic condition, actions associated with the distribution of a planning product, or relationships with decision-

makers. Such functions may be officially established within a certain organisation, creating specific operational codes and accompanied by concrete authority, or they may reflect planning practice regardless of the planners' official status.

* A planning product is the output of planning functions and processes, and is a major instrument by which the dynamics described above is stimulated, directed, and controlled, while simultaneously it is affected by these dynamics. It should be amenable to constant change in its particulars without altering its essence. The planning product is an output of planners' skills and perceptions of the planning object (e.g., region), as well as the decision-making environment. Distribution of the planning product forms the cornerstone of planners' communication with decision-makers, and is basic to its implementation. Plans (i.e., a written document, a map) are the most conventional type of planning product. Yet the final product may not necessarily include all the elements and assumptions that may have been crucial to the planning perspective, such as a statement of intentions, delineation of relations between social groups or confluence of interests. In fact, actual articulation of the product prior to action is not always necessary. Other written documents (e.g., operating schemes), proposed legislation, and organised lobby groups may be different types of planning products. In this sense, the planning product is an attribute of the planning process rather than vice-

versa (planning attribute of plans).

* The planner's goal is to initiate change in the subject matter (e.g., the region) through the activation of the planning product, and the use of planning techniques and resources.
* The "partners" are those decision-makers who are expected to contribute to the materialisation of the planning product. The key to understanding the nature of the planner's influence (or the nature of planning process) is to understand the relationship between the planner and the potential partner of the planning product.
* Implementation is the actual use of the planning product in decision-making regarding the subject matter.

Chapter 2: THE REGIONAL SYSTEM

The "Region" Defined

A region is a complicated, dynamic system, involving a great variety of components that function simultaneously on diverse levels of socio-economic organisation, at different scales, intensities and time limitations.

Generally speaking, regions tend to be defined primarily in spatial terms, by criteria such as physical structure or administrative jurisdiction boundaries. These set the parameters of the region and define the limits of concern with different processes. The analysis of various regional systems, however, proves that such an approach may lead to a delineation of regions in a way that is totally inconsistent with various regional processes: boundaries are set that fail to correspond to those warranted for different activities related to a given region. Consequently, regional analyses and policies come to be based on a partial picture of processes at work within the region. Since this may be inappropriate, it seems that a "content definition" of the region, i.e., one based on the region's diverse characteristics and the aims of concerns with it, may be of greater relevance than one rooted in geography. This is not to argue that the definition should be stripped of all spatial reference, for space is an integral part of the regional system and one of the elements that structure the region (e.g., some activities become topics of concern only because they operate within a given physical area). The spatial element, however, should be perceived as only one

aspect of the content-oriented definition.

In the present context, the "region" is viewed as a spatial system in which a specific combination of socio-economic and organisational activities takes place. By implication, regions are not distinct in terms of the basic types of activities that also take place elsewhere. The concept of "combination" refers to a pattern of linkages between such activities that forms a basis for the performance of specific regional systems, or the specific region's composition. It follows that the regional system is characterised by diverse elements, such as physical attributes (e.g., location, size, morphology), social structure (e.g., demographic trends, ethnic composition), or political features (e.g., a role in the national political Party institutions).

The region is structured along the contours of three major types of social activities: economic, social and organisational (Saunders, 1979; Dunleavy, 1982). All of these are carried out within a given space and determine the specific nature of the region (the specific region's composition). The essence of these activities is the determination of access to resources, defined as the ability to make use of resources according to one's own criteria. This feature is specified below, as it applies to each of the above types of activities and the regional system as a whole.

Economic activities tend to concern themselves with the mobilisation of resources[1] and the generation of capital. There are several types of resources: financial-material (including capital and assets), human resources (skills,

knowledge), and socio-political assets. Economic activities can be further differentiated along lines of production, i.e., the creation of goods and services, and consumption, i.e., the appropriation thereof.

Social activities are those pertaining to the human relations that create the need for resources, and result in the formation of social groups. These groups may be composed of individuals, firms or other entities. They are partly differentiated by their need for and expectations of access to resources, and by the means available to them for the realisation of their access interest. These groups also can be influenced by ideologies, norms, and other not necessarily economic considerations (although the results of such influences can, in most cases, be measured by economic criteria).

Political administrative activities relate to the management of social relations by determining the economic activities that establish social groups' and organisations' access to resources. They include political and administrative activities as well as other institutional decision-making processes, all of which are basically concerned with resource allocation - the distribution of resources among social groups. These activities are also referred to here as institutional activities.

Taken as a whole, these activities form a dynamic system in which access to resources constantly changes due to interactions among the various social groups, each with its own interest in improved access. This system is discussed further in Chapter 3. Since these activities have

spatial implications, as stated above, it is important to emphasise that the spatial element is one of their integral aspects (their existence), though the activities may take on different forms within different spatial boundaries. In fact, it is suggested that these activities function within the social system in such a way that specific interactions between them are related to an "effective space", defined as the spatial area to which they are directly linked and within which access to resources may materialise. In this regard, it should be further emphasised that the region does not necessarily represent an "effective space" for all of the activities of which it is composed. For example, the "effective space" for decision-making in the transition of labour from service to production activities may be the entire country, whereas labour training schemes may be relevant only at the regional (i.e., sub-national) level. Furthermore, the consumption patterns of certain goods may be explained with reference to specific locations, whereas those of other goods may be meaningful only with reference to totally different areas associated with a different socio-economic structure.

To recapitulate, then, the major characteristics of the "region" and its boundaries, as determined by the above social activities, are the following:

* **The region is part of a larger system**, since it does not embrace all processes and activities. This larger system may be a country, the world, or any other scale of activities chosen for specific theoretical and practical purposes. In the present case, the region is perceived as

part of the national system.

* Because the linkages among regional components result in an integration of processes that occurs on various levels and in different contexts of the socio-economic system, **the regional system is an "open" entity,** in the sense that its content is definable only in relation to other systems and its structure is established through interaction with other systems.
* **The regional system is dynamic** in the sense of being structured by the interactions of socio-economic and political activities.
* **The regional system is complicated,** as it is composed of various types of activities that function simultaneously on different levels of intensity, on different scales, and in different locations.
* Since these patterns change with the passage of time and context of consideration, **regional boundaries are fairly flexible.** They lend themselves to modification in view of the types of linkages between activities that are chosen for specific purposes, and change in accordance with the paradigm of interaction among these activities.

Therefore, the "region" is defined as a sub-national functional system, its function being that of the typology of the combination of activities that structure it. It is distinguished by its position vis-a-vis other sub-national systems and the national system as a whole, in which its boundaries are subject to specific contexts of consideration.

The assumption is being made that the socio-spatial system is organised in a hierarchical fashion, i.e., that the "region" is intermediate to the nation on the one hand and the locality (with the latter defined as segments of the region) on the other . Since each level of the above system is distinguished by a different combination of activities, the "region" then becomes an area composed of segments of nationally occurring activities. This definition of the regional system, based on the substance of its activities, has the major practical advantage of addressing to the content of specific activities and issues on the levels relevant to them, rather than forcing the analysis to conform with artificial or irrelevant boundaries.

Admittedly, this definition may pose fundamental methodological difficulties in research, with respect to the selection of relevant criteria and scale of concern, especially in view of the need to deal with numerous "effective spaces" that may barely coincide or even overlap. One way to overcome this difficulty may be to a search for specific types of activities that belong to the specific regional system being studied, which can then serve as the major criteria for the definition of its boundaries. Such an attempt, however, may prove impracticable, since most types of social activities may be equally represented within the region and elsewhere. As an alternative, it has been suggested that the regional system be defined not merely in terms of specific activities and processes, but rather with reference to the composition of elements of these activities or the activity profile that lends the regional system its structure. A simplified illustration will clarify this

point. Different regions may reflect some of the following characteristics: a high rate of out-migration, a production system based on low-skill labour, locational disadvantages relative to major national business areas, poor physical infrastructure, and a high concentration of minority social groups. It is unlikely, however, that all regions will possess all of these characteristics. Furthermore, the more detailed the description (e.g., out-migration identified by age of migrants, ethnic origin, or migration motives) and the more precisely the qualitative values are adjusted to the above characteristics, the greater the possibility that regions will be distinct from each other. By implication, regional boundaries are meaningful only if construed within the context of concern with the region, and the definition of a region contains an intrinsically comparative element. In the case of a region with a specific demographic structure, for example, a description of its qualities will not lead us far, while a comparative analysis may indeed provide a suitable vehicle for understanding "what is going on". In other words, comparison is a prerequisite for dealing with the regional system.

The importance of this approach toward the topic of regional boundaries becomes apparent in its implications:

a. A region is defined only with direct reference to other regions; the performance of one region is directly linked to that of other systems. Thus, the condition of a region should always be stated in relative, rather than absolute, terms. In other words, any reference to a specific region implies direct or indirect reference

to other regions.

b. Since regions are dynamic systems, constantly subject to change, any reference to a specific "relative condition" is relevant only with regard to clearly defined time limits. Thus, the notion of "relative condition" further implies a strong linkage with the temporal dimension.

c. It follows, in view of the relativeness and the dynamics of the regional system, that the "relative condition" of a region is constantly subject to change. Furthermore, since the region is part of a larger system, any change in a given region is likely to affect the relative condition of other regional systems.

Finally, one should be aware of the practical implications of the notion of the "relative condition" of a region. The above assertions assume that the mechanism of regional performance is basically a matter of interactions, or "interactive activities", between the various forces or elements participating in regional processes. Thus we concluded that our major concern should be with those interactions, for they are the parameters by which we may determine the relativeness of the regional system. These interactions may occur on different levels of the social system hierarchy, on different scales, and within different time frames. They may also pertain to systems of similar or different typologies. For example, they may occur on the level of public political debate or on the level of actual movement of economic entities within space. They may

manifest themselves in the exchange of information, bargaining over land development projects, or other proceedings concerning issues such as regional public services. Whatever form they may take, the bottom line of all of these activities is concern over the allocation of resources, either to the region or within its boundaries. Assuming that regional systems function under conditions of constant scarcity of resources (as is usually the case), the interactive activities are likely to take the form of competition, in which regions vie with one another for the largest piece of the resource "pie" available; in our case, this takes place mostly in the national market. Thus, in practice, regional systems become competitors, with the relative condition of each one strongly depending on its degree of competitive success.

Numerous factors, discussed at further stages in this dissertation, affect the nature of competition. At the present stage, two conditions should be borne in mind: first, regions are potentially always competing each other. Second, any reference to a region's relative condition or advantage in the competition is in fact a reference to the competitive advantage of that system. Because competition is by definition a dynamic process, determined in the course of interactions between regional components, a competitive advantage cannot be a permanent situation for a regional system. Moreover, since the nature of that advantage is intrinsically affected by the decisions taken on the basis of these interactions, it necessarily becomes a position generated through the interactive processes. Therefore, it may be susceptible to planning initiatives aimed at

affecting its nature.

In sum, the essence of the proposed approach toward the definition of a regional system lies in the concepts of the "specifity of context" within which the regional content and boundaries are defined, and the "relativeness" of the regional system, the condition of which is determined in relation to other systems. It follows that our area of interest should be the linkages between the social activities that determine the region's relative condition.

Some scholars may object to such an approach toward the definition of the regional system, arguing that it is subject to variable criteria, needs, or interests, rather than absolute or "objective" yardsticks. It is argued, however, that as long as the criteria are clearly specified, there is no justification for rejecting the view that similar processes may be associated with different regions, or that a single location may be considered part of a different region or regions as warranted by the circumstances. This having been said, the practical problems that this definition imposes on any inquiry into regional systems cannot be underestimated. Specifically, one's awareness of the dynamics and "openness" of regions may cause great confusion when one attempts to isolate activities that actually lend a specific regional system its character. As a potential aggravation of this confusion, several activities of ostensible importance may form different "effective spaces", possibly resulting in a situation in which reference is made to boundaries too wide for effective analysis and practice. By the same token, attempts to avoid this problem may run the risk of dealing

only partially with important activities. This difficulty is not insurmountable, its solution lies in the realisation that the determination of boundaries of concern should not be viewed as a single act that, once executed, is irreversible. Indeed, where previously set boundaries prove to be inappropriate, their redefinition is crucial and can be carried out at any stage of the planning practice, even if this entails the modification of important aspects of research and implementation.

Finally, it should be borne in mind that "competitive advantage" is linked to the term "regional inequalities", which refers to the actual expression of a certain region's competitive advantage vis-a-vis other regions (in terms of such elements as income generated within it, socio-political composition, and many others). Thus, the idea of encouraging competitive advantage may imply encouraging regional inequalities. Although a thorough discussion of the question of whether regional inequalities should be eliminated (as many regional plans vie), or not, is beyond the scope of this study, it was in fact argued that "regional inequalities" are inherent in the nature of "regional phenomenon". Accordingly, a realistic attitude toward a region and the forces stimulating regional processes should not turn away from this fact. This dissertation rests on the premise that planners are capable, and should be provided with the freedom to determine their own attitudes toward normative aspects such as those related to regional inequalities.

Regional Analysis

The idea of regional relativeness, and its implications with regard to the importance of specifity of the context within which this relativeness is determined, present a major problem regarding the justification, the need, and the ability to set up the principles for determining, and the criteria for evaluating, the relative condition of regions. This is a conceptual and methodological problem, which may be phrased thus: to what extent may predetermined principles help establish relativeness without disregarding specific elements of the region that exist within particular contexts?

The imposition of predetermined principles on specific cases, while problematic, nevertheless cannot be categorically rejected. That would imply disregard of experience, underestimation of the analytical and conceptual tools provided by various theories, and more importantly, an inability to establish tools for the comparison of different regional systems or chronological stages within one region. Further, the rejection of any conceptual and methodological framework in coping with the issue of relativity strikes at the underlying rationale of this work, which, by necessity, requires the placement of some guideposts and seeks for some areas where generalisations may be defined. Therefore, beyond the specificity that may characterise any type of analysis, a general analytical framework for regions' the relative condition is evidently both required and desired.

Analysis of theoretical approaches and studies of the accumulated experience in regional processes provides an

important starting point for regional analysis in terms of general analytical tools and methodologies; it also offers different perspectives on the nature of regional processes. These studies, based in different disciplines of the social sciences, tend to focus on the functional and spatial disparities within and between regions, regardless of the way "regions" are defined. Geographers, for example, traditionally emphasise observable spatial inequalities and the way these may be measured. Economists examine the interactions of market forces and public intervention, or the viability of regions in terms of their relative attractiveness to productive investments, housing construction or business relocation. Studies linked to public administration and political sciences may highlight the spatial expression of political-economic power distribution and conflict within modern societies.

Taken together, several major contributions seem then to stand out. The first is the principle of selective concern with regional components. Since any regional system is distinguished by some components that are more important than the others, analysis does not require us to deal with all equally. Rather, it should allow concentration on those likely to elicit greater understanding of the processes. This principle is of great importance, as it permits the focus of attention on components of strategic importance.

However, another major question remains: how should specific components that seem to be of relative importance be determined? Different approaches highlight different components, be they social, spatial or institutional, as defined by the innate scope of the specific area of

interest, and thus focus on different types of activities as major determinants and explanatory factors of regional processes. At the two extremes, it is possible to identify approaches emphasising economic behaviour of firms and individuals as explanatory of regional spatial inequalities; other approaches concentrate on non-spatial processes of capital restructuring as determining, for example, the spatial distribution of particular production activities. Some studies are confined to the descriptive level of research, attempting to characterise regional systems and classify patterns of development. Still others attempt to predict future development potential by analysing prevailing social and economic processes. Thus clearly, there is a rather large variety of components that can be classified as important. But, important for what?

By implication, an additional contribution of previous studies should be evident: the purpose of analysis or area of concern with the regional system governs the selection of issues for examination. This "purpose" may be merely theoretical interest in regional processes or it may have practical aspects. The scholar's aim or interest, as well as the identity of the person or agency concerned with the region, may influence the choice of points to be considered. Accordingly, analysis may be conducted for the enrichment of theoretical debate, or for the recommendation of actions.

Indeed, in the context of regional planning our concern is primarily with the activities which fundamentally compose and define the regional system. This focus is supported by various studies stressing the importance of non-spatial and

not necessarily "surface-level" components of socio-economic and political processes in creating an understanding of regional systems (Stilwell, 1981; Massey, 1984). Specifically, the intent here is to identify the regional components that are most crucial in establishing the region's relative condition. Furthermore, our concern with the region is linked to practical rather than merely theoretical considerations (which may imbue feasibility aspects with an added importance). Thus stated, this intent requires clarification.

For the purpose of this discussion, "regional components" are defined as the specific elements (such as employment opportunities or demographic trends) of socio-economic and organisational activities that characterise the region. "Crucial" refers to the role of components in the interactive activities, where it is assumed that components can be structured into a set of actions that will amplify the regional advantage vis-a-vis other systems.

On the practical level, our concern is directly connected with the issue of "change", also referred to in the literature as "development". Change is an intrinsic part of any reference to the region. Indeed, various studies seek to understand its different aspects in terms of volume, timing, location, and means to initiate change and affect its nature. Within the broad theoretical discussion of "change", the literature emphasises the direct connection between the type of change and the socio-economic system within which it takes place. This leads to a focus on the likelihood of certain changes being "marshaled" by given socio-economic organisations (e.g., elected institutions

compared with urban protest movements), and to the determination of desirable and feasible changes in modern societies. Planning studies tend to add the actual-observable manifestations of political processes in order to link categories of changes with given spatial contexts ("housing", for example, is rarely discussed within "regional" studies, whereas migration trends are selectively discussed in association with "urban" processes). In other words, specific types of changes are generally presumed to be associated with different spatial contexts of the social organisation.

Planning studies also share a common interest in "development", a term used to represent change of a "positive" nature of change desired by scholars and practitioners. Unexpectedly, although disparate theoretical attitudes of how the social system operates and how regions are integrated into such a system, most regional studies and plans express some egalitarian ideology in their concern with development and the desirable changes in regions. This is expressed in the continuous search for ways to offset regional inequalities (or the spatial manifestation of socio-economic imbalances).

This dissertation postulates that it basically is possible to initiate change within the regional system and in addition, influence events in the direction of "desired" change, with "desired" change being defined as improvement in the region's relative condition. This premise contradicts various approaches (such as that of the neo-Marxist school), which insist that the desired long-term change entails

actions beyond planners' capabilities. These approaches deny the very possibility of planners contributing to the exercise of fundamental change in the regional system, because they assume them to be part of the "state apparatus" whose raison d'etre is to maintain the status quo.

It is further argued here that concentration on specific regional components can have a material effect on the nature of the larger change being envisioned. This assumes that the initiation of change in some areas of activity can create an effect much greater than that of the initial action. This, in turn, presumes the existence of an accumulative effect in regional processes (e.g., Myrdal's "trickling" effect, 1957), whereby any action may provoke processes that develop in either positive or negative directions ("positive" and "negative" being subjective evaluations). Thus, those (planners, in particular) who are deemed to have a limited area of influence may discover that their initiatives can be put into practice through directing their efforts to specific sets of activities. In other words, planners' ability to impact on events and stimulate changes cannot be dismissed.

In fact, regional analysis and planning is chiefly a matter of dealing with the issue of "change". Because "change" lies at the root of regional processes, the selection of critical components should satisfy a major criterion: namely, they should be those with the potential to have crucial effects on regional change.

Since our concern is with the stimulation of regional change, the criterion can be further specified as the vulnerability of components to change, that is, the

likelihood that a given regional component may bring forth and take the lead in changes within the entire regional system. In other words, it is proposed that the regional components relevant to our purpose are those most likely to be affected by planning practice, and which will at the same time "pull" other components in a similar direction, thus initiating the desired change as defined above (i.e., improving the relative condition of the regional system).

To sum up, it is argued here that regional analysis is concerned with the determination of patterns of interactions between social activities, and with the components determining the nature of these interactions. Although different theoretical perspectives regarding the nature of regional systems may be employed, nevertheless, the actual choice of perspective must be linked to practical considerations regarding its role within regional processes, rather than to mere analytical purposes.

Still to be resolved is the question of the determination and selection of regional components for planning use. The following section proposes a methodological framework for the selection of crucial components.

The Determinants of Regional Structure

In view of the nature of regional systems (e.g., complexity, constant change), it is both irrelevant and impractical to attempt to determine invariable, universally applicable crucial components of regional processes. This is due to the simple fact that different nations and their regions may operate differently. For example, the decline of subsistence family farming in Israel, as throughout the Western world, is part of certain social-economic processes that have resulted in the reorganisation of the national political-economic system. However, unlike in Britain, for example, the farming production processes in Israel serves three different roles in the national political economy, and, depending on the specific sub-national area, may be identified with different importance: the Kibbutz system which can be associated with a distinct segment of capitalist control of the means of production, the Workers' Moshav system that is simply part of the national consumption processes, and particular political minority groups that are excluded from major state organisations, and, in Castells' (1977) terms, from labour reproduction processes. These parts of the farming system have rather clear functional and spatial manifestations, and thus must be considered separately in the regional analysis of the Israeli system. Therefore, in our attempt to establish a general framework for regional analysis, to go so far as to suggest that the family farming process is necessarily a relevant or irrelevant element of the regional processes may be misleading.

As an alternative to the "fixed rule approach", it is proposed here that the major categories of activities within the regional system, those most important to regional processes and the determination of a region's relative condition, should be identified as a basic framework; within this framework, the components that are crucial within specific contexts will come to light. These categories should facilitate the determination of crucial components, which their further reduction to specific elements of the regional system provides a basis for an understanding of concrete cases and for action.

An analysis of regional processes in light of available theoretical approaches and studies of planning experience suggests that among the broad categories of activities mentioned above that structure the region (i.e., economic, social, and institutional), the ones most crucial for strategic purposes are production and institutional activities. "Production" refers to the structure of both the direct productive process itself, as characterised by the area of production, and the way the process operates (e.g., type and size of the firm, its headquarters-branch structure, status of ownership, labour composition, etc.), as well as the productive environment: support services (financial, offices, etc.), educational system, and technological infrastructure (e.g., telecommunications). "Institutional processes" pertain to the political and administrative decision-making by which resource allocation is managed. This emphasis on production is supported by Castells (1977) and the trend of thought developed on the structuralist argumentation (e.g., Stilwell, 1980; Massey,

1984)), which holds that the organisation of means of production and unequal development of productive forces form the essence of "the regional question". Political-administrative activities are important in that they demarcate the functional decision-making milieu of production activities by affecting the scale of the impact of production processes on the regional system.

From a more pragmatic point of view, production processes can be more easily influenced by individuals, and thus are more "comfortable" targets for planning operation. Political adminstrative activities determine the planning operational environment. Simply expressed, production processes have a potential direct affect on major characteristics of the regional system, such as social structure and social relations, demographic trends, or patterns of private investment; political-administrative processes, in turn, represent the decision-making arena within which the potential impact of production processes is determined.

The essential aspect of these categories of components is that they usually determine the vast majority of regional characteristics with which they are directly and indirectly associated. For example, the potential impact of both categories with respect to linkages to various characteristics of the regional system, as illustrated below, shows that both categories of activities may be linked to most regional processes. The role of the production system may manifest itself in its impact on the social structure, in terms of effects on population migration trends and socio-economic composition, as

determined by job opportunities. It may impact the region's economic structure by measures that affect income levels, and, therefore, demand for services. Both of these may affect and be affected by the physical and technological infrastructure, which also helps determine the nature of production processes. The role of the political-administrative system may manifest itself in its impact on investments and entrepreneurial conditions, by means of fiscal policies, its impact on demographic trends, social structure, and economic processes, by determining the availability of services such as housing and communications, as well as its impact on production activities, by determining the availability of services such as education.

The major implications of this emphasis on the above categories of activities, as determinants of the regional relative condition, are consistent with the principles expounded in this paper:

a. The "openness" of the regional system, a consequence of the fact that the stated activities operate on different organisational levels of the social system.
b. The intrinsic flexibility of regional boundaries demonstrated in the analysis, this being subject to various aspects of the above dynamic activities.

Both of these aspects require an analysis not confined to the "regional" level alone.

c. Elimination of issues of lesser concern: production and institutional activities are regarded as primary forces

behind regional processes.

d. Regional systems are distinct not in types of activity, but rather in specific attributes of activities such as scale, intensity, and specific roles within larger systems. In other words, the crucial focus of analysis is the composition of components within a specific context.

The practical implication of this determination of crucial activities is fairly clear: the scholar or planner may thereby place planning initiatives within predefined conceptual boundaries, avoiding an inefficient division of efforts. Furthermore, since these activities occur on different levels of social system organisation (i.e., different "effective spaces"), any reference to them requires a multidimensional analysis, in which linkages within the regional system and between it and other systems come to light.

Thus far, the first stage in determining the structure of a region, and hence its relative condition, consists of the identification of the nature of production and political-administrative activities insofar as they establish regional components crucial to the region's processes. The way to proceed, then, is by identifying the specific elements of the above activities that play crucial roles in stimulating the relative condition of a concrete region. Indeed, this premise is an essential aspect of the theoretical perspective taken here on regional processes, as suggested above in the argument favouring selective concern

with regional components.

This dissertation asserts that specific crucial regional components and elements may be distinguished only with reference to individual cases; however, it is still necessary to construct a methodology that will facilitate the implementation of this principle. In other words, a methodology is needed to guide the uncovering of the specific factors within the above categories of activities affecting the region's relative condition, and those particularly relevant to pursuit its competitive advantage. It is therefore suggested that the method best suited to this task is one based on the identification of key factors of development. "Key factors" are defined as those regional components that are most crucial within the regional functional system and, therefore, the most relevant for practical purposes. As argued above, they are likely to fall within production and political-administrative activities.

The proposed method involves a procedure reminiscent of systems analysis, reducing the regional system to components that are reintegrated on the basis of their role in (or type of impact on) regional processes. Thus defined, the issue of "key factors" becomes controversial, not merely because of the technical difficulty of the selection procedure, but rather because of the conceptual implications of the rationale behind the attempt to conduct an analysis of this type. This conceptual problem arises within the mainstream of theoretical planning debate, which clearly indicates a trend toward rejection of those approaches that seek to deal with planning issues in a rational, systematic manner, as with "systems analysis" or "rational comprehensive" theory.

These approaches and their modifications are rejected as impractical, misleading (based on the policies they produced), or irrelevant as planning tools. Furthermore, they are alleged to underestimate crucial socio-structural processes, to be unable to deal with intangible aspects of processes, and to reduce the planning process into a mere technical exercise, remote from reality. Indeed, there seems instead to be a general shift toward the casting of regional processes into prestructured conceptual frameworks, which present clear criteria for choosing issues of analytical relevance. This is a trend that emphasises the conceptual rather than practical aspects of analysis.

My practical experience and that of other fellow planners, however, shows that regional systems analysis and the setting of regional policies entails a combination of both approaches: an attempt to utilise the methodological means of rational/systematic analysis while integrating it into a coherent conceptual framework as an explanatory base. In so doing, one rejects conceptual pretensions of total objectivity in analysis and the fiction of a completely exhaustive consideration of all possible components.

The question remains as to how key factors are selected and how the specific selection is explained in analytical terms, since this undoubtedly affects the content of policy. The approach advocated in this dissertation treats the practical and theoretical dimensions of planning as equally important. It assumes that the theoretical underpinnings of a given planning initiative do not rule out the need for systematic analysis, and that the latter does not necessarily imply an attempt to achieve comprehensiveness

and absolute objectivity in either analysis or action. Indeed, as argued above, the conceptual perspective on regional processes taken here assumes that two categories of social activities (i.e, production and political-organisational) are the most important for regional processes. Thus, they are presumed to constitute the area in which crucial regional components or development factors should be identified.

With this in view, the proposed methodological framework is presented below.

Key Factors of Development (KFD)

As previously stated, the appropriate method for tackling this type of investigation is based on the identification of "key factors of development" (KFD), and is grounded in an understanding of strategic business principles (as these were presented to me by a director of "Intel-Israel Ltd.").[2] The KFD method is basically a process of restructuring regional components in accordance with their role within a specific "process-tree" or "cluster-analysis" (Baki, 1965). This, in turn, is structured on the basis of a thoroughgoing analysis of the regional system, in the course of which major characteristics are identified and their interrelations revealed. The advantage of this method is that it permits one to perceive the regional system as relative to other systems, and to concentrate on actions or processes that may alter regional strength.

The method proposed for the determination of KFD is composed of the following four stages:

a. Specification of **regional characteristics**, supported by comparative analysis for the adjustment of qualitative criteria (including general indices, such as high/low performance). At this stage, it is possible to list all types of characteristics or to present them within their functional group.

b. Discovery of possible **problematic aspects and interrelations among components**. This stage is based on analysis of both a concrete system and other relevant systems, and may be presented in a simple "issue diagram". It is a crucial stage for determining one's interest in a given region.

   The presentation of solution-oriented questions may be an efficient way of determining problematics and linkages between components. "Solution oriented" questions[3] are those so phrased as to point in the direction of a solution, as distinguished from questions that lead to a "dead end" (Intel-Israel, 1983). For example, a process of high out-migration rate may be approached in different ways: "What can be done to lower the rate?", "Can the region maintain these migrants?", "Can the region absorb in-migrants?" The latter two questions clearly permit further analysis; the former fails to indicate a direction for further work, and to permit the penetration of ideas that do not necessarily fall within conventional approaches to the stimulation of regional changes. This attitude is also useful for limiting the areas

potentially subject to change to those where relatively higher impact can be generated.

c. Identification of **aspects that are critical** with respect to their location in the previously identified linkages. Once again, this stage is based on the above-mentioned identified linkages. It also rests on a conceptual perspective as to the structure of the region and its major functional processes. In our example, such aspects may be the housing market or job supply.

d. Determination of **development-conductive components** within the critical aspects previously identified. These components, identified in the course of the analytical process, are the crux of the entire method, since they provide the grounds for the actual determination of development strategy. In other words, they are the elements on which the relative advantage of the regional system may be promoted. Such components may be telecommunication infrastructure, rental housing supply or education facilities.

It is suggested that the procedure be applied with special reference to the major regional activities, that is, production and political-administrative, though not necessarily.

In sum, the identification of key factors within the regional system is argued to be a prerequisite for the attempt to affect a region's relative condition. This method should not be perceived as merely a technical procedure, for only by means of imagination thinking is it possible to

scrutinize processes and accentuate their major components, which may not necessarily be visible at first glance. Neither should this method be viewed as an "objective" way of coping with problems, since it is by necessity affected by the analyst's value judgment.

Finally, this method seems most appropriate for strategic purposes, because it permits the analyst or planner to focus rather than diffuse his or her efforts.

CONCLUSIONS

The regional system and its major characteristics, as defined in this chapter, present a great challenge to those who intend to deal with them. This is because the "region" is so defined as to permit a wide variety of elements and criteria to determine its concrete content and parameters, depending upon the specific purpose of concern.

This definition entails a great disadvantage, connected with the "freedom" it grants to those interested in regional systems. It may also obviate the possibility of inter-regional comparison. In this regard, however, it is argued that as long as the criteria are clearly specified, there is no justification for the rejection of any type of regional definition merely because it is different from others. This is especially important in view of the particular advantage of this approach: its ability to deal with regional activities in the context best suited to the specific purposes.

Notes

(1) To mobilise resources implies, to affect their distribution and composition.

(2) This method was presented by Mr.D.Duchan, 1986.

(3) Ibid.

Chapter 3:
SEEKING LONG TERM CHANGE - THE DECISION MAKING ARENA

Introduction

As argued in the previous chapter, the relative condition of a region is established through a process of competition over available resources. Since the nature and consequences of the competition are determined by the resource allocation process, which provides a means for increasing the region's competitive advantage, it is essential to deal with the mechanism of allocation (i.e., management). This chapter therefore is concerned with the management of resource allocation processes, and with the decision-makers who are viewed as the potential managers of this process.

Stating such a broad interest immediately draws attention to a complex of issues related to political and economic decision-making processes that have been investigated from a wide range of theoretical and empirical perspectives. However, in view of this dissertation's task to set up a methodological framework for planning function exercised in a socio-economic context, we shall address ourselves to a very limited selection of aspects, and mainly to the way in which they should be conceived by planners. This might be viewed as committing an injustice against prevailing theories and studies, both in not discussing them

thoroughly and in mixing them together. It is in this context, however, that a contribution can be made in structuring the major trends of thought in a way most useful for planning practice.

What do planners need? They need to be able to understand the political-administrative decision-making arena, because, simply stated, planning function operates within this system. Friend (1976), for example, suggests that planners need to acquire two types of skills: the technical ability to analyse the complex issues of urban and regional processes, and the ability "to work within an intricate decision-making context of interacting agencies, professions and political forces" (p. 25). Furthermore, not only are the traditional analytical tools often insufficient (Friend, 1976), they also should deal with a greater complexity of interorganisational arrangements (Friend, 1980; Baer, 1977). Indeed, since planners are not in direct control of resources, and since they are equipped with a wide body of knowledge that sometimes confuses the profession's practical codes, there is a need to seek a framework within which their knowledge can be fit and utilised. In this chapter, therefore, we try to clarify a useful way in which the decision-making system should be perceived, and the expectations planners may have with regard to the responses of decision-makers to their initiatives.

The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part sets up the decision-making determinants that can assist planners with identifying in which dimensions of the

decision-making processes they may function. The second part attempts to reveal the usefulness of the decision-making determinants that were classified in the first part, and the types of responses on the part of decision-makers toward which planners may aim.

3.1 Resource Allocation Processes

As previously argued, the distribution of resources is the essence of a region's competitive condition, and this is governed by different social-economic forces. Generally, three broadly defined categories of resources can be identified: financial-material (capital, other tangibles); human (skills, knowledge, and other human capabilities); and socio-political (votes, organisational capabilities, personal contacts),[1] all of which are closely interrelated (Saunders, 1979). The strong links between various types of resources may be illustrated as follows: decision-making control can be obtained by the expenditure of capital (e.g., the ability to "buy" votes) (Werner, 1983), or by the use of skills in order to persuade decision-makers to act in a way that suits one's interests and needs (Doron, 1986). Conversely, one's ability to affect decision-makers, originating in professional skills and personal contacts, may be used to increase privately owned capital (Werner, 1983). The essential point is that the interrelations of different types of resources tends to lend these resources a cumulative effect (Saunders, 1979), by which access to one category facilitates access to others. For example, ownership of financial resources may provide opportunities for enriching skills (e.g., costly university degree) or

enhance access to a political party campaign. This is not to imply that access to financial resources necessarily paves the way to political power,[2] or the ability to control publicly owned resources, let alone leads to any actual attempt to (acquire and) exercise this potential. One kind of access merely leads to another, and this, in turn, provides footing for an attempt to gain access to other categories. "Access" to resources is, therefore, the potential ability to make use of resources according to one's own criteria. Further, it is associated with the notion of political power and power distribution, as suggested by Saunders (1979) and others: "those who control the scarce and crucial material resources in society are also often those who enjoy the closest and more effective contacts with government" (p. 23). Thus, "the possibilities for effective political action are unevenly distributed ..." (Saunders, op. cit., p. 23).

The concept of "resource allocation" (i.e., decision-making or actions taken toward the distribution of resources) generally is viewed as the essence of any context of political decision-making. "Resource allocation" therefore is a public-political activity that deserves theoretical and practical attention. It is distinct from individualised spending and investments in volume of resources concerned, magnitude of impact, and, most importantly, in distributional implications and their association with social-economic externalities. According to this line of thought, certain activities even of individuals (such as the case of Edmond Hammer's contribution to Project

Renewal in Israel) are considered political.[3] This distinction is associated with financial allocations that are channeled through the political system, and have widespread impact. Nonetheless, public "resource allocation" is an important element affecting distribution of private resources.

In the context of planning studies, the issue of resource allocation and its spatial implications is the subject of much concern, as this is a major element of public intervention as manifested in land uses. Clearly, patterns of resource allocation are an important expression of the framework within, and the way in which, planning function operates. Indeed, planning studies are interested in the way resources are mobilised in order to affect land use patterns, land values, and land development. Explanations of the planning function are now given mostly in terms of the planner's role vis-a-vis different interest groups and the scope of public intervention in specific socio-economic contexts.

In practice, the object of regional plans and of many public policies (the "region" and its specific components) tends to be analysed from two widely divergent perspectives: a structural view of the region as a spatial case of national/worldwide socio-economic processes, and an economic-behavioural view of the region as the functional system of individuals and firms; these latter are more often associated with their role as migrants or entrepreneurs, or with their relocation activities. The above components become integrated into discussions of political systems and political resource allocation processes when their links to

the political system (e.g., as interest groups) can be identified.

An analysis of different planning experiences indicates that planners, too, are interested in this process, but from a different perspective: although planners probably have assumptions regarding the socio-economic and political context into which plans and their expected results should fit, these remain implicit in the planning product (e.g., a plan, a written document). It would be quite unlikely to find plans that deal with the question of why resources are allocated one way or another. Instead, plans specify where resources should be allocated, sometimes when and at what magnitude or proportions, and, most importantly, plans concentrate on the results of the recommended patterns of public resource allocation; these mostly are expressed at the level of individuals, firms, and concrete spatial-functional components such as roads.

In other words, planning studies (including analysis of planning experience) on the one hand, and planning activities on the other hand, often operate from within different spheres of interest with regard to the issue of resource allocation: the former is interested in explaining the impact of public intervention within a wide social context, whereas the latter is interested in the actual response of individuals, firms and local-specific forces to the intervention, and avoids concern with their "context". I daresay that planners tend to disregard their (even unconsciously) assumed political context.

This disparity is understandable from the planners' point of view, given their concern with the manifest content of the planning product: unless specifically relevant (e.g., required), it is not within the planning product's scope to specify an assumed perspective regarding how the socio-economic system operates. Its task is rather to facilitate communication on the basis of concrete issues and recommendations (as further discussed). Thus, a discussion of the "how" the system operates may prove irrelevant and exhausting for those interested in the practical implications of the planning product. This state of affairs, however, should be modified so as to allow the knowledge gained through various theoretical discussions and assessments of previous planning experiences to be integrated into planning practice. This knowledge should provide planners with greater understanding of their functional environment, thus improving their ability to estimate plans' feasibility and the appropriateness of tools to promote the integration of plans into decision-making processes. This still does not to imply that the planning product should present the planners' perspective regarding the "why" question; the way this knowledge should be integrated into the planning process is elaborated at an advanced stage of the dissertation. What is in fact argued here is that regardless of planners' assumed socio-economic and political planning environment, their perspective should be integrated into the planning practice. Implicitly, a change in the way planners perceive the planning process may (though not necessarily) lead to a different planning product and process.

In view of the argument that answers to questions of when and how changes are to be established and resource allocation affected should be conceived of within the "context" of planning practice and with a clear perspective on the "why" questions, this chapter classifies decision-making determinants in a way that enables planners to apply any assumed planning context; the elements of public intervention and non-public decision-making that should be considered by planners are set in a framework that may be particularly useful for planning practice. The application of this classification is discussed in the following chapters.

The process of resource allocation is assumed to be determined by initial availability of resources, access thereto, and the motivation (need and desire) to take advantage of potential access. The former determinants refer to the extent and nature of resources that may be mobilised according to one's own criteria. The latter refers to the motivation to put the mobilisation potential into practice. Saunders (1979) introduces several basic arguments about the nature of the decision-making processes that take place in this context:

* The availability of resources does not necessarily imply what will be done with the resources, or that any attempt will be made to change states of availability.
* The availability of resources does, however, facilitate the ability to influence the distribution of resources. Thus, resources are one source of power with which to influence the distribution of other resources.

* The types and extent of available resources determine the potential ability to influence allocation.
* The motivation to influence the distribution of resources originates in access to resources, coupled with additional factors such as the prospective gain or loss of resources resulting from a particular decision, or the ability to estimate these gains or losses before decisions are made.

In practice, therefore, any attempt to affect resource allocation is concerned with the distribution of:

1. **Elements permitting access to resources**, as representing the basic state of control over resources and its associated political power in a specific historical context.
2. **Forces promoting the exercise of potential access**, representing the various elements formulating the case for involvement in decision-making.

The first category of decision-making determinants is important insofar as it reveals the given socio-economic relations that govern political and functional environment within which planners operate and attempt to promote the implementation of plans. The second category reflects the context-specific argument of most theoretical perspectives that allows local-specific exercise of power relations in accordance with or in opposition to the principle conceptual framework and its rules regarding the way decision-making operates. It is important for planning practice because it provides a basis for the integration of these forces into

the planning process. This category shows how the planning process may be integrated into the decision-making system that controls resource allocations.

Finally, in the context of the broad theoretical and empirical concern with "decision-making", the literature convincingly argues for the case of viewing "non-decision-makers" as integral elements in the decision-making processes (e.g., Bachrach and Baratz, 1963; Saunders, 1979). We will not refer to this measure of social relations as a separate issue. However, the argument that planners should focus on active and observable patterns of decision-making implies a reference to those voluntarily excluded from decision-making, rather than to those forced out of such processes. In practice, planners may choose to concentrate on the latter group, and offer their services to them. In such cases, they will also attempt to make non-decision-makers publicly stress their interests.

3.1.1 Elements Permitting Access to Resources

This category embraces the elementary characteristics of decision-makers that determine their basic state of control over resources, and the potential political power associated with it. Although these characteristics are essentially given to planners, awareness of them is crucial. According to available studies, to speak of elements permitting access to resources is, in fact, to address the question of who controls the decision-making processes by which resource are allocated.

An extensive concern with the question of "who governs

our life" is beyond the scope of this dissertation, as is an intent to seek for the theoretical approach that may be particularly relevant to any given planning practice.[4] Rather, our task to formulate a framework for planning practice suggests that we may limit our concern to one major question associated with the distribution of potential power: who are the "partners" of planners in the planning process? "Partners" are those decision-makers through which planners may wish to affect distribution of resources. In view of the status of planning functions, planners who wish to integrate the planning product into the decision-making process presumably will seek out those forces in the social system that have the potential to advance this task, implementation thereto. This argument is based on the premise that elements permitting access to resources are basically given to planners, and cannot be subject to change from direct planning initiatives.

The literature highlights three types of potential partners: the owners of material wealth, the elected system, and the extended non-elected state apparatus and individuals. Furthermore, the literature offers two measures for classifying potential decision-makers' power, relevant to planning, that arise from two types of access to resources: the potential power that originates from direct availability of resources, and the potential control that originates from decision-makers' roles in the socio-economic system that create access to resources. These categories are distinct in the sense that whereas the first group represents a power potential that is not necessarily directly activated, the second group represents those

actually exercising power. The following section emphasises the importance of these measures of potential power distribution for planners' search for "partners".

a. Direct availability of resources.

This measure concerns the links between the availability of economic resources that can be transformed into capital, and patterns of resource allocation. "Direct availability" in this case refers to ownership of these resources. Such a position is taken as the extreme case of decision-makers' freedom in having the "last word" in decisions regarding owned capital, and in strongly affecting other decisions. This position may be shared, for example, by individuals, industrial firms, large private businesses and corporations, or the banking system. We shall refer to them in the aggregate as the "business sector". This sector may also include a political party that owns assets and in many cases functions according to the interests of the business, and in contradiction to the party's principles (for example, such conflicts often occur between the Labour Federation, which owns the Workers' Bank, and the Labour Party in Israel).

The pluralist perspective (Pahl, 1961) holds that the different elements structuring the "business sector" may not amount to more than a flexible group that is organised in specific cases of mutual interest, and will not maintain a permanent dominant role. However, most studies prove the opposite, such that this category may be clearly identified over a course of time and in concrete socio-political

context. Over the last twenty years, Israel, for example, has experienced a constant growth of the "business sector", which consists of banks, several private entrepreneurs (industrialists and land developers), and a few international industrial firms (Hashimshoni, 1983). This sector is increasing its influence on state economic and land development policies, gradually replacing the "developer" role of the government associated with the first decades of the state. Recently, with the developers becoming more closely linked with the banking system and the state becoming "poorer", there are signs of private investments even in the peripheral regions, which until few years ago were completely dominated by the government system (e.g., construction or industrial development in the settlements are no longer strictly government affairs) (refer for example to Massey and Catalano, 1978, for an analysis of the British system).

Direct availability of resources generally is argued (by different theoretical approaches and for different reasons) to be advantageous for those enjoying this position (although not only for them). Saunders (1979), for example, argues that "material wealth constitutes one of a number of key potential political resources" (p. 23). Buying votes (Werner, 1983), is only one example of this potential influence.[5] Ownership of material resources may enable the owners to press their interests in the political system (e.g., the "property lobby" discussed by Colenutt, 1975, as quoted in Kirk, 1980, p. 61; or the attainment of development contracts discussed in Werner, 1983). Such interests may easily be advanced when structured within the

government system (Bilski, 1980), as in the Israeli case of the representatives of the agricultural sector that serve in the Water Committee of the Ministry of Agriculture, and determine water quotas and prices. In fact, the structuralist point of view that political decision-making is relatively advantageous to capitalist interests (at least long-term interests) is clearly supported by the Israeli government's "shares regulation" of the late 1970s, which proved most profitable for Israeli Banks, rather than for the "public" that was supposed to enjoy the (unrealistically) high share values and a stable national economy. From a different perspective, the ownership of material wealth may also be useful in coping with the complex bureaucracy and the constraints it imposes on those it attempts to serve (Kirk, 1980; Werner, 1983). Finally, private capital may in theory be used to finance protest groups, although little evidence supports this possibility (Dunleavy, 1980b, Hasson, 1983).

In practice, however, different theoretical accounts strongly suggest that the initial advantage in political decision-making that stems from availability of resources and the possibility of promoting interests should not be taken as a necessary stimulus for active participation in such processes, planning thereto (either because such interests are not endangered [pluralist-elite], or because they are secured, by the state system, for example [neo-Marxist]). In fact, most theoretical perspectives consent that the vast majority of "business sector's" members are more likely not to be actively involved in actual political decision-making. This, however, is not to be confused with

involuntary non-involvement (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963; Saunders, 1979).

Further, the links direct availability - active involvement may be partly associated with the notion of "political awareness" (i.e., awareness of the potential power that exists in such a position) (Kirk, 1980; Colosi, 1983). The case of the Israeli entrepreneur, Mr. Vertheim,[6] indicates a great awareness on the part of the private owner of his ability to mobilise the interest of the Labour Party so as to secure his wealth. Indeed, his offer to buy the collapsing government industrial firm of Beit-Shemesh was viewed by Labour as a major contribution to maintain its electoral base in this town. Importantly, this experience indicates that even full awareness of individuals of their potential power does not necessarily imply their involvement in the system: the individuals actively attempting to affect public decisions will limit their efforts to specific issues where particular interests can be satisfied. Such a task-specific involvement may nonetheless result in the creation of distributional effects (e.g., the establishment of the Kefar Havradim settlement in Western Galil,[7] and its impact on the nearby town of Ma'alot). In this regard, an economic rationale that views the business sector as more sensitive to the inherent risks of decision-making, and hence more likely to be deterred from mobilising resources around issues entailing a high degree of uncertainty, may prove useful to planners interested in ways to generate responses from individual entrepreneurs to public initiatives. This rather individualistic measure of participation in resource allocation processes should not be underestimated.

If we want to estimate the likelihood that elements from the business sector will anticipate planning perspectives and effectively promote implementation, we have to consider where planners function from. Bearing in mind that planners and planning functions are mostly associated with public sector activities, several scholars (e.g., Kirk, 1980; Colosi, 1983; Friend 1976) suggest that the business sector may refuse to cooperate with public sector planners, although there are situations in which some confrontation is inevitable due to the planner's official role (e.g., in a city's planning commission) (Schon, 1982). The Israeli case of the Region 2000 project in the 1980s, which incorporated private and public initiatives to develop Western Galil (discussed in the following part of this dissertation), shows the relevance of this argument. Some members of the public committee for this project[8] refused to work with the planners, who were employees of a public organisation. They did, however, offer to hire planners themselves, and to manage the planning of Region 2000 from within the private sector.[9] Indeed, most studies focus on the role of the planners as public employees. In particular, not much is offered on the possibility of regional plans being managed and initiated in the business sector, nor on planners' relations with "capitalists", as compared with the extensive discussions available on their interest in the poor, those politically obstructed from participation, and those financially unable to press their interests (e.g., discussions of planning advocacy, public participation), let alone the possibility of planners purposely serving capital interests through involvement in the public sector (as

opposed, for example, to their proposed role as state employees who supposedly unconsciously serve long-term capitalist interests). However, the possibility of cooperation between the business sector and planners, who may be either public or private employees, cannot be overruled merely because it is rarely discussed. In spite of the constraints the business sector imposes on the initiation and management of plans, it is not impossible for planners to wisely stimulate this sector to act, as will be discussed further on.

In all, the direct availability of resources as a measure of potential power in decision-making processes clarifies two aspects relevant to planning practice: first, it may be prudent to seek "partners" in the business sector, insofar as planners are concerned with mobilising privately owned capital. Second, the business sector, which confines to a strong element affecting political-economic decision-making and public resource allocation, is most unlikely to be actively involved in the political system in a systematic way, and if this is the case, involvement in the political-administrative system takes place within a very limited, specific task-oriented scope. Thus, planners who find such involvement relevant should carefully assess concrete cases in which private active involvement may be stimulated.

b. Indirect availability of resources.

This category refers to the availability of resources that is linked to the role or status of organisations and individuals in the political-administrative system; these determine the type and magnitude of resources affected by the decision-making organisations and individuals with the potential power to affect resource mobilisation. The effect on decision-making discussed here is basically a result of purposeful intention. In some cases this category may overlap the previous category, mainly when those enjoying direct availability of resources form part of the political decision-making system.

Perhaps the most obvious "candidate" for political power in liberal democracies is the elected system. This is suggested by early pluralist approaches that viewed this system as capable of making decisions and managing resource allocation in a way that satisfied the majority of interests and wants prevailing in the social system (Dahl, 1961; Nicholls, 1975). Most theoretical discussions, however, seem to have come to terms with the idea that political power extends beyond the electoral representatives. This is explained, for example, by the inability of electoral institutions to adjust themselves to meet the growing complexity and volume of political issues that are officially the responsibility of, and should be handled by, the different tiers of the elected system (Kleinberg, 1973). Indeed, most of the literature seems to share a view of an increasingly weakened electoral politics, as compared with an increasingly powerful, extended, non-elected political-administrative system and different non-government interest

groups (Dunleavy, 1980a). Even an attempt (Doron, 1986) to argue for the importance of the electoral system by suggesting that this system still bears official responsibility for the consequences of decisions does not contradict the common view that the exercise of political power is not a matter of "who signs the paper at the end of the day", but rather of who determines whether and when the papers will be signed.

The diffusion of the electoral system is viewed in several ways. An elite perspective might stress the strong impact of non-elected individuals, and, in opposition to pluralist democratic principles, will define the flexibility of elected decision-makers mainly in terms of the demands and interests of elite groups - this system will be far less responsive to non-elite members or to members of competing elite groups (Michels, 1959). These elite groups may be large private corporations (Pahl and Winkler, 1974), or socio-cultural groups that have maintained their initial historical advantage over other groups (e.g., advantage gained by virtue of being the first in the country - Israel [Mishal, 1971]). This perspective suggests that in order to affect, for example, resource allocations, it is not necessary to operate within the state apparatus. Rather, individuals and social groups are provided with the opportunity to make their interests sound through personal contacts and strong relations with political administrators. This possibility may be useful for the promotion of an idea or a plan (Friend, 1976). Another type of theoretical approach emphasises the strength of the bureaucracy in the political system. Be it part of a political interest group

(Dunleavy, 1980b), or an autonomous entity interested in its own survival (Appleby, 1949), the responsibility for forging policies into concrete practices, the diversity of issues managed by the public bureaucracy, and the magnitude of information stocked in this system, are held to be the main elements establishing the strength of this non-elected and supposedly "objective" system of civil servants (Landau, 1969). The bureaucracy may also have the advantage over elected politicians insofar as its position is basically secured (Kramer, 1977). Nevertheless, protest groups may also provide an alternative for affecting political system (Castells, 1977), although examples such as the British (Dunleavy, 1982b) and Israeli experiences (Hasson, 1983) suggest that this potential power is not easily materialised.

In all, the extended state apparatus that enjoys access to resources regardless of (though not unrelated to) its ownership status, may provide planners with useful grounds for integrating their initiatives into political-administrative decision-making processes, especially, but not necessarily, if they operate within this system. As noted, however, most theories associate public decision-making with an orientation toward some type of stability in socio-economic relations. Therefore, mostly planners who are in accord with this principal direction of decisions will find "partners" from the extended state system useful. Those planners working toward a result at odds with the prevailing governmental winds may find it difficult to identify potential partners. Thus, depending on their perspective on political power distribution, planners should carefully

assess the system within which they wish to operate or on which they wish to exercise influence, be it a certain elite group, a protest group, or individuals within a political party.

To sum up, the above measures represent one aspect of the environment within which resource allocation is exercised, a basic framework within which one can identify potential responsiveness to decisions, and the types of resources most likely to be mobilised. Importantly, both elements permitting access to resources refer merely to a potential access (as previously defined), whereas the realisation of this potential might not necessarily occur. In fact, as various scholars argue, cases of active attempts to materialise potential access are fairly rare.

These measures are not presented in a way that deals with how potential access is created and activated, but rather in a way that emphasises the distribution of potential access, and that it is unequal (Saunders, 1979). Accepting this, and the assertion that potential power is not necessarily actively materialised, where planners can find "partners" is largely a function of their subjective definition of the objectives of a particular planning process, and of their accordance with a certain perspective regarding the state system. Both the "business sector" and the extended state apparatus were argued to be important forces, determining socio-economic processes by virtue of different modes of influence, as well as the elected system which its role cannot be neglected. Importantly, the task-

oriented involvement (i.e., selective materialisation of access potential) of the business and the overwhelming complexity of the public sector suggest that planners are likely to operate within a system that is largely outside their direct control. Accordingly, their search for "partners" and their attempts to promote specific initiatives may be difficult. Nevertheless, the essence of the measures presented here may assist planners to identify the socio-economic structure and the decision-making determinants that are given to them, into which they may or may not fit. The following category of determinants are more flexible elements of decision-making, thus relatively responsive to the content of the planning initiative.

3.1.2 Forces Promoting the Realisation of Potential Access to Resources

The exercise of potential political power (as defined above) is either a positive or a negative response to an existing situation or to an expected change in the existing access to resources. A "positive" response refers to the initiation of action(s) to change condition; a "negative" response arises in reaction to an unsatisfactory situation or process. As noted, an active response to processes that can affect access to resources is not always likely to occur. In fact, political decision-makers and individuals arguably are indifferent to some, if not nearly all, processes that may affect their basic terms of access. Furthermore, even when they are not indifferent to specific processes, the nature of their response will vary according

to the type of expected change and the available means of responding.

In view of our main concern with efforts to establish planners' operational base, three categories of decision-making determinants are important because of their impact on specific patterns of response: the expected change introduced by a certain decision, the issue concerned, and the distribution of costs incurred by a certain decision. These measures are important for planning practice by virtue of their context-specific sensitivity, and their effect on the determination of concrete reactions of decision-makers to specific events. As such, these determinants may enable the planner to intervene to some degree in the concrete responses of decision-makers to socio-ecnomic processes, planning initiatives, etc., by means to be specified at a later stage. These measures deal with the "we don't respond if we don't have to" case, which is taken as a measure of motivation to take advantage of the theoretical (in the pragmatic pluralist approach) freedom to function in liberal democracies. We will not refer to the case of not responding because it is prevented (see Saunders, 1979, and Bachrach and Baratz, 1963 for a convincing discussion).[10] In fact, all planning initiatives embody a certain attitude toward these determinants. However, no evidence prevails of attempts to make use of them in the formulation of the planning product and a purposeful integration of their selective nature into planning functions. Therefore, along with the principles of this dissertation, we propose the following variable categories of decision-making determinants to be integrated into planning practice.

a. The effect of "changes" on decision-makers.

This aspect of decision-making focuses on the impact of the decision on certain terms of access; it is assumed to be a measure of the motivation that induces particular modes of involvement in socio-economic processes. The impact of a decision may be perceived as positive or negative, manifesting itself in the actual availability of capital, status on the job, place of residence, or position within the political system, all of which affect the potential access to resources and modify the need to take advantage of this potential. Nevertheless, it is generally argued that only a small selection of such possible changes provoke actual reactions to decisions. Most are left unnoticed or simply do not stimulate active attempts to affect the prospective change. Selective responses to change-induced decisions depend on the priorities of organisations and individuals (i.e., the relative importance assigned to each change, and the means available to affect decision-making). The expected response, although can only partially predicted, may be of great use to planners, assisting them in identifying possible responses to initiatives, and directing their actions toward those decision-makers who are expected to be relatively sensitive to specific planning ideas.[11]

The essence of planning initiatives is most often described by planners in terms of "change", expressed in objectives such as improving the region's economy, promoting industrial growth, and different individualised objectives (i.e., increasing individuals' income). Thus, in seeking ways to promote implementation, planners should identify

those political decision-makers who are likely to be in accord with the prospective change, and possibly other decision-makers who can be expected to respond to the planning initiative. Planners must further consider the nature and feasibility of the proposed change. Most theoretical accounts view these questions as interconnected. The Patero optimum principle and the Kaldor-Hicks criteria (Mishan, 1976)) suggest that although any change is theoretically possible, an attainable change is conditioned by the ability to yield benefits that are equal to or greater than the expected loss generated by the change (although the benefits may be counted only theoretically to compensate for the loss). At the other extreme, neo-Marxist arguments regarding relations between the state apparatus and capital interests suggest a unidirectional and necessary link between these elements on the one hand, and the social segment within "change" is initiated (e.g., state apparatus, workers' movements) on the other, and thus its desirability. They further distinguish between two types of changes, suggesting that when planning is part of state intervention, the change is likely to be such that will not fundamentally affect the prevailing social relations status quo. Accordingly, non-fundamental changes (i.e., those maintaining the status-quo), which are less desirable conceptually, are likely to be acceptable to the political system (Pickvance, 1976). Other approaches are less categorical about these necessary links, although not less inflexible about the type of change achievable in modern societies. Such approaches also suggest that this issue is linked to questions about the type of proposed change (and

its distributional implications), and the question of who is initiating and expected to execute the change. Accordingly, they argue that when the planning function is carried out within the public sector, it is likely to be involved with incremental changes; this implicitly is conceived to be the most feasible impact of planning. Olson (1965), for example, accords with the idea that changes introduced within the state system are likely to be incremental and non-drastic, suggesting that since public policy is a product of the status quo between competing social interest groups, it is likely to obstruct changes with a potential effect on the prevailing "political order". A political elite perspective (Bunce, 1976) further argues that conservative policy principles and moderate changes in the existing social status quo are essential for the prevention of overt social conflicts, and thus essential to the elite-desired maintenance of consensus regarding the social values that enables it to rule. In this line of thought, Mishal (1971) showed that the "melting pot" policy of the 1950s and 1960s, meant to facilitate the absorption of the masses of migrants that arrived in Israel in the late 1940s and early 1950s, was carefully designed to prevent a collision between these migrants, the existing population, and the ruling elite group. Accordingly, it is possible to perceive the planners (headed by Mr. Brutzkus), who enthusiastically supported the population dispersal policy and the establishment of New Towns, as a part of this "melting pot" principle that was given the potentially "dangerous" task of population absorption within an incremental, state-initiated framework for change. Although Etzioni (1967) pointed out

synoptic-innovative decisions associated with professional influence that were taken within the state apparatus and had widespread impact, such as the decision to develop the atomic bomb, Etzioni himself accepts that the general tendency is to create incremental changes (which implicitly are desired). Indeed, even an event such as the establishment of the state of Israel, which is, according to Doron (1986), a good example of a synoptic decision "originating from dissatisfaction from incremental changes" (p. 70),[12] is a unique example, one of very few similar cases in world history.

Beyond the conclusion that incremental change is what is mainly achievable, the question of what is the desired change is still unsolved. Many studies harbor explicit and implicit assumptions that drastic changes, although they might be highly impractical to achieve through existing channels, are theoretically desirable. Instead, "grassroots" movements and similar social structures may create the potential grounds for establishing the "desired", "fundamental" change. Indeed, this concept of desirability is appealing to some planners, who may see the emphasis on "grassroots" as justifying their initiatives. In this context, however, we shall refrain from discussion of this aspect; we assume that planners should determine their subjective perception regarding the "desired" change. Planners must nonetheless be aware of the argued links between what is desired, by whom, and what is possible.

In all, this decision-making determinant may prove flexible to planning process. Planners may expect or desire different types of changes, and the expressed change may be

differently conceived by different decision-makers. In fact, planners are faced with a wide range of opportunities with regard to the desired and the feasible change. The important element in determining these aspects of recommended change is to bear in mind and estimate the implications of changes for organisations and individuals (mainly, those identified as potential "partners"). Such knowledge provides planners with an important tool for provoking response to, and promoting the implementation of, their planning product. For example, planners may suggest private housing construction be encouraged as a means to improve the competitiveness of housing prices. Two different consequences of such a recommendation might be the discharge of a public housing construction agency's role, and an increased burden on the institution providing building permits (the latter will have to deal with many individuals rather than one construction agency). Both organisations are therefore inclined to oppose the planning proposal, though on different grounds - the loss of income and jobs in the public housing construction agency, and increased congestion in the planning authority. In view of these consequences, planners should estimate the extent to which such opposition might jeopardise the execution of the recommendation, and determine their moves accordingly.

b. The issues

Decision-making essentially is a matter of responding to specific issues set within specific contexts (e.g., time, location), and to the way in which they are presented, both

of which determine the content and impact of decisions. Significantly, this aspect of decision-making is never objective.

This aspect is considered by most scholars to be crucially important to an understanding of the decision-making mechanism. There seems to be a general agreement on the principle that theoretically similar issues may be treated differently by specific decision-makers in specific socio-economic situations, and that they may be sensitive to different issues.

Planning practice necessarily is associated with this aspect. Among the questions with which planning studies deal and planners should deal are: which issues are being and should be treated by planners; how should planners deal with issues that are seen as important by the political system, vis-a-vis publicly neglected issues; and how should "issues" be raised by planners (triggering their integration into the public agenda is only one possibility)? In principle, the "flexible" nature of "issues" creates for planners an important base for promoting their ideas, by permitting them to affect the aspects that become issues and the attitudes toward them. But this is easier said than done.

How do planners come to deal with concrete issues? Although there is not much direct debate on this question within planning studies, different discussions suggest that the issues subject to planning initiatives basically are imposed on planners, either by the overall conditions with which they are concerned, or by the organisation in which they function (Schon, 1982; Blowers, 1982). Planners, then,

are not free to determine the issues with which they are concerned. My observation is that planners tend to deal with "problems"; this justifies their recommendations that in most cases entail some aspects of change. "Problems" are generally identified in accordance with the political-administrative environment in which the planners operate, so that problems subject to planning concerns are closely linked to issues identified as "important" within this environment. In this regard, Anderson (1979) argues that political decision-makers also tend to deal with "problems"; they will make a decision if they are convinced of the existence of a policy problem.

The existence or non-existence of "issues" and "problems" is an important aspect of planning practice. Available theoretical discussions and empirical studies offer fundamentally different explanations of the mechanisms by which "issues" become public concerns, appear on, or are excluded from, the public political agenda, the extent to which its appearance on the agenda indicates its importance, and other aspects related to the way in which control is exercised in liberal democracies. These arguments provide different guidelines for planners' search for "partners" and means to promote implementation. In fact, it is widely suggested that it may not be necessary and desirable to deal with publicly debated issues. Although a pluralist perspective might suggest that a concern with publicly debated and recognised problems will ensure that the appropriate, democratic decision will be taken, different studies convincingly suggest that debated issues are not more important than non-debated issues (to say the least).

Bachrach and Baratz (1970), for example, argue that issues reaching the public agenda are mostly non-problematic in the sense of the ability of decision-makers to deal with them publicly. Thus, dealing with "key issues" - those that generate public controversy (Dahl, 1961), or those that originate in certain feelings of dissatisfaction or discrimination that were identified by public decision-makers as problems requiring solutions (Anderson, 1979) may divert planners' concern away from other (the "real", according to the structuralist approach) issues and problems that prevail in specific situations. Bachrach and Baratz (1970) also propose the existence of a mechanism that excludes issues from the political agenda and prevents their being politicised. Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) further suggest that since several issues may compete for the public agenda, not all of them will actually be discussed. Thus, even with an issue that gained some political interest, the difficulties in coping with it may result in its conversion to a different issue or its replacement by other issues. A good example of that is the case by which concern for the democratic rights of Arab-Israeli citizens is constantly being converted to the issue of land control by this minority group. Similarly, a wish to avoid the public agenda that rests on the above possible treatment of "issues" may also come from the "public" itself. As was expressed by a director of "Koor" in the Arab Sector[13]: "if we could only avoid public debate, the establishment of new industrial plants in the Galil may be done in a few months, and both Jewish and Arab leaders will accept such development" (Mr. Tahun, December 1985).

Still, the importance of an "issue" appearing on the public agenda or creating public debate should not be underestimated. The following example elucidates this point. A private entrepreneur may wish to invest in a certain land development project. The project's or the site's becoming a matter of public debate may change the initial investment conditions (e.g., postponed development permits, increased development costs and land prices), and thus affect the entrepreneur's propensity to invest in the project concerned. In this line of thought, planners who enjoy access to information, may mobilise it with the objective of affecting "issues"' status.

Another area of concern with the "issue" is the emphasis placed on the relative nature of issues and their relations with the subjective interests and backgrounds of those discussing them. Parkinson (1957, quoted in Doron, 1986, p.95), in his observation of the way in which decisions are reached in a public committee, concludes that the more trivial and the more familiar the issue, the more attention is paid to it. Further, even assuming that we can objectively define the importance of an issue, this does not imply that it will receive the time and attention its importance demands. Thus, public debate may be problematic for practical attempts to promote implementation within a reasonable time period. Accordingly, planners should assess the implications of a process or action becoming a "problem" or a publicly debated issue, remaining aware of the fact that the presence or absence of public debate suggest nothing of the issue's relevance and importance in specific

cases. They should also be aware of their opportunity for defining "problems" that are different from those accepted by the political system, and the possibility that one "issue" will gain public interest in different contexts of time and ways of articulation.

Like the political decision-makers, however, are planners even capable of turning an "issue" into a problem? The literature offers several ways to attain this goal. We shall note here only that the susceptible nature of the "issue" and its role in the decision-making process suggests that in the way planners treat an issue they may be able to affect its integration into decision-making processes (e.g., promote a public debate around it or attempt to prevent such debate); they may present "issues" in a way that will accord with prevailing debate (thus increasing the chances of the planning product being considered), or present an issue in such a way that will immediately generate opposition to it. Therefore, once the choice of the "issue" of the planners' concern is made, it is most important to consider the question of how planners may treat these issues. As noted, once planners determine their own attitude toward an issue, the likely attitude of different decision-makers to this issue, and its distributional implications, they may find themselves considering two aspects related to the ways in which issues are presented as vehicles to stimulate a desired reaction on the part of decision-makers: the extent to which an issue should be specifically and directly tackled, versus a more indirect approach; and its familiarity to the actors. We shall expand on this at a later stage.

c. Distribution of costs

Generally speaking, any decision taken has a potential effect on the distribution of costs incurred. These costs may be direct or indirect, social or economic costs, measurable or non-measurable. In fact, costs imposed by the decision-making process are an inherent consequence of the process, and a manifestation of its economic efficiency and social viability.

The important aspect, however, seems to be that of distribution. Who creates the costs, and who bears them? Does the decision take account of the potential cost, its scale, and similar ramifications? These and other questions undoubtedly reflect the possible attitudes of decision-makers toward socio-economic processes. Externalisation of costs[14] may decrease sensitivity to the impact of the decision, whereas the inability to externalise costs may increase awareness of its implications. For example, consider an attempt of the Housing Ministry to construct a new housing complex. The prospect of having to bear the costs of road construction, sewage infrastructure installation, and housing maintenance, or alternatively of being able to transfer the responsibility for such costs to other institutions and individuals, probably would drastically affect the attractiveness of such a project to the initiating organisation and others who are to be incorporated within it.[15] The higher the direct costs, the greater the potential for response; a decision's high internalised cost is positively correlated with the potential decision-making response. Therefore, the ability to estimate overall costs of a decision, and their

distribution, may elucidate the impact of a decision and provide a fairly strong basis for its evaluation. Indeed, the determination of the nature of costs, or more important, the estimation and increased awareness of their potential distribution, may provide planners with a major practical avenue toward integration into decision-making processes.

On the whole, the category of "forces promoting the realisation of potential access to resources" refers to the nature of the environment in which the impact of decision-making on a socio-economic system is determined, thereby affecting patterns of involvement in these processes (as manifested in response to specific decisions).

The determinants included in this category are rather flexible elements of decision-making, since their content depends largely on how they are built into socio-economic processes. Indeed, planners may affect decision-making by determining how issues are presented, by estimating the distribution of costs, and by assessing the expected effect of specific changes on decision-makers, thus predicting their potential patterns of involvement in socio-economic processes. Therefore, it is postulated that these determinants are crucial elements in the planning process, in the sense that awareness of them provides an important vehicle for integrating a planning initiative into a concrete decision-making process.

To sum up, this part of the dissertation distinguished between two categories of determinants that affect the decision-makers' involvement in socio-economic processes, and, thus, their possible response to planning initiatives. The category of "elements permitting access to resources" refers to the potential power of decision-makers within the socio-economic system, as this is directly affected by the processes that determine their conditions of access. This category reflects both the initial point of reference of decision-makers in their involvement in socio-economic processes (i.e., their basic interests and motives in attempting to improve or maintain a prevailing state of access in a specific time context), and their response to possible changes in their condition of access. "Forces promoting the realisation of potential access" refer to those determinants that affect decision-makers' patterns of involvement in specific situations. As the forces reflecting the derivatives behind concrete responses, they may also be viewed as the means by which potential access conditions (initially determined within the first category of determinants) are materialised. Accordingly, the former category reflects the decision-makers' principle direction of response to, for example, a planning process, which potentially can affect their initial terms of access. Similarly, the latter category consists of the more variable elements of decision-making, and embraces their aspects by which planners may wish to affect socio-economic processes, and thus are viewed as providing a promising ground for planning practice by permitting planners to affect the content of the decisions to be taken. Similarly, Finally,

planning initiatives affect the former determinants in an indirect manner only; in the latter category, by contrast, the planner's role is relatively clear. The two classes, however, are strongly interconnected, and thus should be considered simultaneously.

The discussion was concerned mainly with the possible types of responses to the determinants of decision-making, arguing that these determinants are of paramount importance in analysing the decision-making processes, and thus relevant for planning. The discussion attempted neither to treat thoroughly all possible responses that may characterise different cases, nor to concentrate on practical examples. The aim was rather to suggest, in general terms, the linkages between classes of determinants and the possible impact of each on decision-makers, while emphasising the distinction between these determinants as major tools that planners may use in practicing their initiatives. This task reflects the principal approach of this dissertation, which attempts to establish a methodological framework for the exercise of planning initiatives. Thus, the focus is on restructuring these determinants, which are discussed extensively in the literature, in a way that seems most relevant to planning purposes.

In practice, in view of planners' need to make use of these determinants (i.e., analysis of decision-making processes and determination of ways to integrate the planning product into these processes), they may be invoked in an explanation of the resource allocation mechanism in two basic dimensions, both of which are applicable in the

formal and informal, explicit and implicit aspects of the decision-making:

a. **The structure of the system as the unit of reference** - assuming "fixed" or predetermined interests of actors within the social system (e.g., dominant capitalist interests, or the interests of ruling elite groups). Here, an attempt may be made to assess potential responses within the decision-making process, in accordance with the above determinants, in view of the dominant interests that decisions are likely to serve.
b. **The individualised level of explanation** - concentrating on behavioural elements of decision-making, leading to an analysis of the determinants as a function of the decision-makers' traits in specific cases.

Various theoretical approaches tend to provide explanations within a single dimension. Most of them (even those that are very convincing in the coherent framework they provide for the analysis of historical processes and events) are difficult to apply as they are presented to actual practice, since they do not provide unequivocal answers to such problems as how to rank determinants by importance within specific contexts, or how to distinguish between their relative degree of importance to different decision-makers. For example, the neo-Marxist school does not enable a distinction to be made at the present time between public decisions that are straightforwardly in accordance with capital interests, and those that are a concession to the immediate requirements of the "public". This is possible in a historical perspective. Since the

latter type may pave the way for the promotion of important changes, the inability to identify it "on the spot" may prevent planners' from advancing their initiatives.

Each dimension, however, offers different tools for planning practice; these, when put together, may facilitate planners in synthesising relevant determinants and ranking their relative importance in specific cases. This is important, since the planning practice involves elements of the overall system's structure as much as elements whose such links are not immediately apparent. Therefore, this dissertation seeks to explain the decision-making processes in both dimensions, postulating that different contexts and issues necessitate different levels of explanation and action. Throughout, our major concern is with the means of affecting the resource allocation mechanism.

The distinction between categories of determinants is based on the assumption that those creating potential access to resources form the point of departure and a term of reference for an attempt to evaluate the actual or potential impact of a decision and the changes it triggers; whereas those promoting the establishment of the access potential represent the nature of the impact of a decision on elements that may trigger a particular pattern of response to a decision. It may then be argued that any attempt to affect the nature of decision-making should concentrate on the latter class of determinants. In practice, however, these determinants must be integrated into an explanatory framework, within which planners may analyse and apply them.

3.2 Integrating Determinants Into Planning

Having defined two categories of decision-making determinants, differentiated in terms of their response to resource allocation, we now consider the usefulness of these categories for planning purposes. We may then raise the aspect of the decision-makers' response to the planning process as facilitating the latter's integration into decision-making, and the dilemma of the decision-makers' contribution to the planning process that originates from the attempt of planners to identify "partners".

An analysis of these categories suggests, first, that some of the decision-making determinants are of a special practical importance, since they are potentially vulnerable to planning initiatives. "Vulnerable" is defined as being susceptible to integration into the planning process, and flexible with regard to change, under prevailing conditions. Second, these determinants provide some indication of the decision-makers' involvement in the planning process or their interactions with planning initiatives. In this context, it is suggested that involvement is a function of a specific conceptual and practical context, and can thus be predicted, and, possibly, induced. Accordingly, this section consists of two parts:

1. The functional foundation of planning action as provided by the decision-making determinants that are vulnerable to planning practice, compared with determinants that are relatively predetermined for planners' operational purposes (that leave the planner

with limited areas of function).

2. The decision-makers' attitude toward the planning process, construed in terms of their commitment to the planning product. This attitude is perceived as an indication of their ability and will to operate with reference to the planning process; "commitment" is a descriptive element referring to the observable response to the planning process.

The discussion assumes that reactions toward the planning product may be affected, decision-making patterns can be generated, and that attitudes toward planning initiatives may be mobilised, in a desired direction. Their practical application should therefore permit planners to "struggle their way through" the task of influencing decisions concerning, in our case, regional systems.

3.2.1 The Functional Foundation of Planning Practice

A planning initiative presumably aims to affect decision-making as prescribed by the planning perspective, and the nature of this impact presumably depends on both the content of the planning initiative and the characteristics of the particular regional system to which the planning initiative refers. In other words, the potential for impact (again presumably) originates largely in the manner in which the planning initiative is structured into existing processes. In view of the above proposal that some decision-making determinants are relatively more vulnerable to the planning process, two questions arise: First, why might these aspects be vulnerable to the planning process? Second,

how can one take advantage of this quality?

Several aspects were identified in this category of potential vulnerability: the issue at hand, the distribution of costs, and the effect of change on the decision-maker or on the socio-economic system.

The issue is important because the response to it depends largely on how it is expressed, the decision-makers to whom it is presented, and the timing of its presentation, rather than on its "objective" content alone. Undoubtedly, the importance of the content of "issues" should not be underestimated. Yet, the pattern of response to issues largely extends beyond, or is unrelated to, their basic content. "Issues" develop within specific contexts; thus, attitudes toward them are susceptible to control (or external effects). An elementary illustration of this is the alternative of viewing a glass as half-full or half-empty. In other words, issues may be presented either in a way that provides the decision-maker with "self-fulfillment" (e.g., addressed in some way to his interests, opinions, or needs), or in a way that will give him the immediate sense of being "attacked", thereby provoking his immediate opposition. The process of residential rent increase in New York city provides an example of this. This process is often (1990s) associated in the newspapers either with the exodus of the middle-upper income population, or with the "homeless" phenomenon; each provokes different "issues" (e.g., the issue of middle class emigration, as opposed to the issue of increased street violence), hence potentially different reactions, although both may be a consequence of the same process. Furthermore, having noted that acceptance or

rejection of a planning initiative and its planning product (two extreme responses) depend partly on how the issue is presented, it is important to bear in mind that the gap between complete acceptance and categorical rejection, and between different patterns of response (e.g., active or passive) is fairly wide. It is this gap that is of crucial importance in the planning process. Remoteness from an issue or an inconclusive opinion about a certain proposal also may be, in certain cases, important in restricting the range of decision-makers involved in the process. In practice, a planner is faced with a wide variety of choices as to how, when, and to whom to present a topic; the planner's strength lies in his ability to determine the most relevant context and method of presentation. Specifically, the planner needs to take note of the availability of various ways of presenting a subject, such as reducing it into several components, presenting each one in different contexts, or selecting the specific decision-making forum into which concrete issues are to be presented. This important aspect of planning may prove crucial in attaining the desired impact; at the same time, however, it presents obstacles because of the inherent difficulty of controlling the development of the "issue" within the decision-making process. For example, planners are unlikely to affect the way in which an issue becomes a matter of public debate, although theoretically they have the opportunity to "recruit" the media for such a task.

A second determinant of decision-making that can provide planners with an important means of influencing the process was noted above in the context of distribution of

costs. The nature of the costs created by a planning initiative or through the planning process, and their distribution (insofar as this is directly measurable), depend on the nature of the planning process. As previously argued, planners' concern with the distribution of costs is the crux of the planning processes, and determining this distribution is a major objective of any planning initiative. Careful analysis of concrete proposals in light of prevailing conditions in the relevant system(s) provides planners with an essential practical method of affecting decision-making. This is achieved through their ability to predict the feasibility of a proposed change, determine the most relevant way to distribute its costs, and provide concrete measures for estimating the planning recommendations (such measures are important for establishing a basis for communicating with decision-makers). The requisite planning initiative, therefore, is one that takes account of possible sources or areas of costs, as well as the sensitivity of different socio-economic organisations to different types of costs.[16] A simple example clarifies this point. Assuming that a given planning task is to enrich the industrial structure of region A. One may attempt to achieve the goal by encouraging a specific firm to move from location B to location A, causing an immediate loss of jobs and income in location B. An alternative plan providing incentives for the establishment of new plants in location A may prevent such immediate impact in location B, though possibly affecting its future conditions, by creating a competitive job market. Either plan may help enrich region A's industrial base, but

the second alternative may achieve it with a smaller immediate negative impact on region B. Furthermore, the two alternatives are likely to create different reaction patterns. The first plan may arouse opposition in location B,[17] which stands to suffer when the firm relocates; the second plan may avoid this type of opposition. In this example, planners would need to consider these types of responses in view of, for instance, the practical difficulties in starting a new plant as compared to the utilisation of the prevailing base for the plant in region A. This is related to the previous argument, i.e., the response to distributional issues is largely a function of how the issues are created; in the example, long-run consequences that are relatively difficult to measure and thus less concrete are less likely to provoke vigorous reactions that may disrupt the objective of enriching the industrial base of region A. In sum, costs and their distribution are also functions of the structure of the planning initiative.

A third aspect of planning practice relevant to our case is the effect a change has on the decision-makers. This effect represents the impact of a given planning initiative, which results largely from the way in which the initiative is structured into existing systems and processes. Most planning initiatives imply changes in the social system, its institutions and individuals. In fact, the essence of planning practice is the ability to determine the nature and scale of changes that a given plan can be expected to make within the socio-economic system. Because "changes" may affect social groups, organisations, or individuals in

different ways (and be perceived differently), the expected responses to change are likely to vary with the cost of change. Planners therefore should seek to determine the nature and direction of change, managing it in such a way that it will be absorbed into the social system. As before, the planner's strength lies in his ability to control the way in which a proposed change is structured and presented, in order to predict and affect the system's possible response to it. Bearing in mind the previous example of the choice between supporting the relocation of an industrial plant or establishing a new one, and in view of the distinction between individualised and non-individualised change, planners should seek support from those who are fairly distant from the particular case in question, or from those who are unlikely to bear the direct consequences of the proposed change. In other words, the criterion for choosing the appropriate alternative is attached to the nature of the socio-economic organisation involved.

In general, assuming that planners can and should influence decision-making, the vulnerability of the decision-making determinants provides the fundamental basis for determining the areas in which impact is possible. These determinants are important for the establishment of a "niche" for planning practice within the decision-making process, and for possible interactions with decision-makers. As noted, certain decision-making determinants (e.g., access to resources, and organisational location) are less vulnerable than others to the planning process. However, because some measure of access potential and organisational

location is presumed to exist at the start of the planning process, these decision-making characteristics unquestionably are affected by planning initiatives. Planners should therefore attempt to analyse these aspects within the entire regional analysis that they integrate into the planning process. For example, the interest of certain decision-makers in increasing the material resources available for one business sector should be taken into account, but the way to integrate this interest into practice is by anticipating the possible implications of the planning initiative for this interest, and then presenting the planning product in such a way that proves that the interest could or could not be satisfied in the specific case.

Essentially, the concept of the vulnerability of decision-making determinants implies that planning is mainly a function of how planners choose to advance their initiatives, rather than merely a function of the "objectively right" content of their initiatives. Thus, awareness of the vulnerability of determinants provides planners with fertile ground for determining how they will exercise their perception. Given this argument, we still need to cope with the questions of how to identify cases in which vulnerability may be applied for generating support of the planning perspective, and how to identify those decision-makers whose support planners most need.

3.2.2 Commitment Within the Planning Process

The literature on decision-making proposes the concepts of "interests" and "wants" as major explanatory elements. Whereas the latter refers to one's own perspective regarding his or her situation or needs, the former refers (Saunders, 1979) to "the achievement of benefits and the avoidance of costs in any particular situation" (p. 45), regardless of one's own perception of reality. Thus, one's interests lend themselves to objective assessment, while individual wants are subjective functions that may or may not clash with objective interests. Various theoretical approaches discuss both concepts in depth, dealing with their interaction, and especially with attempts to identify the types of interests that dominate decision-making, their distribution, and their integration into socio-economic processes, thus measuring the extent to which different patterns of involvement in socio-economic and political processes coincide with major interests.

The assessment of decision-makers' involvement in a planning process can be linked to the discussion of interests and wants. The actual involvement of decision-makers in a planning process provides an indication of both their interests and wants; but how this knowledge should be applied in the planning process poses a major difficulty - should planners concentrate on the "interests" or "wants" of decision-makers when attempting to predict their response to a certain initiative and seeking for ways to promote implementation? This difficulty is linked to the basic nature of these concepts: interests are not necessarily articulated or expressed in some identifiable manner. Even

when interests are articulated, they may not reflect objectively identified interests. The fact that the decision-maker is not always aware of his interests implies that the decision will sometimes be in opposition to them, and the extent to which a decision was in accordance with objective interests can be assessed after it was taken. It further implies that planners often interact with decision-makers on the basis of their wants or subjectively defined interests. For example, assume a politician who believes his interest is to prevent the penetration of Arab-Israelis into Jewish urban areas on the grounds of securing the well-being of Jews (minimising the possibilities for mutual hostility). This, however, may be different from his objective interest in maintaining the prevailing reproduction of the Arab labour force (by enabling them to improve their living conditions), which is essential to the Israeli state's economy and the capital accumulated through the use of this labour. Assuming a planner who wishes to promote the development of a region and believes that encouraging Jewish-Arab spatial and functional assimilation is important for this task. Should he attempt to convince the above decision-maker that improved Arab living conditions will prevent future conflicts such as the 1976 Earth Day in the Galil? Should he downplay the assimilation potential, or should he emphasise areas in which hostility can be minimised (for example, in the area concerned, or in other areas, in the local industries)? This example shows that planners operate within both dimensions of decision-making determinants. It also shows that planners, while keeping in mind objective interests, can in most cases communicate with

decision-makers on the basis of the decision-makers' subjectively defined interests, or wants. There is therefore a need for a measure that facilitates dealing with situations in which decisions clash with interests, in which interests are vague, in which a given interest may be satisfied in different ways, or in which people make decisions not because they want or need to, but because that is their "job" or those are the "rules of the game" to which they belong.

This leads to the concept of "commitment", that is, the social obligation to function in a certain way, as determined by the decision-maker's role in the socio-economic system. Voting in parliament according to the political party's discipline is a standard example. Importantly, commitment may reflect the way in which conflicts of interest, originating from decision-makers' roles and their different functions in the social system, are resolved practically. Commitment to political party discipline, for example, may lead Decision-makers to vote against their own beliefs, and, possibly, their own interests. The concept of "commitment" thus complements "interests" and "wants" by explaining situations in which decisions clash with interests or wants. It also allows elements such as personal contacts and political pressures to affect commitment.

Unlike wants, which are wholly subjective, and interests, of which one may not be aware even though they basically are given within specific contexts, commitment consists of both subjective and objective elements. It represents the choice actually made by the decision-maker as

to the functional and behavioural codes inherent in his role within the socio-economic system - a choice possibly made regardless of his objective interests (and possibly subjective wants). In this context, "functional and behavioural codes" consist of a given and identifiable system of rules specifying how socio-economic organisations should function. In fact, commitment differs from interests in that whereas in most cases one should be concerned with generating awareness of interests (assuming "objective interests" indeed exist), awareness is the very essence of commitment; generating it may be construed as generating commitment. In other words, commitment differs from interests in that it can be perceived independently of interests, and thus may be used to foresee decisions in specific contexts.

Like the other concepts, commitment is susceptible to change; since the functional bases of organisations change, the set of rules that determine the content of commitment also changes. Finally, as with the other concepts, patterns of commitment are context-specific, even though theoretical generalisation is possible. Changing social relations and concrete events that generate conflicts between the different functions of decision-makers (even if they are temporary) are among the important aspects enhancing commitments. In fact, commitment is largely a set of rules imposed on individuals by the specific social organisations in which they function; the realisation of commitment is the result of subjective decision-making only insofar as this does not neglect the essence of the organisation's functional basis. Therefore, the acceptance of commitment is

an integral element of decision-making, resulting from interactions within the organisation, but still permitting socialisation (i.e., accommodation to rules) and legitimisation processes (such as lobbying, personal contacts, or political pressures) to affect one's attitude toward the commitment.

Defined in this way as a manifestation of decision-making within a given socio-economic system, commitment can be perceived as a constraint on decision-making flexibility. Indeed, commitment does impose restrictions on decision-making flexibility to the extent that it precludes the likelihood of being completely free to step away from any framework at any time for no predictable reason, but it should not be equated with the extreme case of unconditional connection with an issue, situation, or belief. In fact, as argued, making a commitment does not rule out the possibility of modifying the content or action resulting from this commitment. Thus, a commitment should be viewed as one of several socio-economic parameters that define the decision-making environment. It represents a responsibility toward a given framework, within which one may and can introduce flexibilities or initiate changes. The importance of commitment therefore stems from the fact that subjectivity is bounded within a given framework of rules. It may be useful for practical purposes, because the framework of rules constraining subjectivity can be identified in practice.

However, the concept of commitment also is seriously problematic: as a descriptive measure of decision-making, it does not form a firm explanatory element of socio-economic

processes. Can we provide rules as to types of commitment and their relative importance? Is an assessment at all possible, as in the case of objective interests, or is commitment basically a matter of subjective determination, as in the case of wants? Analysis of decision-making processes in view of available theoretical approaches indicates that one may identify major types of commitments that characterise different organisations within a specific context of time, area of interest, and location. For example, a member of parliament elected as a representative of the agricultural sector may be committed both to this sector's interests in increasing farm profits and to his party's policy. Yet, neither their relative importance, nor the extent to which any type of commitment dominates the others, can be determined. Insofar as the two coincide, the M.P. is unlikely to encounter any difficulty. When party policy clearly clashes with agricultural interests, however, there is no way to predict accurately which of the commitments the M.P. will respect. This is a major drawback in the concept of commitment, since the identification of general principles regarding the potential impact of different types of commitments on decision-makers is rendered problematic. As one parameter of decision-making, commitment may nonetheless be linked to available theoretical approaches and their analytical tools, permitting us to conceptualise a basic framework of rules, and, thus, plausible patterns of commitment. The assessment of commitment must therefore be linked to available theoretical approaches and explanatory elements. Strong links to theoretical approaches are also advantageous in

that they provide planners with a framework for initiating commitment: as commitment is part of decision-making, and is affected by the determinants specified above, the planner may thus be able to induce specific commitments by the application of the knowledge gained through theoretical perspectives.

Importantly, the fact that commitment is, to some extent, a function of subjective determination lends it an advantage that should be treated seriously, as it implies that decision-makers are receptive to influences generated in socio-economic processes. This invests planners with the potential to affect decision-making priorities by intervening in socio-economic processes. In other words, the attributes of commitment are themselves important aspects of decision-making that can be influenced by the planning practice.

Beyond its contribution to a planner's ability to make predictions (i.e., because the framework of rules constraining subjectivity can be identified in practice), once a commitment is made, its consequential conditions may be crucially important for planning purposes. A commitment may be abstract (e.g., to improve the quality of life) or concrete (e.g., to increase per capita income by 2%). Furthermore, it may take the form of a declaration (the level of commitment with the lowest liability) or of action, as manifested, for example, by resource allocation, perpetration of physical change, or a legislative initiative. Different manifestations apply to different situations. In our context, commitment to a planning issue,

planning product, or the planning process in general is in fact a commitment to an attempt to decrease the level of uncertainty attached to the future environment in which the planning process operates. Since uncertainty is inherent in any planning initiative, the decision-maker's commitment to the conceptual and practical planning framework can potentially further the process in two complementary respects. First, it permits a certain level of certainty with regard to the decision-maker's pattern of response to the planning initiative. For example, a firm's commitment to relocate its production department gives an indication of its attitude toward various regional processes and prevailing public policies. Second, in view of the cumulative effect of regional components characterising regional processes (see Chapter 2), a commitment represents a major means of affecting regional processes. In the above example, the existence of (and ability to generate) such commitment provides the basis for advocacy of other decisions on the residential environment for labour, changes in the educational system, or investments in complementary industrial plants.

The potential impact of "commitment" on the content of decision-making in general and planning processes in particular can be measured by several criteria:

a. **Timing** - the stage of the planning process at which the commitment is made. This criterion is linked to the question of "who is first to commit?"
b. **Manifestation** - action as compared to mere declaration.
c. **Explicitness** - the extent to which the commitment is explicit (and clearly specified). A vague or abstract

commitment fails to provide a clear indication of its content, and hence of its impact.

d. **Scale** - the commitment's distributional implications.

e. **Awareness** - the dissemination of information on the existence of the commitment.

f. **Competency** - adequacy of a commitment as it results from the principle power of the person or the organisation committing themselves to a certain issue (e.g., the level of organisational hierarchy at which commitment is expressed).

Each of these helps determine the level of uncertainty in the decision-making milieu (to which the commitment refers). They are important (for planning purposes) because of the existence of the previously mentioned "cumulative effect" created by the linkages between the numerous elements and components of the regional and decision-making process.

Specifically, the timing of the commitment may determine the initiation of other decisions and actions that may follow, in view of an enhanced ability to predict consequences and measure possible gains. Thus, the timing of a commitment clearly affects cost distribution and risks assumed by those making a commitment. For planning purposes, the ability to encourage one type of commitment may facilitate the triggering of other decisions. In an economic enterprise, for instance, timing may be measured in terms of profitability. A commitment to relocate a plant to an underdeveloped region at a fairly early stage of the planning process will generate costs that arise from the

fact that its functional environment is not yet "ripe" (e.g., basic services are not yet available), but may still have utility in qualifying for tax relief or generating a capital gain by the use of abundant cheap labour. The same commitment made at a later stage (e.g., once the economic environment has consolidated) is far less risky (although not necessarily less costly). Such commitment does not imply that relocation will immediately take place, but rather contributes to setting up the "scene" for the relocation. For example, the commitment of a certain firm to relocate its research group to the Galil,[18] which was made public in the mid-1980s, forced the construction of an industrial zone that until then only could be found marked on master land use plans. Such development was aimed at satisfying the relocation prerequisites expressed by the firm. By the time the particular firm backed down on its commitment, the industrial zone was legally established, and the budget for initial construction was available, and thus development started, encouraging, in turn, other firms to consider relocation.

Awareness of commitment is virtually tantamount to the existence of commitment, whereas a lack of information about the commitment may completely nullify its impact. In our example, awareness of Firm A's relocation commitment may encourage investments in complementary services, whereas unawareness is unlikely to yield consequential changes. This does not rule out the impact of relocation, once truly materialised.

Another determinant of the potential impact of commitment is its distributional implications; commitment to

the development of an entire business sector is different, and probably limited in its distributional effects, from a commitment to the profit base of one business.

A vague, irrelevant, or incompetent commitment on the part of a decision-maker who does not have the authority to make such a decision may have no effect on the level of uncertainty or any overall impact, even if there is full awareness of the commitment, and the initiative is timed correctly.

Finally, experience shows that the more concrete or assertive a commitment is, the greater its ability to mitigate uncertainty. A commitment of the Minister of Housing (rather than of an employee of this office) to improve the roads network in the Galil (rather than to improve access conditions to other areas), which has been expressed for many years, is now generally taken as election campaign rhetoric. The same commitment, if accompanied by instructions to further the statutory status of the new roads, might be seen as more "serious", even though no suggestion of actual road construction has been made.

On the whole, these criteria represent the extent to which decision-makers are willing and able to bear the risks attached to a commitment. In fact, they determine the nature of the commitment and establish the grounds for determining the means needed to generate it. Bearing this in mind, it is useful to combine these criteria with the previous classification of decision-making determinants, permitting us to assess the role of commitment in decision-making.

An attempt to deal with commitment in view of the decision-making determinants identified above leads to the following conclusions:

a. Initiating commitment with significant distributional effects at an increasing scale, measured in terms of level of risk, may be positively correlated with access to resources (greater freedom to choose), remoteness from costs (assuming that decision-makers will commit themselves more readily when they are not likely to have to bear the costs themselves), and impersonalised change (in which undesirable change does not directly affect the decision-maker).

   Similarly, it is probably negatively correlated with private ownership of resources (individualised risk), internalised costs, and personalised change.

   The explicitness of the issue (assuming that concreteness permits greater accuracy in estimating the impact of the commitment) probably affects both.

b. A demand for a commitment that increases future certainty may be especially important for the group characterised by lower ability to bear risk (i.e., individualised risk and costs).

   The following diagram illustrates these interrelations:

Diagram no.1: **Commitment Under Risk Conditions**



* High ability to bear risk: access to resources and level of authority, remoteness from costs, impersonalised change, explicitness of the issue.
* Relative low ability to bear risk: private ownership of resources, internalised costs, personalised change, explicitness of the issue.

These risk-commitment relations imply an assumed distinction between two basic groups of decision-makers: those capable of bearing high risks, and those more vulnerable to high and personalised risks. This distinction can, to some extent, be applied to the same decision-maker when he functions in different situations. It is also possible to apply this distinction to the structure of the social system as analysed by available theoretical approaches. Depending on the specific theoretical perspective adopted by planners, the "risk" may be measured, for example, in terms of the instability of social relations, or an individual's deteriorating profit. Accordingly, the ability to bear risk can be linked, for example, to the potential for long-run contribution to capital accumulation in the business sector, as in a state system that may bear the costs of a highly expensive housing

project for the poor population, or an individual entrepreneur attempting to increase his share in the stock market.

Finally, this distinction suggests that a position of low probability of bearing risk may lead to dependence on the group(s) largely able to bear the risk in a particular case; this provides the latter with an advantage over the former group in the sense of the latter's relatively high impact on the nature of socio-economic processes (assuming the first to take an active step will affect its succeeding actions). In other words, a major aspect of commitment is the existence of a gap between the ability to initiate commitment and the demand for it. Experience shows that this disparity may be construed in terms of conflicting motives (functioning interests of groups of decision-makers). The first step in coping with this disparity is the identification of these motives.

This gap is acute for planning purposes: the ability to pinpoint the position of decision-makers on the risk-commitment axes permits us to predict, to some extent, which of them might be the planners' "partners", and the initiatives to which they are likely to respond. Moreover, in view of the assumed status of planners in decision-making (i.e., they neither control resource allocation processes, nor are directly responsible for plans' implementation), a commitment to a planning product may create a normative base for different decisions, which would clarify the principle direction of the process and the potential role of decision-makers in this process. Such a normative base may be especially appropriate for regional planning in tackling

a complicated system. Acknowledging the argument that a commitment to a planning product is a liability to the future decision-making environment, and the nature of regional systems, we attempt below to deal with the question of potential "partners" in the planning process, considered in the long-run and over a large, complex scale.

3.2.3 The Case of Long-Run Decision-Making

Regional planning attempts to generate commitments on the part of decision-makers requires that decision-makers will be associated with a long time-span and a large-scale, complicated system. Thus, in theory, the identification of potential partners can be based on decision-makers' presumed attitudes toward these aspects. In practice, however, such attitudes of different decision-makers are highly interrelated, to the extent that the identification of potential partners becomes quite tricky, a matter of permanent concern to planners, and an aspect of planning practice that creates a difficulty that can never be completely solved, as elucidated below.

An important assumption, implicit throughout this discussion, is that there exist categories of decision-makers: the business sector, the state apparatus (elected and non-elected systems), and individuals, that share similar characteristics in terms of sensitivity to risk, and, hence, in terms of their attitude toward planning initiatives in general, and their ability to commit to its content in particular. This distinction is based on the

assumption that socio-economic processes are basically driven by two, broadly defined, types of interests: economic interests, which seek to measure all activities and decisions in terms of profits, and which are aimed at their maximisation; and non-economic interests, which permit various social considerations (such as ideologies or norms) to affect decisions; although, in most cases, these have economic implications. Accordingly, the business sector, as a whole, represents decisions measured primarily in economic terms, whereas the public sector represents a readiness to give precedence to predominantly indirect economic considerations. Individuals fall between the two extremes, as the case may be. These groups manifest different types of attitudes toward commitment; private enterprise is relatively sensitive to economic risks, whereas the public sector (elected and non-elected bodies), which may be economically more flexible, is fairly sensitive to the organisational changes in the administrative system that planning initiatives may present.

Concentrating on the possible different features of these categories of decision-makers, and the way these features may be applied to the planning practice, may lead one to conclude that once the decision-makers' role in the social system is identified and the determinants relevant for concrete actions and decisions are recognised, the choice of "partners" is straightforward. In practice, however, the question of which decision-makers are likely to contribute to the planning practice is far more complicated.

Commitment to a specific planning product is important. Insofar as regional planning is concerned, three major

prerequisites will determine the importance and relevance of a commitment: First, the scope of activities of the organisation or the individual should be such as to permit operation under constraints of high risk. Second, it is necessary that the organisation or individual be able to cope with the complexity of a region and the great variability of its components, as determined by the organisation's or individual's operational mechanism and access to resources. Third, the role of the organisation or the individual in the socio-economic system must provide the organisation or individual with the ability and preparation to cope with externalities.

The first two features tends to be viewed as characterising the state apparatus and large businesses. The ability to internalise externalities, however, is viewed as representing the scope of the public sector; this also is used to justify public intervention. In this logic, the basic risk-commitment relations may imply that the public sector's tendency to emphasise the non-economic components of a decision enables it to establish initial conditions for business sector commitment by decreasing the level of uncertainty within which the latter would preferably function. The wider the scope of intervention (and hence the scale) of public sector activities, the larger the area in which the public sector's commitment will be relevant to other sectors and activities. By implication, since most planning initiatives come with important economic implications for resource allocation, decision-makers located in the public sector may be viewed as "natural" partners for the planning process; the generation of their

commitment to a specific regional planning product may be regarded as the task of planning practice. In reality, regional planning function is indeed mostly practiced in the public-governmental sector. Nevertheless, the planning experience in general, with its many cases of failed implementation, suggests that this conclusion is not as straightforward as it seems. The public sector, while possibly able to bear economic risk, strives mainly to maintain the existing socio-economic functional status-quo. Thus, the expectation that it will support planning initiatives that, almost by definition, attempt to effect changes in the socio-economic system, will probably be problematic. By the same token, the business sector, cannot be considered an optimal partner, since it may also be unreceptive to such structural changes and less capable of taking the economic risks involved in the introduction of structural changes.

Nevertheless, since the two sectors are sensitive to different aspects of planning initiatives, their potential contributions are inseparable. This line of argument is supported by observation of historical regional processes, which indicate that the sectors play complementary roles within the socio-economic system: the business sector is presumed to be a major agent securing continuous changes or development (e.g., the provision of jobs, housing construction). The public sector creates the general conditions in which the business sector performs. For example, investment in roads, an external, organisational concern most often handled directly or indirectly by the public sector, has a critical impact on the business sector

by increasing accessibility to investment opportunities, as measured in terms of higher quality of life, lower transportation expenses to be factored into product prices, greater investment opportunities in more accessible areas, and the like. In other words, both sectors continue to play a role in implementing the planning product and each sector tends to contribute to the process at a different stage or with respect to different components. These complementary roles are important for planning practice: planners may devise a strategic perspective that allows the integration of partners from each sector at a different stage or place of the regional process, thus encouraging the integration of each sector's potential contribution to the regional system as a whole. This may require to abandon the desire[19] to determine one single "partner", concentrating instead on the distribution of different segment of such strategy to different potential partners and recruiting their involvement as the case requires. We shall expand this argument in the next chapter. At this point, however, it should be emphasised that the relationship between the roles of the public and business sectors in regional processes remains problematic, because each sector tends to interpret commitment differently. Conflicts are likely to arise especially in contexts of long-run and possibly large-scale commitment, which establish levels of risk, as illustrated by the following discussion of the two sectors' different attitudes toward those aspects, and the problems of integrating them into planning process.

The public sector's long-run commitment is especially important in areas external to private enterprise, since it

is assumed that the business sector will make such commitments only in cases crucial to its functioning mechanism. In this sense, the role of the public sector is to create a more favourable environment for business enterprise. The concept of "long-run", however, is subject to different definitions. The state system tends to define it in terms of electoral processes, according to which "long" may mean the period between elections, or according to a specific decision-maker's tenure in a particular position. The business sector, by contrast, may measure it in terms of a product's life-span or production cycle. Finally, individuals may regard long and short terms as functions of individual characteristics. This could lead to a situation in which the "long-run" commitment desired by the business sector to clarify its probable situation (i.e., a decreased level of economic risk) is beyond the scope of the public sector. Even if the public sector makes such a commitment, it hardly justifies the risk taken by the business sector, because guarantees in cases of structural changes within the government apparatus are hard to provide. A simple example clarifies this point. The business sector regards investment in telecommunication infrastructure as an externality, even though such investment is essential for its sound performance, and even though improvements in this area may generate a direct profit. Assuming a case in which investments are needed for the next 20 years, and that the public sector will start investing and even commit to finishing the project, the business sector theoretically is provided with the security to invest in activities requiring such an infrastructure. Even so, is there any way of

securing that this infrastructure work will be carried through to the end? Not entirely. Yet, we may argue that such securities might not be required. The previously mentioned case of the industrial zone in the Galil shows that although the enterprise's commitment was called off, the investment stimulated by this commitment continued, thus possibly promoting the future functioning of this industrial zone.

"Long-run" commitment by the business sector also is problematic, since it tends to relate only to internal issues under maximum control. Thus, issues that have indirect impact and involve externalities over which private control is minimal are likely to be outside this sector's interest, since the considerations of others are beyond its scope. One should bear in mind that commitment patterns within the business sector can never be fully revealed, and hence their impact only can be measured once they are effectuated. Thus it may be difficult or even impossible to integrate other components of the system into future actions. In the example of the commitment to relocate a plant, there is no guarantee that the plant will relocate until it has actually relocated. Consequently, plans concerning such components as vocational training may prove either irrelevant or of limited utility in terms of their integration into the newly established production element. Therefore, a situation can develop in which the business sector attempts to externalise the costs of commitment as a way of maximising the protection of its interests, assigning the public sector costs that it may not be able to absorb.

An additional aspect of importance in this context is the scale of the system to which the commitment refers, along with the level of risk within which the system functions. This, again, is differently defined in the private and public sectors, and is determined by each sector's scope and scale of activity and specific area of concern. The business sector differs from the public sector in the limited range of issues preoccupying its individual entities (firms, enterprises, etc.), and their scale. Thus, with respect to the scale of issues, a public sector commitment is needed to clarify the future functional environment of the specific business sector units that are most likely to fall under some degree of public sector control. For the business sector, "large-scale" is chiefly a function of the types of activities in question. Experience shows (to make a crude generalisation) that this scale tends to be smaller in the private than in the public sector. As such, this issue is directly related to the distinction between internalities and externalities, in the sense that, for the public sector, "large-scale" may be construed as a set of linkages among different types of (external) systems and activities, whereas for the business sector it refers mainly to internal components.

In general, as in the previous case, the concept of the "large-scale" is a function of the nature of the activities dealt with by each of the sectors in specific cases. It should be emphasised that the potential ability to initiate commitment at a higher level and larger scale does not necessarily imply a demand for such a pattern of commitment.

In other words, different sectors may commit themselves to different aspects of the planning product (or at different stages of the process). Although the public sector basically acts to maintain existing structures, it may be geared toward facilitating a business sector breakthrough in a given situation.

So, the dilemma remains: planners aim for a complex system, and hence require the cooperation of either or both the public and business sectors, but we cannot suggest that the cooperation of any one sector is particularly advantageous. What we will suggest, however, at a later stage of this dissertation, is that by presenting a general strategic perspective and generating commitment to it, planners may find it possible (although perhaps not easy) to coordinate the different sectors' responses to the planning initiative, and combine the possible limits of commitment of each sector.

Conclusions

This chapter identified those aspects of decision-making that are of central importance to the planning process. It was argued that decision-making manifests itself in the allocation of resources, and that resource allocation determines the nature of competition, which, in turn, shapes the nature of regional systems. This being the case, it was emphasised that the foregoing aspects of decision-making permit planners to conduct practical analyses of regional processes. Because the essence of specific decision-making

components depends on the specific context in which the components occur, this chapter places its major emphasis on those determinants likely to be most relevant in dealing with specific cases. Rather than presenting a detailed discussion of the numerous possible impacts that the determinants of decision-making can create, we have concentrated on the type of impact each aspect may have, presenting the framework in which important aspects of decision-making may be revealed, by classifying them either as forces promoting access to resources or as elements permitting access to resources.

The integration of the determinants' vulnerability into the concept of commitment is the very essence of planning practice. Vulnerability refers to those aspects of decision-making that planners may influence; the concept of commitment permits planners to identify types of responses to specific planning initiatives, and the optimal subjects for any attempt to influence decision-making. To utilise these devices, planners must systematically analyse the decision-making arena in which they operate, investing sophisticated and creative thought in determining how the potential decision-makers can be manipulated in the desired direction. This process should provide planners with clear-cut criteria for the selection of target decision-makers for the implementation of planning initiatives, including the points at which they may be mobilised for the planning process.

It was then postulated that once one has in hand the criteria for choosing relevant "partners" (i.e., decision-makers who may be geared toward commitment to the planning

initiative) and making decisions on how to approach them, through the activation of vulnerable determinants, one then has the basic tools to exercise the initiative. This approach rests on the premise that planning depends largely on the professional qualities of the planners, along with the specific conditions prevailing at the time an attempt to exercise a given planning initiative is made. There is therefore no valid reason to prescribe specific actions to take in each case.

The important element to provide is a methodological framework within which the planner's qualities may be exercised, one that points out the aspects worthy of treatment and the avenues by which they may be identified and implemented. The identification of the major decision-making elements relevant to regional processes may be left to the planner, who should be able to determine the specific analytical tools. Nevertheless, since we are concerned with regional development processes and ways of improving them, we must still discuss the nature of the planning strategy within which the above aspects are integrated.

Notes

(1) Information, considered an outstandingly important resource, may be classified in each of the three categories.

(2) Power - the ability of decision-makers to impose their considerations (e.g., priorities, interests) on other members of the social-economic system.

(3) Other investments, such as Hammer's investments in a new private plane, will most probably not be considered "political".

(4) As previously argued, the determination of appropriate theoretical approach for concrete cases is, and should be, left to planners and analysts.

(5) A good example is the case of one American Jewish religious community (the Lubavich) that used its material wealth to promote changes in the Israeli parliament's part coalition and in the relations between religious and non-religious institutions. This wealth enabled the religious parties to gain a political power that exceeds their actual electoral base.

(6) Mr. Vertheim owns a large industrial complex. He is famous for the initiation of a private settlement in the Galil region and the recent acquisition of a small settlement in the Galil.

(7) The establishment of Kefar Haveradim was made possible by the allocation of state-owned land, for the first time since Israel's founding, to private settlers led by the above entrepreneur.

(8) In particular, the director of two large industrial enterprises, Mr. S. Vertheim and Mr. U. Galil.

(9) From an interview with Ms. H. Aflallo (April 1990), a former Jewish Agency planner who is presently employed by the Region 2000 company.

(10) It is indirectly argued here that "no response" scenario pose immense difficulties on the planner's involvement. A response of any type is almost a prerequisite for planners' search for "partners", since they do not and cannot operate alone.

(11) As a generalisation, over sensitivity of decision-makers to a certain idea is assumed to be undesirable.

(12) This decision fundamentaly changed the entire state system and the political power distribution (both between the Jews and the Arabs and within each group) that prevailed during the pre-state period.

(13) A a large quasi-governmental corporation.

(14) "Externalised costs" is cost not borne directly by the individual or the organisation acting to effect it.

(15) Regardless of others' awareness of the proposed project, which is a totaly different question, as previously discussed.

(16) Thus, one is calling for a planning initiative that can take into account possible sources or areas of costs as well as the sensitivity of different socio-economic organisations to different types of costs.

(17) Assuming an awareness of the planning proposal.

(18) The firm: Fibronics LTD, based in Haifa; the industrial zone: Teradion, located in Segev area.

(19) Assuming it is preferable to operate with one "partner" rather than many, especially since the "one" may be an organisation that consists of many individuals.

Chapter 4:
TURNING VISION INTO PRACTICE - REGIONAL STRATEGY

Introduction

The following are the major conclusions of the foregoing sections:

a. Political-administrative decision-making processes (as manifested in resource allocation patterns) are an important aspect of regional development processes because of their impact on the region's competitive advantage.
b. The essence of the planning initiative lies in its integration into existing economic and socio-organisational processes.
c. The ability to stimulate desired or expected patterns of response to planning initiatives within political-administrative organisations is measured by the ability to generate commitment on the part of decision-makers, by taking advantage of decision-making determinants that are potentially vulnerable to planning initiatives.

These conclusions bring major questions to the fore. What sort of impact does a planner seek in a particular region, and how may he achieve this impact, in view of the nature of the regional system and the practical qualifications he should have in order to affect resource allocation processes?

As for the desired nature of the impact, no absolute rule can be proposed (even the traditional objective of improving the region's relative condition is meaningful only with regard to other criteria). The means by which a planner can achieve the desired impact, however, is another matter altogether. This chapter argues that a strategic approach is most appropriate for affecting regional processes and facilitating continuous regional development. It, therefore, deals with three major themes:

1. Regional strategy in general - coping with the inherent problems of operating a strategy in a given region.
2. The functional environment of planners - the scope of planning practice.
3. Regional strategy in practice - a methodological framework for the exercise of regional development strategy.

4.1 Regional Strategy Defined

The concept of "strategy" is rooted in military studies, in which it is defined as "the art of projecting and directing the large military movements ..." (Oxford Dictionary, Third Edition, 1956). This notion has since been recognised to apply to other areas of research, especially management and business. Prevailing definitions of "strategy" vary with the specific subject matter. Generally speaking, there seems to be a consensus as to its basic task: the determination of the scope and future direction of a given entity (a company, an army etc.). Scholars agree,

too, on the principle attitude that characterises strategic thinking: a broad consideration of the issues of strategic concern, often coupled with a focus on large-scale activities.

Within the context of regional planning, regional strategy is the art of stimulating decision-making processes in the direction of altering the region's strength relative to other systems. This definition of regional strategy is structured on the following basic elements of strategy, and is coupled with the notion of competition previously (chapter 2). As simple as this definition may sound, its implications are rather complex, especially with regard to the complex of aspects related to regional systems, and the task of regional planning that assigns planners to deal with this complicated system under conditions of no direct control over resource allocation and political-administrative decision-making processes.

The following major aspects of this definition of regional strategy, some of which are discussed thoroughly in the literature, require clarification:

1. To what extent can and should a strategy be a basis for action? From a pragmatic point of view, this question is irrelevant, since strategy ordinarily is structured for the precise purpose of guiding action. However, by rephrasing the question as "For what do we need a strategy?", we may deal with the essence of strategy.
2. How can the difficulty in determining the precise parameters of a strategy (or its boundaries) be overcome?
3. What is the organisational context of regional

strategy? It is this context, after all, that gives planners their functional grounds for action.

In addition to these questions, which establish the basic rationale for our concern with regional strategy, other questions directly linked to the nature of the proposed strategy require clarification:

4. Can a strategist influence decision-makers; or, how likely is it that a decision-maker (a potential partner) will follow a particular strategy? Favourable answers to these questions lie at the essence of the proposed strategic approach, which concerns itself with methods of applying strategies, and assumes that planners can recruit decision-makers into them.
5. How do strategies, policies, programmes, and procedures interrelate? This is largely a matter of finding practical pathways along which interactions should function; by definition, it falls within the task of strategy.
6. The aspect of the modification of a region's relative strength. This concerns competition, and requires extensive discussion since, although in business studies it seems obvious that companies function within a competitive environment, regional studies tend to underestimate the competitive environment of the regional system, although they do treat different aspects of competition, such as the scarcity of resources. This aspect is discussed in Chapter 2.

These questions are discussed in the following sections:

4.2 The Case for a Regional Strategy

General approaches toward strategy, especially within the business world, tend to assume that strategy is a crucial, commonly exercised element of policy-making. These approaches presuppose a basic readiness of the system to function in accordance with strategy, but nevertheless acknowledge that the more innovative or drastic the strategy is in terms of the change recommended, the more difficult it will be to impose it on the system. By implication, strategy always lends itself to manipulation, and poses practical difficulties.

It is generally assumed that any organisation of any scale and structure will have some sort of long-run strategy. Some organisations take strategy as the main source of operational guidance; others allow day-to-day events to supersede overarching policy. As a whole, when dealing with an organisation's strategy, it is generally argued (Aharoni, 1982) that an effective strategy is a major determinant of the organisation's improved performance. Such a strategy therefore is considered both desirable and needed. Accordingly, studies focus on alternative strategies (varying in time-span, breadth of issues addressed, resources required, etc.) and their relevance in specific cases. Beyond the existence or absence of a strategy, the issue of its effectiveness, by contrast, evokes entirely different questions and discussions about the organisation's internal structure and capabilities (such a discussion at this point is beyond our scope).

However, when we deal with regional systems, we cannot

assume that a long-term regional development strategy is essential to the individual system. Unlike private firms, which may either cease to exist or lose capital in the absence of a strategy, regional systems do not cease to operate in the absence of a long-term development strategy. Moreover, experience proves (e.g., Friedmann and Weaver, 1979; Manners, 1980; Goldsmith, 1980) that even when a regional strategy is applied, it does not guarantee more efficient performance on the part of the regional system. Indeed, the relationship between regional systems and regional strategy is problematic. This difficulty is directly linked to the nature of the regional system, which, as was previously suggested, is a complicated system forming part of a larger system, and a dynamic one undergoing constant change as a result of interactions between regional components. In fact, these interactions instigate the process through which the nature of the regional system is established. In short, if no attempt is made to intervene, "regions" will not disappear; at most, they may operate differently. In this case, if attempts at region-wide change are made, they most likely will be realised only insofar as they meet the individual organisation's needs or interests. It is most likely that an overall strategic perspective of the regional system will be obtained only to the extent that it satisfies the needs of the individual organisation.

A simple example illustrates how a region can be influenced by a strategic perspective. Assuming an industrial plant located in region A decides to establish training schemes for its employees. It may either operate such schemes by itself, or contract with an existing

education system capable of providing the required service. The choice of one of these alternatives, based on evaluation of the practical implications of each for the plant (including factors such as costs, duration of the process, trainers' professional qualifications, etc.) will inevitably stimulate market dynamics for such a service. The dynamics may be manifest in the form of competition between existing educational institutions, modifications within a particular institution to accommodate itself to the demand, or in other ways. In any case, the choice of an appropriate scheme is unlikely to be influenced by a consideration of its contribution to the regional system; rather, the major criterion will be the utility of the selection to the organisation.

These processes are important, because they are among the different types of interactions that determine the nature of the region. In our example, the dynamics following the actual choice, although an organisation's internal affair, may result in a service that is new to the region or in an improvement of the existing educational system, both of which could be offered to other plants. Similarly, it may increase employee competence, and hence production, both in the specific plant and in others. On the other hand, the impact may be negative, as in the event of the above process occurring outside region A, thus denying the region its possible utility. One way or another, the result of this process probably will satisfy the plant's requirements, although not necessarily those of the regional system, which either can gain or lose from the resulting educational and production changes. Furthermore, the process will be

coordinated with other organisations in a given region only insofar as they are connected to it.[1] It can therefore be concluded that, first, the need for a regional strategy transcends the straightforward, internal concerns of individual organisations, and requires an ability to perceive the region as a coherent system. There is, however, a possibility that strategy's contribution to regional organisations may be fairly straightforward, since individual organisations operate under conditions of uncertainty with regard to other forces' decisions and expected changes in their functional environment. Second, an attempt to influence processes within the overall regional system must focus above all on the interactions between various organisations operating in relation with the regional system. In practice, therefore, the attempt to influence regional processes requires that interacting organisations operate on the basis of similar objectives and expectations from the socio-economic system. Since interactions occur between socio-economic organisations that differ in terms of location, scale, or other such variables, and since changes do not take place immediately and interactions are rarely generated on the spot, the great extent of uncertainty involved in such interactions should be mitigated. Thus strategy, and those who shape it, should act directly by guiding the organisations toward common goals. Implicitly, then, attempts should be made to convince all concerned that a shared goal can decrease uncertainty.

Briefly stated, regional strategy confers the following advantages:

a. It facilitates guiding the effects of day-to-day events;
b. It decreases uncertainty, thus permitting organisations to determine how well their integration into the process would coincide with their own interests;
c. It may amplify comparative regional advantage by treating the region as one socio-economic system (though an "open" one; see Chap. 2);
d. It facilitates the assessment of the impact of various activities on the regional system.

In the example of the search for training schemes, the firm's choice undoubtedly will be affected if the local/regional educational system can guarantee the long-run (or as long as is required) availability of such services. If it can, the investments made by the educational system in "importing" needed trainers would in turn be worthwhile only if the region could guarantee appropriate housing, schools for their children, and so on. In other words, the strategist must concern himself with the cumulative effect that probably will, and should, be generated through a strategic perspective on the region.

Some may point to a potential disadvantage of such a perspective: namely, the risk of preventing or neglecting initiatives by those who deviate from the overall principles of the system, although they may be contributing to the region. This being the case, it nonetheless depends on the nature and practice of a given strategy, not on its existence per se.

To sum up, regional strategy is perceived as providing a framework for the management of regional processes. As such, strategy is essential for the promotion of major changes in the regional system by streamlining its operating mechanism. The need for strategy does not mean that it is possible to manage by strategy all the diverse forces operating within the region. Regional systems, as argued, are "open" entities, susceptible to numerous internal and external forces. However, we must deal with the interactions as a whole if we wish to steer the system toward a common goal. For example, an educational system and a housing market may seem only loosely connected, since they ostensibly deal with entirely different aspects of regional processes. Experience (Manners, 1980; Sewer and Tabb, 1984) proves, however, that different regional components are not only highly interconnected in many cases (e.g., they affect migration trends), but are also directly linked to other components of the regional system, such as the labour market. Increasing the competitiveness of the educational system, as well as raising housing standards, may attract highly skilled labour, thereby leading to an influx of high-technology plants, thus stimulating the demand for highly skilled labour and possibly affecting the population's socio-economic conditions. All of these trends manifest themselves through improvement of the region's overall competitive advantage. Therefore, the only way to cope with these interactive activities is by integrating them into a single, coherent strategic perspective. Nevertheless, the actual need for a strategy does not mean that the entire strategic approach necessarily will be

presented by planners. It may be used by planners for different tasks (such as guiding their search for "partners" and their interactions with other decision-makers), while only concrete aspects of the approach may be presented. By implication, a strategy is useful for improving the planner's performance.

4.3 Boundaries of Concern

The parameters (or boundaries) of regional strategy are, by definition, a function of the nature of regional systems. A strategy's limits of concern may therefore be determined with reference to two measures: the physical (the spatial area to which the strategy applies), and the functional (the set of activities and processes with which it deals).

It may be very appealing to emphasise the spatial criteria, thus concentrating on the region-specific functional system given within a specific spatial area. This attitude, however, is both impossible and undesirable. First, the "openness" of the regional system implies that it is difficult to apply a narrowly region-limited perspective. Second, as argued in Chapter 2, since the physical aspect of a regional system is merely the result of socio-economic activities, the emphasis should be placed on the nature of the activities of which specific regional systems are composed.

Admittedly, reference to a set of activities with which regional strategy should deal causes a serious problem. This problem is directly connected with the major characteristics

of the regional system: "openness", complexity, and dynamic, which permit any type of activity to be integrated into the strategy. Since it is impractical to deal with the entire range of socio-economic processes that structure the regional system, there is a need to limit the boundaries of strategic concern. The questions therefore become: what are the boundaries of a strategy, and how may we limit these boundaries?

The literature recognises the problem presented by the potential broadness of strategic parameters. Whereas they permit great abstraction on the part of strategy, scholars (e.g., Ansoff, 1965) tend to concentrate on the question of where strategy ends. Military studies, for example, tend to distinguish between "strategy" and "tactics" - the latter belonging only to the mechanical movements of bodies set in motion by the former ..." (Oxford Dictionary, Third Edition, 1956). This rationale assumes a hierarchy of treatment of policy-making issues: strategy theoretically is expected to confine itself to a broad view of processes or issues. Increased specificity or technical concern with processes is the domain of tactics, programs, and procedures. However, while accepting the principle of hierarchy of treatment with issues, and the argued need to determine the limits of this treatment, our concern in the case of regional strategy requires clarification in two aspects:

a. These studies assume that the subject of strategy is clearly demarcated, or that it is a distinct entity, such as the armed forces or a business firm. Accordingly, the problem of defining the "upper" limits

of strategy is viewed as irrelevant. That is not, however, the case with the region, which, as noted, may theoretically permit any type issue to be treated in a regional strategy.

The upper limits of regional strategy, in terms of the scale and complexity of the activities with which it deals, is largely a function of the region's relationship with the larger system (the nation, for instance). Thus, the strategy's limits should be delimited by the issues that arise in each case. For example, a planner's interest in the educational system may in theory be limited to intra-regional educational institutions and activities. In some cases, however, a broader perspective is required, as with extra-regional institutions that serve the region (e.g., universities). Therefore, the regional strategy should not confine itself to the physical boundaries of a given region. In fact, as suggested in Chapter 2, it should transcend local (internal-regional) processes, and deal with those processes that affect the nature of regional processes. At the same time, however, we should not assume the automatic relevance of non-local issues, as is shown in the following example. Assume we are interested in the links between industrial development and the educational system in a particular region. This may require, for example, to dealing with higher-education institutions located outside the region, which their isolation from industrial activities is assumed to be partly linked to a nation-wide attitude toward applied research. It may also

require some reference to the national government educational system and policies. Yet, in our extensive concern with such aspects, we may end up providing a national strategy for the encouragement of industrial R&D activities. But is this an appropriate strategy for the regional context? Probably not. Alternatively, a strategy also based on knowledge of national processes that proposes that certain incentives be provided locally (within the region) for the integration of outside educational institutions in the industrial system, probably will be more appropriate.

So, the concerns of regional strategy are not limitless, either spatially and functionally. Planners, however, are limited only by their understanding and imagination: the question of parameters is important only insofar as it emphasises that regional processes should be addressed within a perspective that aims to create a framework for operating with respect to regional systems.

b. In view of this "freedom", planners may face a problem related to the practical determination of strategic limits. The question of determining "where the strategy ends and the tactics start" is subject to extensive discussion. Business studies provide interesting and important insights in this regard. Ansoff (1985), for instance, suggests that the problem be solved by distinguishing between strategy, policy, programme, and operating procedures, which he ranks in order of their "increasing level of ignorance: standing operating procedures and programmes under condition of certainty

or partial risk, policies under condition of risk and uncertainty, and strategies under condition of partial ignorance" (p. 107). Nevertheless, the problem of isolating clear criteria for the distinction between strategy, policy, programmes, and procedures remains unsolved at the level of theoretical discussion. Indeed, a strategy may deal with any issue on any level, but only as long as it serves its requirements and permits it to cope with regional processes efficiently. What "counts", then, is the set of activities and issues selected for strategic purposes. The contents of this set are determined solely by the way in which the strategist perceives the region and defines his goals. This being the case, however, the precise limits can only be determined only empirically.

In practice, beyond these difficulties, two principles of strategy are of particular importance in the regional case:

a. The administrative level of concern with strategy. Available studies that are interested in questions such as who is responsible for a strategy or whose needs it serves, tend to associate the scale and complexity of treatment with the administrative hierarchy of organisations. Strategy is confined to upper-level administrative functions. Increased specificity or technical concern with processes takes place at lower levels of the administrative hierarchy. This implies that the content of strategy cannot be separated from the organisation's structure and power distribution,

i.e., in order to promote decision-maker commitment to a strategy, certain functions in the organisation's system are relatively more relevant than others. This principle, however, is directly related to the planner's problematic role in socio-economic organisations, as will be further discussed.

b. A second important feature of strategy, presumed to be obvious in all studies, is its specification. Studies emphasise its necessary links to tactics, programmes, and procedures. This suggests that a strategy cannot stand by itself, and the pathway to its implementation lies in its concretisation. Although planning experiences shows that "strategic" planners underestimate the importance of a strategy's specification as a vehicle to promote certain changes in regional systems, this aspect is crucially important for planning practice. Planners view this process as technical (or procedural), and often disregard the implications of such an approach (for example, specification of strategy may result in formulating a strategy that is different from the one initially sought).

On the whole, these questions emphasise the problem of the choice of activities to be included within a strategy, or, more accurately, the type of concern with various activities and extent of emphasis that each deserves. In practice, no clear-cut definition of such activities is available. However, the arguments presented in this dissertation elucidate several categories of activities that are prime candidates for strategic interest, and

importantly, establish criteria by which relevant activities may be determined. Specifically, since production and organisational processes are crucial components of the regional development process, the nature of these processes is likely to affect the determination of regional boundaries and the parameters of regional strategy. Further, in view of the previously discussed concepts of regional competitive advantage, commitment to planning initiatives, and the vulnerability of decision-making determinants to the planning process, it is rather clear that the criteria for determining the boundaries of a regional strategy are directly connected with the issues that satisfy planners' efforts to modify regional systems their particular context. Finally, while seeking to eliminate certain areas of activity, and ensuring that others will be examined and modified throughout the process, if this is required regional strategy lends itself an essential aspect: flexibility. This may become disadvantageous, as an excessive proliferation of activities ranked on similar levels of importance within the strategy may lead to chaos. Yet, this possible disadvantage can be turned to advantage by the planner's ability to deal with various components of the regional system at their most relevant levels.

To sum up, the issue of "boundaries of concern" is a crude example of the planning approach presented in this dissertation, which leaves the planner with a maximum degree of freedom to determine the aspects he should treat, and assumes that such a selection arises from the professional qualities that are necessary for engagement in regional strategy.

4.4 The Organisational Context of Regional Strategy

A central aspect of any regional strategy, and a crucial element in determining its impact, is the functional context of the strategy, or the way the regional strategy is integrated into the regional decision-making system. The task of making an impact on regional organisations and decision-makers (who are expected to function within a unitary, long-run strategic framework) is argued here to be both feasible and desirable. Feasible - assuming that the planner's professional and personal capabilities make the essential contribution toward the establishment of change. Desirable - as opposed to some theoretical approaches that rule out the possibility of effective planning, by arguing that too often the planning function by necessity serves the dominant interests of capital accumulation, and, therefore, cannot initiate requisite structural change.

This task, however, is not without problems. Difficulties arise in the following complementary aspects:

* The nature of the organisations within which regional strategy is initiated; and the kind of organisation that may initiate and manage one in view of, or as an indication of, the possible scope of a strategy, and the available resources to assert it regarding issues that are beyond the concern of the specific organisation. The problem that arises in this regard concerns the organisational characteristics that may lend these organisations an advantage in their treatment of the regional system as a whole (Friend, 1980).

* The internal-organisational context in which a regional strategy is initiated. This aspect concerns the establishment of planners' potential role and their ability to create conditions under which the organisation will adopt the strategy. The major questions that arise in this context have to do with the planner's position within the organisation, his actual involvement in the decision-making process, and his ability to have an impact transcending his specific organisation (i.e., the organisation employing the planner).

The following discussion further elaborates these aspects.

4.4.1 The Initiation and Management of Regional Strategy

Beyond the theoretical need for a regional strategy, actual problems arise with respect to the readiness and ability of socio-economic organisations involved in regional processes to initiate or manage a regional strategy, especially in view of the nature of regional systems. Chapter 3 discussed the question of power distribution and organisations' commitment to long-term and large-scale processes, as well as the interrelations between public and business sector attitudes toward commitment to such processes. This section, therefore, links these arguments to the case of regional strategy, and highlights the aspects particularly relevant to such strategy.

As stated, a region is a non-unitary system structured of different interests geared toward different policies. Since the interactions between the various forces forms the essence of its performance mechanism, these interactions should be the major concern of regional strategy (Friend, 1980). Thus, the integration of the diverse economic and non-economic regional components (e.g., firms, individuals, local institutions) into one strategic framework is, almost by definition, an extra-organisational matter, in the sense of generally being concerned with the system as a whole, rather than meeting a prerequisite for the existence of any individual organisation. Examples of such extra-organisational issues of intrinsic importance in regional strategy are the available roads or transportation infrastructure in and leading to the region, public services, and telecommunications, to name only three. They do much to shape the organisation's attitude toward the regional system. A direct concern with such issues and a purposeful attempt to deal with them as a whole within a strategy is uncommon in the actual attitudes public and private organisations take toward their functional environment. In most case, any organisation, when determining its actions or policy, will consider such "extra" issues as the integral components of their environment's (regional) structure, but will not necessarily attempt to modify this structure if they are displeased with it. The individual organisation will either accommodate its system to the given conditions, or relocate to a more satisfactory environment. Rarely will an individual organisation attempt to initiate changes that are beyond its

specific scope. Indeed, the very notion of "extra-organisational issues" alludes to attempts to deal with various aspects of regional systems in a way that tends to transcend the interests of the individual organisation. In view of the potential contribution of a regional strategy to specific organisations and economic entities, the regional strategy is a type of "socio-economic externality", that is, an activity pertaining to public goods, which, by definition, no individual economic entity would produce if it were forced to bear the costs alone (Mishan, 1973).

Attempts to intervene with such components tend to occur only when a potential direct benefit is perceived; even then, involvement is generally limited to the (direct) functional environment of the organisation concerned. Indeed, in the case of a regional strategy, as opposed to other types of strategies (e.g., firm A will not benefit from a successful marketing strategy of firm B targeted to the same product's market), individual components of the regional system may directly benefit from a strategic success without suffering commensurately from strategic failure or the lack of strategic initiative.

By implication, first, not all organisations involved in regional processes necessarily need[2] a regional strategy. Second, although a regional development strategy may have direct economic consequences, its initiation and management cannot be a matter of merely economic considerations. Third, although a wide range of organisations may desire an efficient regional strategy, few will find it worthwhile to initiate or manage it. Alternatively stated, the initiation and management of a strategy is a function of the

organisation's ability to cope with extra-organisational issues. Moreover, linking this aspect to the risk-commitment relationship implies that the ability and desire to deal with external issues depends on the organisation's ability and will to bear the high economic risks involved in dealing with external issues (regarding which the reaction of other socio-economic organisations cannot always be predicted).

It is in this sense that involvement with regional strategy is directly linked to the exercise of political power; the ability and the desire to impose a certain strategic perspective on a wide range of social institutions, individuals, and businesses requires that the organisation practicing the strategy have some advantage over the above regional components. Such an advantage may be a particular economic strength or official authority, both of which become political power when used to facilitate the strategy's materialisation (as specified in Chapter 3). The ability to affect different socio-economic activities that is associated with this practice is likely to be accelerated; it may generate dependence of different regional units on the organisation controlling the strategy, or increase the magnitude of economic resources available to the strategising organisation.

The practice of this power. i.e., the coordination of the regional components toward common goals, is difficult. This practice could be eased by an inclusive a priori agreement on a strategy, which, although desirable, is totally unrealistic to expect (Friend, 1980). In reality, a strategic initiative need not be based on a general

consensus among all organisations that are expected to have some role within it. In fact, the essence of a strategy lies in its possibility of inducing some organisations to follow the strategic initiative, or in its ability to attract diverse forces to the desired process (Dyckman, 1976, in Baer, 1977). The following example illustrates how the power potential can be practiced through indirect measures. Consider the ability to improve the road network in a given region, or the ability to modernise a region's telecommunication infrastructure. Both actions, externalities by definition, can be taken without widespread agreement, assuming the financial capacity for such investment exists. Provided these actions are integrated into a strategic perspective that determines their location and timing, the response of the region's "market" for these commodities will be directed in accordance with the strategy, and different organisations initially not aware of the existence of the strategy will modify their activities according to it. A "wise" strategy, however, will attempt to integrate the diverse regional components into a relatively homogeneous functional framework, while providing these components with sufficient "space" to function within it. In our case, a strategy should not deal with the telecommunication infrastructure of, for instance, an industrial park; the management of this park should in theory make the choice of being connected or not to the region's infrastructure. Nevertheless, the estimated regional demand for such infrastructure should include this industrial park. In other words, a regional strategy should attempt not to replace the internal development policies of

specific regional units (firms, services, etc.), but rather to provide a framework within which these units may exist and even improve their performance. Thus, an important practical condition for the initiation and management of a regional strategy is the ability to deal with interactions among regional elements that do not fall under the direct responsibility of an individual firm or similar regional component. A successful player would also be able to cope with the externality costs generated by these interacting processes.

The power potential associated with the ability to practice regional strategy, providing an "umbrella" for various forces and guiding their activities, further depends on the scope of the initiating organisation's activities; a broader scope is considered potentially advantageous (Friend, 1976). Thus, an organisation that controls a broad range of regional production services, such as automotive and equipment repair, would potentially be better able to practice a regional strategy than another organisation that controls few such services. A large volume of services controlled is not necessarily a prerequisite for effective strategy; the nature of the components under control should be considered as more important. Indeed, control of land development and building permits, for example, may prove much more valuable in luring other organisations into a strategy-driven process than the above-mentioned control of services. Thus, the concept "crucial" modifies the role of components within regional processes. The conclusion is that the nature of the activities under direct control is an important determinant of the ability to impose a strategy on

various regional organisations. It is difficult to determine either the nature of the "crucial" components that can amplify the impact of a strategy, or the specific type of organisation that is likely to have the available means to generate a regional development strategy within a specific time and location context. Nevertheless, having suggested that a strategy initiative is largely a function of the ability to cope with externalised issues, we may further suggest that the issue of "crucial" components in this context is directly linked to the non-economic activities of the regional system and the externalised costs generated by regional processes.

An additional and important concern in the initiation and management of regional strategy is the organisation's practical ability to carry out these tasks. This is generally a function of the organisation's internal structure, and is manifested in two ways. First, it is necessary to have the internal synergy and functional efficiency that may facilitate the management of a regional strategy, which is, after all, a complicated mission. The availability of staff and professional skills may also be required in this case. Second, the organisation must to a certain extent be geared toward long-run thought. This element is argued to distinguish the state apparatus from the business sector, for example. Indeed, one should note the Japanese industrial firms, which are famous for the relative importance they place on strategic planning, and their integration of strategic functions into the overall functional mechanism of the firm.

Finally, it is important to seek organisations that are

either strongly inured to previously mentioned externalities or well equipped to bear their costs. The concept of commitment (Chap. 3) may further elucidate this problem of determining the type of organisation that is likely to be prepared to manage a regional strategy, that is, a socio-economic entity capable of bearing the risk of managing the processes that generate these externalities. This further implies that regional planning should base itself on the ability to distinguish between different types of externalities, and the different levels of sensitivity displayed toward them by different organisations.

These arguments lead to the almost inevitable conclusion that the organisations best suited for this purpose are public organisations. Some scholars might support this conclusion rather straightforwardly, asserting that such activity represents the essence of state intervention. Indeed, reality clearly indicates that the vast majority of regional strategies are under the direct responsibility of public institutions. Other theoretical perspectives, such as the political economy approaches, may similarly regard these functions as inherently connected with the role of the state apparatus in liberal democracies, manifested by their contribution to the maintenance of the social relations status quo, while permitting the ongoing accumulation of capital. However, the foregoing conclusion, based on these theoretical and deterministic approaches, cannot be ratified unquestionably. First, an acceptance of the political economy perspective implicitly admits that any regional development strategy is bound to be ineffective in the creation of structural changes. Indeed, even though we

do not attempt to argue that structural changes in the social system and capital relations are necessary prerequisites of an effective strategy, it is difficult to accept fully an approach that rejects the possibility of such impact a priori. Second, the fact that most regional strategies actually are under the responsibility of government ministries and agencies does not provide ipso facto justification for the continuation of this state of affairs. In fact, such a conclusion is shown to be problematic because of the nature of the state apparatus, which imposes fundamental constraints on any attempt to achieve long-run commitment (a prerequisite for regional strategy, as previously argued), and clashes with prevailing experience regarding the state apparatus' role in regional development policies.

The expression "state apparatus or public sector" evokes an immediate association with large, highly fragmented organisations, in which decision-making tends to be inefficient, polluted by irrelevant considerations, and unable to exercise long-term commitment. The "private or business sector", by contrast, tends to be associated with small organisations noted for highly efficient economic performance. These are fallacies; private organisations may have similar or other characteristics that preclude efficient treatment of regional strategy. Public organisations may be small, deterministic, and efficient bodies. Yet, the major difference between the two does seem to be the primacy of economic considerations in private sector decision-making. Still, this is not to say, as is conventionally presumed, that state agencies completely

disregard economic considerations in determining their policies. Neither does this difference between the two sectors indicate that one or the other is necessarily more "relevant". Therefore, since both sectors have potentially complementary roles to play in the socio-economic system, the problem is how to implement a strategy that integrates the potential contributions from both sectors. In practice, then, the relevant questions to ask are concerned more with the ways in which a given strategy is initiated and the nature of its content, rather than with who (i.e., which organisation) bears responsibility for it. Additional questions that should be posed when one actually attempts to determine the organisational context of a regional strategy are:

* Is the initiating sector capable of carrying out the task it has assumed?
* Does the initiation and management of a strategy by a certain sector impose a priori constraints on the participants and their mode of involvement?
* How effective can a strategy be in view of the constraints intrinsically imposed by the sector responsible for it?

The answers to these questions in view of strategic objectives may enable planners to choose the appropriate organisational system by which strategy can to be managed. These answers, however, warrant preliminary comments. First, any organisation may encounter intrinsic difficulties in the practical task of coping with a regional strategy. Second,

any organisation involved in a strategy will undoubtedly affect the scope of the strategy and determine other organisations' patterns of involvement in the regional system.

In sum, one cannot a priori reject any type of socio-economic entity as irrelevant to the management of a regional strategy. The public sector's flexibility in dealing with extra-organisationl issues may lend it advantages in the management of a regional strategy. At the same time, the objective cannot be attained without the integration of private forces, which are needed for the handling of aspects of development that transcend the grasp of the state apparatus. This assumes, as argued in Chapter 3, that the public sector cannot effectively engage the issue of long-run productive entrepreneurship, a crucial type of activity in regional development.

4.4.2 The Role of Planning Function

As stated, the attitude of organisations toward a strategic perspective is an important aspect of the organisation's ability to initiate and manage one. A related aspect that deserves our attention is the role of the strategist in this organisation; its importance to planning practice is well attested to in the literature (e.g., Friend, 1976; Baum, 1980; Forester, 1981), although sometimes it is underestimated by planners themselves (Forester, 1989). It may be associated with the above theoretical links between the strategy and the administrative hierarchy of organisations.

Traditional business studies assume that strategic planning is an intrinsic part of a firm's business management activity, and that strategic function is integral to its performance mechanism (Aharoni, 1982). Accordingly, it tends to be argued that the authority of a strategic planning unit may vary according to elements such as the nature of the specific organisation, issues being subjected to the strategy, or the professional competence of the strategist, depending on the specific case. Further, there seems to be a general acceptance that the desired situation consists of the planning unit working close to upper-level management of a given institution or firm, and in direct relation with the overall decision-making system that is supposed to take its recommendations into account and attempt to implement them. Again, however, this paradigm arguably is invalid in the case of the status of strategic planners in regional planning, which is far more problematic, especially in view of the previous discussion

emphasising the intrinsic difficulties arising in the implementation of a regional strategy. Indeed, the literature is well aware of the "fragility" of the planner's role in decision-making systems, as argued by Baer (1977) "Planning is too important to be left to the planners" (pp. 675-676). This is a result of the planner's basic dependence on those social forces with the potential power to implement planning products (Baum, 1980), and the possible disparity between the planner's expectations as regards his role, as well as the way land use planning function is perceived by non-planners (Baer, 1977). In this regard, is strategic regional planning function distinct from other (land use) planning functions?

As noted, the planners' status is always problematic. This also applies to planners who operate in the business sector, in spite of the tendency to idealise the role of business-marketing strategies and strategists (Aharoni, 1986). However, unlike in the case of business strategies, whose existence in a given firm reflects the firm's basic acceptance of the strategic function, the fact that land use planners operate in a given organisation does not necessarily imply that strategic planning is an acceptable function. Further, since a regional strategy is not a prerequisite for the organisation's existence, the planner's position is unlikely to be more advantageous than any other position in land use planning, to say the least, because the planner's attempt to stimulate the organisation's involvement in a high-risk regional development process may be particularly undesirable, or at odds with the organisation's standard operating patterns and interests

(Baum, 1980).

It follows from the above that different regional strategic planning initiatives may differ in the content of the planning product, in the magnitude of the issues concerned, or in planners' expectations. However, they are unlikely to differ fundamentally in the principal role of planners in their organisational environment. In practice, therefore, what is likely to be planners' role in their organisational environment? Where are planners' potential strengths in influencing decision-making? Which principle function can be suggested to be most appropriate for the practice of regional planning?

The planning literature and the associated contribution of different theories and empirical studies from other social science disciplines thoroughly discuss the question of the planners' role in different social systems, the actual planning practice as compared with the practice desired by planners, changes in planning ideologies, and more recently, the question of what planning is, and the disparities between planning as an academic and as a practical domain. This dissertation itself is a manifestation of a specific perspective on what planning is all about. In practice, however, among the different "planning" issues and challenging theoretical discussions, we shall limit our concern to a very small selection of aspects with a particular relevance to this section, and emphasise their implications for planning practice, rather than, for instance, their implications for planning theory (insofar as these two can be separated).

In general terms, most theories imply that the planner's basic functional framework is given by the system in which he operates. The planner's specific role depends on the theoretical perspective of the structure of, and the power distribution in, modern democracies. Most planning theories, however, provide planners and individuals with some freedom of choice within their basic functional framework. This freedom, again, depends on the theoretical perspective through which the planner's role is analysed. Three major types of planner roles are postulated: The planner-bureaucrat, the planner as a consultant or advocate (the latter refers to consultation that is coupled with "humanistic" aspirations), the planner as a negotiator.

Wherein do their potential strengths lie?

The bureaucrat. This function refers to a situation whereby the planner has a clear official status in the system. This may explain why the concern with this function is confined mainly to official planning systems (that tend to be regulatory). Indeed, the literature generally views planner-practitioners as belonging to the category of government officers or civil servants. Such planners may concern themselves with executing given policies and regulations, some probably established by their fellow planners, although the literature in general rarely discusses this aspect. On the other hand, planners may exercise their potential strength so far as to serve their individual "existence" interest in the organisation or alliance with their professional interest group. In both

cases, the literature does not see potential conflicts between their official and actual roles as interfering with their functioning. In this role, the planners' power to influence decision-making is associated with their official status, which facilitates the determination of issues on the public agenda and the accessibility of non-planners (and non-professionals) to material (e.g., information, documentation of evidence) (Jowell, 1977; Forester, 1989). This status, when coupled with planners' professional skills, their knowledge accumulated during long periods of service in specific organisations, and the masses of information stocked in planning departments, may be utilized to manipulate elected politicians and individuals. Finally, a planner's potential strength is associated with official status: the chief planning officer is viewed as "stronger" than the ordinary planner serving in the same department.

This power, however, is largely negative. Opponents of the exercise of such power emphasise the elitism-paternalism and relative pettiness of planners who believe they are superior. Accordingly, the planner-bureaucrat's potential power as recommended by scholars such as Rex and Moor (1967) and Pahl (1975) is strongly questioned by insights into planning systems and the distinction of planners from other civil servants; Mellor (1977) and Broadbant (1977) make the point that many issues are beyond planners' authority and their ability to exert influence, due to their lack of control over budgets and implementation. Baum (1980), however, associates this attitude toward planners' power with planners' unrealistic expectations. Indeed, the literature does not provide examples of important public

policies that were affected by such bureaucrat-planners. At the most, examples show that interpretations of prevailing policies may differ according to local-specific characteristics of the planners administrative set-up. The common example of the way bureaucratic power is exercised is taken from the city or local planning commission (Mellor, 1977, quoted in Kirk, 1980, p. 36).

The following example from the Israeli system shows the limited potential for influence that may be associated with such a planning function. The settlement site of Ginat, located in the northern West Bank, was not converted during the mid 1980s from a military camp to a civilian settlement (as opposed to most other military camps in this area). This was partly due to the planners of the WZO Settlement Section in the Haifa region office, who erased this site from the maps used by the political director of this organisation (Mr. Drobles) during this period of mass construction of new settlements in the West Bank. Indeed, and the planners credited themselves for this,[3] the site "disappeared" from official statistics and rarely enjoyed visits from officials. However, the conversion or non-conversion of Ginat did not affect the major trend of populating Jews in West Bank, nor did it change the fact that the military camp remained, and would probably require consideration of its future scope at a later stage of the settlement process. Further, in my personal view, planners could not have acted in the same way in connection with other sites that were politically more important, and they did not attempt such acts. Also, these planners in fact served the interests of their director, whose complicity with a fellow party member

(Mr. Sharon, who was the political referee of Ginat) made it possible not to allocate resources to Ginat.

This planner-bureaucrat type of function is echoed in many aspects by the mainstream structuralist perspectives of planners within the state employee system or as state agents, who are merely technicians following orders with a very limited freedom to have their professional and personal inputs (Poulantzas, 1969). Nevertheless, planners facing conflicts between their given function and their personal beliefs may act as "bureaucratic guerrillas" (an Altshuler term, 1965) who may utilise their potential strengths, including an advantageous position with respect to information, greater understanding of information, and a somewhat "protected" status (as opposed to politicians who may or may not be reelected [Doron, 1986]), to assist those believed by the planners to be discriminated against by a given organisation or deprived of important information. Although this type of function is not reported as a common planning practice, it reflects some concession planners must make to their own beliefs. It also extends planners' freedom far beyond the traditional view of planners as professionals "following orders". This, however, is argued to hold true for only a short time, since it challenges the official status of planners. Still, its importance is in emphasising the difficult situations planners may find themselves in as a result of their fundamental dependence on the execution machinery and budget.

The consultant. The consultant's strength lies primarily in his professional skills or expertise (Davidoff,

1965; Maziotti, 1974). He may be hired as a specialist by a given institution, while his status being clearly determined with regard to a concrete task. His involvement with other issues may confuse the system and be practically difficult. In general, his views are likely to influence decision-makers who expect the consultant to guide their actions in specific issues. Alternatively, there is the possibility of the consultant-specialist who is hired by a public agency on behalf of others (the "public" in many cases). In this case, his status may not be established due to a lack of clarity with regard to the identity of his "clients" (the "public", an agency) (Gans, 1968) and their relations with official organisations. The Israeli Project Renewal experience, in which planners were hired by the government on behalf of specific urban communities, proves this argument. Planners' dual loyalties and dual sources of status (i.e., the government and the local communities) obstructed their ability to operate beyond the production of written documents. The government viewed these experts as representatives of the communities, and thus felt no obligation to involve them in most decisions. The communities, on the other hand, viewed these experts as government-biased agents, an thus limited their cooperation with these agents. Planners were able to generate cooperation and increase their involvement in local political decision-making only when they were hired by the local communities.[4]

Planners may prefer to call this function "advocacy", assisting the politically needy either through direct involvement with such "clients" (Davidoff, 1965), or at some

distance from them (Albrow, 1970). Such aspirations, at best, do not seem to affect planners' status in organisations. In many cases, however, they may only punctuate the problems of unclear status and conflicting loyalties planners often face.

The planner-negotiator. The planner-negotiator likewise faces a problem of dual loyalties that is a direct result of his status (Jowell, 1977). In this function, however, planners tend to face conflicts between private developers or those economically advantaged, whose initiatives may be needed by the public agency, and the public agency, which will attempt to stress its "control". In working with either party, planners are expected to obtain agreements that will satisfy both sides (Schon, 1982). Professional skills count here, but the personal characteristics that permit the management of the negotiation are equally important (Kirk, 1980).

Planning studies tend to place the bargaining advantage in the private sector; this is linked to the specific perspective of power and influence in social systems, rather than to the nature of planning function. This function is most common in discussions of land-use planning and during the process of granting development permits (Schon, 1982; Kirk, 1980; Healey, 1992).

On the whole, studies focus on the planner's role within his immediate organisational environment, assuming this to be a public planning agency (this is probably the easiest environment for assessing planning practice, since

here planners function within a fairly visible set of rules). Studies also tend to associate greater "limited freedom" with higher official status. This argument can be empirically assessed. Concurrently, planners' relations with other organisations are poorly discussed, presumably because these relations are assumed to be remote from most planning functions (except, maybe, that of the negotiator). Discussions of such relations do exist, but with respect to different public services in which scholars attempt to reveal the patterns of influence between the public and private sectors that are the result of professional mediation (Bilski, 1980; Dunleavy, 1980a). In general terms, we may suggest that a planner's ability to influence other organisations depends on the socio-political role of the organisation employing the planner - its scope of activities and political power, as previously discussed.

The different planning functions, each challenging in its own way, lend themselves to several important implications for our case:

* Personal contacts and the input of personal characteristics are allowed by theories, in one way or another, to affect concrete planning practices.
* Each planning function may be appealing in different aspects, but the limited power of the planner to exercise influence "cries out", and is evident in all discussions.
* Consequently, measures such as those suggested in the previous chapter may improve the performance potential of planners, i.e., their ability to integrate initiatives into political-administrative decision-making systems.
* We cannot suggest that any specific function is

particularly appropriate for the practice of regional development strategy, each may be useful in different contexts.

* Empirical studies do suggest the relevance of active attempts to promote ideas and plans rather than merely following instructions - a strength that stems from planners' attitude toward planning practice and, at times, from some sort of deviation from prevailing norms and rules.
* Studies emphasise the complex of organisations planners operate within, their complicated relations to planners, and the importance of these issues to the understanding of planning practice.

What are, then, the determinants of planners' access to decision-making processes and their role within them?

The specific status a planner must enjoy in order to participate actively in the decision-making process depends largely on the nature of the organisation involved. In some cases, this status is conferred by planning laws or regulations that take planners' proposals into account. In other cases, planners serve as consultants to top decision-makers, thus affecting the latter by virtue of their dependence on these consultants and the reliability of their advice. However, the planners' official status is important only insofar as they can exploit it to present proposals in a fashion that commands attention and response. They may, nevertheless, face a major problem, that is, the need to conform with the organisation's goals or functional scope

(Friend, 1980; Schon, 1983). Planners' proposals are expected both to further the performance of their organisations and to benefit the entire regional system. Yet, this task may necessitate a change in the prevailing attitudes of decision-makers, which may further imply drastic change in the functional basis of the organisation, and may affect the personal status of specific decision-makers within the organisation, who, needless to say, may be disinclined to accept the proposed change. Therefore, assuming that the planning proposals are relevant and professionally sound, two opposed patterns of behaviour may be used in their presentation. Planners may avoid opposition by refraining from presenting non-conformist proposals or by modifying the proposals in order to satisfy expectations (Baum, 1980). Alternatively, they may present their proposal and act to promote it, in spite of the risk of rejection. These alternatives should reflect a combination of the nature of the organisation (in view of its ability to absorb planning initiatives with the changes they inherently augur) and the professional and personal characteristics of the planner (Friend, 1980). In this context, I argue that planners may compromise with expectations only insofar as this does not implicitly denigrate the professional competence of their proposals, although this is sometimes difficult to achieve in practice. Indeed, this dissertation rests on the assumption that planners can and should mobilise decision-makers to follow their proposals, and that they may invoke various ways of achieving this only if their goals are strictly defined.

Generally speaking, these aspects of planning practice

are important because it is assumed here that, first, the planner depends on decision-makers for execution, and second, that the strategic function is an essential part of the regional development process. Indeed, an analysis of the role of planners in decision-making processes, with respect to their ability to integrate strategy into these processes and affect its implementation, leads us to distinguish among three categories of elements facilitating planning practice:

* **Structural-functional:**
  This category encompasses the relationship between the organisation's scope and the regional strategy, expressed in terms of the former's ability to absorb the strategy, including the changes and scale of investments it requires. These relations are affected by the extent of the required commitment to a proposal, attendant costs, scale of investments, conformity with the organisation's policy and attitude toward the region, as well as the planner's location (official and unofficial) within the organisation. Problems arise because of the nature of regional strategy, which almost inevitably prescribes change. Therefore, the major question is how planners should cope with them.

* **The professional attributes of the strategy** (and the planner):
  This refers to competence of the strategy - how well it provides conceptual and practical means with which to cope with regional processes and future development. Among them, the most important is timing, both of its presentation and its recommended implementation (as

further discussed). In the context of acceptance, a major factor in affecting decision-makers' attitudes toward the strategy is information. Nor should the importance of the quality of the means of presentation be underestimated.

* **The behavioural-personal characteristics of planners and "partners":**
  A subjective, and unpredictable determinant is the planner's ability to approach decision-makers and create personal contacts, through which he may penetrate the decision-makers' "world" and affect their attitude toward the proposed strategy. This determinant assumes that decision-making is strongly affected by personal, subjective contacts, thus may be crucial in the implementation of a strategy (Friend, 1976).

To conclude, this classification implies that the integration of a strategy into a regional system is strongly conditioned by planners' attributes and their ability to utilise their professional capabilities for formulating a strategy and promoting its implementation. These quantities are crucial for the establishment of a basis for a breakthrough with regard to the existing situation, since, as previously suggested (Chap. 2), the regional system is structured for development in inconsistent, sporadic changes, whereas the type of change that may be required is consistent with long-run objectives that restructure its components. Indeed, a strategic approach that incorporates several, previously discussed, principles should facilitate planners' work and permit them to steer strategy along

routes over which they may have considerable control:

* The availability of vulnerable decision-making determinants provides a point of departure for determining the issues to be tackled and the means to implement the strategy proposed.
* The decision-makers' commitment can be used as a measure of the potential efficacy of a planning initiative.
* The acceptance of the idea that a given planning product should not be regarded as the only one available in the market, nor treated as generating interest in itself, implies that planners should make active attempts to promote the integration of a certain planning product into a specific decision-making context. Indeed, planners should make use of various marketing, lobbying, and public-relations procedures, in order to reach the potential consumers for different parts of the project.
* The acceptance of the need to specify the strategy into working procedures, or "packages", may further be an effective way of coping with large-scale initiatives (see also the following section).

Nevertheless, the entire process is subject to fundamental constraints, which, in most cases, will thwart the continuous implementation of strategy. It should be made clear that there are no formulas guaranteeing a successful planning experience. In practice there is never any certainty that a strategy will be both sound and come to the attention of its target audience, even if it appears to meet all the requisite determinants.

To sum up, this section of the chapter dealt with the organisational context of regional strategy, which is argued to be an important aspect of planning practice.

Having asserted that the nature of the organisation within which planners function has a major effect on the nature of the strategy, we went on to argue that it is the planners' task to take advantage of the organisation's characteristics to bring about the integration of the proposed strategy into the decision-making system.

Furthermore, because both the public and the private sectors may have a role to play in regional development processes, it was concluded that the type of organisation within which planners function is not as important as their ability to mobilise decision-makers in the service of the proposed strategy, and to impose their influence on the system as a whole.

Consequently, the remaining question refers to how planners may carry out this task, that is, what kind of strategy may permit the planner to carry out such a difficult task?

4.5 Strategic Breakthrough

The aim of regional development strategy is to determine the timing, scale, and "actors" of an intervention that will provide this region with a sustainable edge over other regions (its competitors) in particular issues. The major aspects to which the strategy may refer and with which the strategist should deal are discussed above. The question of present concern is fairly straightforward: how may these be integrated into a strategic framework? Indeed, along with the principle approach expressed in the entire discussion of regional strategy and its related environment, the following proposal is expressed.[5]

Thus far the discussion focused on locating or identifying every issue deemed important for planning practice within a single coherent framework governing regional processes. Emphasis was placed on the rationale underlying a decision to stress certain aspects and their practical implications. This approach neither determined the aspects that deserve attention in specific cases nor discussed the specific means by which these aspects should be analysed and implemented. Rather, it attempted to point out the variety of aspects that may prove relevant for planning purposes, while indicating how each aspect is integrated into the regional process approach. Briefly stated, the discussion of regional systems emphasised the importance of competition and conflict-relations among the many components that form its structure, and are crucial in any attempt to effect changes. Because competition is generated over resources, the discussion then turned to the concept of commitment as the outcome of various decision-

making determinants that affect resource allocation, and stressed its importance as an element planners should aim to affect. Having also argued that commitment is highly relevant to the resolution of the inherent uncertainty in the planning process, we further suggested that planners' awareness of the vulnerability potential of certain decision-making determinants may permit them to enhance commitment to a certain planning product or planning initiative among decision-makers. Thus, we arrived at a "team" composed of three basic "players", whose interaction determines the nature of regional processes:

a. **The region**: the functional area of reference, with its processes representing the result of competition.
b. **The "partners"**: decision-makers involved in regional processes and motivated by the need or wish to improve their terms of access. Their pattern of involvement in the planning process is measured by the extent of their commitment to the planning product and to the regional development process.
c. **Planners**: who aim to initiate change in the regional system by activating a planning product (e.g., the strategy) and by utilising planning techniques and resources to promote integration of the planning product into a specific decision-making system.

By implication, the type of planning process envisioned fashions the regional system in a process of interactions between "partners" and planners, with the latter directly involved in socio-organisational activities. This being the case, it may seem insufficient to planners to reveal mainly

the various functional opportunities they may face. It might be preferable, by this line of reasoning, to prescribe specific actions - what to do, when, and where. It might also be preferable to prescribe one theoretical approach to decision-making as most suited for any planning practice. This dissertation is distinguished by the fact that it gives the planner a broad latitude in the determination of his specific mode of function and the theoretical base of his initiative. My experience, indeed, as reflected in the perspective presented in this dissertation, has been that it is precisely this type of "freedom" that is most important in structuring a strategic approach by which the changes needed to sustain a regional development process may be initiated. But what is the type of framework within which planners may realise this freedom? What kind of strategy do we need?

Most prevailing regional planning approaches and regional strategies are constructed on a rigorous process of analysis, projection of trends, and estimation of constraints, all of which lead to a conceptual framework and specific recommendations that are often "comprehensive" in their concern with an extremely wide variety of regional components. This very tendency, however, may lead to stagnation, especially since it permits the inconsistent effect of day-to-day events to determine the region's nature. It thus is argued that only a conceptual (strategic) breakthrough, driven by creative and intuitive thought rather than purely rational processes, can lead to the desired change, even though it may clash with the existing "culture". This is not to dismiss the relevance of analysis.

On the contrary: efficient analysis provides an indispensable stimulus and a necessary tool for the examination of emerging ideas. A step-by-step methodology such as systems analysis, however, seems insufficient in a world unsuited to linear modeling. An alternative, non-linear method, leaving room for the integration of "brainstorms" and flashes of ideas and imagination, would seem to be more relevant for an environment in which challenges arise. Furthermore, such an environment is accessible only when planners are not "locked" into a rigid methodology that dictates the stages and outcome of the planning process, and thus stifles innovation and creativity. In short, it is proposed that planners apply a "strategic thinking", that is, a mentality situated between systems analysis and pure intuition, which is marked by the ability to analyse regional processes (or make use of an analysis) coupled with an intellectual flexibility, by which the planner may come up with realistic responses to changing situations.

These arguments immediately bring two practical questions to the fore:

a. How, if at all, can a "strategic mind" be produced? The "mind" in question is enriched by an imaginative and intuitive abilities to grasp the major aspects of situations or phenomena, both strengthened by intellectual capabilities. Some people have the confidence to follow their intuitions and allow their imagination to be integrated into their decision-

making. Others may need a basic methodological framework, such as that provided in this dissertation, with which they can structure their work in a way that elicits creative strategy. This assumes that by providing planners with a basic framework, within which they determine their specific way of operating and choose among the operational opportunities that emerge during their engagement with the complex of regional systems, the basic precondition for enhancing a creative strategy is met. Underlying this assumption is another assumption that the actual process of selecting, from among the components of regional systems and the decision-making determinants, those that are relevant for stimulating specific regional changes, requires a fundamental intellectual process that can elicit and initiate the imaginative attitude and creativity envisioned here. Obviously, these qualities are also a function of the personal-mental integrity of specific planners, including their self-confidence and articulation ability. However, most professionally qualified planners may be stimulated by the above process, and, thereby, may be able to fashion an appropriate regional strategy.

b. What constitutes the product of "strategic thought"? Alternatively, what input is needed to generate this "output"? Such a product may be at odds or clash with existing operating norms. If this is so, how may it be adopted, and why might it be implemented?

The answer should be sought in the combined effect of the nature of proposed strategy and the means adopted

by planners to promote it by taking advantage of their potential opportunities to operate within a specific institutional context. The principles of the proposed strategy are as follows:

* The strategy is distinct from other policies governing the promotion of regional development by virtue of the concept of competition, this being the basis for creating important change as opposed to operational improvements. Accepting that implies the need to question the very nature of the existing system and the validity of conventional solutions and policies, since a basic acceptance of existing parameters is bound to lead merely to improvements that maintain an existing structural-functional status quo. For example, assume the case a planner who operates in an organisation that is heavily involved in the establishment of new settlements as a vehicle to increase the population of a given region. This planner may find it "natural" to be concerned with questions of where and how additional settlements can be added to the region. We, however, suggest that this planner will come to question the validity of creating the new settlements as a tool to increase population. This kind of planning attitude takes nothing for granted that may create access to areas or components susceptible to change, and to decision-makers who are willing to be involved.
* Coping with the regional system from the point of view of competition also requires to distinguish

between factors whose associated problems can be tolerated, as opposed to factors whose effect on the region's relative condition is likely to be significant. The latter cannot be left aside. Only in certain cases, a poor neighbourhood may be tolerated while insufficient physical access between an industrial plant operating in this area and other areas cannot be tolerated.

* In principle, most attempts to promote implementation require an "aggressive" planning approach that is based upon planners' active efforts to integrate a planning product into decision-making system, which utilises marketing procedures and exploits other regions' inferiority as major tools for stimulating decisions and directing regional processes. A strategy that is not accompanied by an awareness of this is a useless one. By "marketing", we refer to the various ways to "sell" the planning product. Such means are thoroughly discussed in the business literature, and thus we need not specify the available tools.
* Once decision-makers have been made familiar with the essence of the planning product, the next stage is to secure their commitment to this product, in full or in part. Thus, by use of the methods described above, the implementation of the strategy may be advanced. As noted, however, further specification of the strategy is equally important for this purpose.
* Since the world is undergoing constant change, the

> planning product should be amenable to change of two kinds: that of internal components, and that of the issues and decision-makers subject to it. A third kind of change, touching on the essence of the strategy, is unquestioned. This flexibility, however, is not limitless. Within the parameters of our concern with accessibility to and within a region, we may shift from roads to telecommunication, or even to the transportation services. But we may not start dealing with the taxation system that encourages the use of certain type of cars.

Finally, it remains to generate the principle structure of the proposed strategy, as illustrated in Diagram 2 (in the following page).

An analysis of the regional condition is the starting point of any strategy. It is at this stage that one determines the major characteristics of the regional system and the very need for a strategy. The analysis should provide an overall perspective on the issues of concern, and, as argued throughout this dissertation, it should provide a comparative perspective of the regional system. Because the analytical techniques available for this are thoroughly discussed in the literature, there is no need to elaborate on them here. It is assumed that the planner should be able to determine those techniques that are most relevant to his case or tasks. The outcome of this comparative analysis should provide the following:

Diagram 2: REGIONAL STRATEGY



* An initial insight into the current and potential relative strength of a specific regional system.
* A basis for identifying potential "partners" (decision-makers who are likely to involve themselves directly in the planning process).
* A basis for determining the key factors of development (mentioned in Chapter 2).

All of these should be ascertained concurrently, insofar as this is possible, because they are strongly interrelated. The choice of "partners" should be connected with their role in major regional processes; their role, in turn, affects the choice of the key factors of development.

The "vision", the planner's ideas about the future of the region and his insights into components that are both malleable and capable of creating some cumulative effect, coalesces into the planning product, in which ideas are clearly articulated and the means to achieve them spelled out (at least in part). Because this planning product aims to be a source of reference for decision-making processes affecting the region, and is the major tool by which planners may disseminate their ideas, it should be structured so as to be accessible to all interested players (in the way its contents are articulated and in any other meaningful aspect). It should also be reducible to specific parts for presentation to different decision-makers and further execution. As previously argued, however, this planning product should not necessarily be presented in full to decision-makers. At the same time, the content of the planning product is not rigid, in the sense that it is likely to change throughout the implementation process. In

most cases, the "first edition" will probably be rather abstract (but not too abstract, because abstractions do not easily command basic commitment). As the planning process advances, arguments and recommendations can be specified.

This scheme presents one possible way to approach the task of imposing one's impact on the decision-making process. It is based on the author's experience, which suggests that a multi-dimensional procedure, one that permits simultaneous actions on various planes and ensures their integration, is best suited to the regional system paradigm. The specific device is **the "working package"**, that is, a group of highly interconnected issues (e.g., employment and housing opportunities) that should be worked out together. "Working out" implies a greater level of detail in planning, from the initial "grand" vision to the level of specific policies, programmes, and procedures. In practice, this type of attitude toward specific elements of the strategy also permits the planner to bring in various specialists, thus increasing the likelihood of efficient treatment of problems and the creation of relevant solutions. It is argued thereby that strategists not only should not but also cannot cope with all the specific elements of a strategy. Rather, it is their task in this regard to reduce the issues into manageable "packages" and to link each one to the overarching strategic perspective.

While specific solutions to specific problems are worked out, strategists should concern themselves with **the "partners" of the strategy** - those decision-makers who can be attracted to the process of stimulating change in the

regional system. My experience proves that this task calls for a "business" approach, entailing marketing, public relations, and lobbying. The choice of the relevant procedure depends on the nature and quantity of the task. An attempt to reach a wide variety of population groups will probably require a public relations campaign. Lobbying procedures may be most appropriate when one needs to bring public pressure to bear on political decision-makers. Attempts to "sell" a private entrepreneur may be realised by a "door-to-door" technique.

Once again, choosing the best method by which to approach decision-makers, and the selection of the decision-makers themselves, are subject to the specific context within which these selections are made, and depend on the planner's implementation abilities. Moreover, these decisions can be made only with direct reference to other aspects of the strategy and current changes in the region concerned. To be sure, planners should not allow every change to modify their strategy. Indeed, the strategy should safeguard the integrity of the overview (e.g., of processes, activities, issues) so as to determine the relative importance of each dimension.

Summing up, this diagram is presented as a one-way, "top-down" procedure. It should be emphasised, however, that the essence of the strategic approach lies in its ability to provide a framework for multi-dimensional, task-oriented concern with regional processes.

As such, the scheme may seem to prescribe a rather "standard" type of strategy, especially since it reflects

something of the "systems approach" - a pyramid structure in which analysis serves as the basis for determining specific recommendations and actions. The structure of the strategy should be presented consequentially, so that the viewer may understand its principal elements. This, however, does not necessitate a one-way, single-direction attitude. Rather, work should proceed as the planner deems relevant, even if the basic structure is somewhat abrogated thereby. This is permissible as long as the basic requisites of strategy are satisfied (e.g., that the ideas are accompanied by a profound understanding of the issues under consideration).

Finally, the important point is the content of the proposed strategy, that sets a given strategy apart from all others, as expressed by the following principles:

* Emphasis on the relative advantages of a region, implying a selective concern for its components and the stimulation of performance in key factors of the regional system.
* Commitment of decision-makers to the strategic approach (all or parts of it) as the route to implementation.
* An "aggressive" planning approach - the marketing of ideas and projects, aimed at taking advantage of other regions' inferiorities.
* The ability to integrate short-term changes into the overarching perspective.
* The flexibility of specific elements within the overarching perspective.

Conclusions

Having established (in the previous chapters) the framework for planning practice's operational environment, that is, the region, the decision-making environment, and planners' potential strengths in it, the essence of this chapter lies in the presentation of the proposed approach that may assist planners to promote the processes they desire or deem necessary. Indeed, in view of the complexity of the region and decision-making system on the one hand, and the need to direct various forces toward a common goal under conditions in which planners have only indirect control over resources and operate under complicated institutional condition on the other hand, the strategic attitude presented here seem most relevant.

The discussion was developed from the basic perspective of a strategic function as an important element of attempts to influence regional processes. This perspective is not necessarily shared by the various forces that operate in the regional system. Planners are therefore faced with a difficult task in generating commitment on the part of certain decision-makers to the planning product and directing decision-making processes along strategic principles. In confronting this task, planners should be aware of the importance of the limits of the strategy and the continuous specification of its components, as well as of the capacity of specific decision-makers ("partners") to follow the strategic perspective or its specific segments presented to them. Indeed, the discussion emphasised the

complicated and context-specific nature of the above aspects of planning practice, thus providing planners with great freedom to determine their attitudes in concrete areas. These areas include the theoretical approach adopted for the analysis of decision-making and the determination of leading regional components, as well as the personal characteristics to be applied during the planning process and in the establishment of planners' relations with the given institutional context.

In practice, several important guidelines for a strategic approach were highlighted. Among them are the importance of the interactions between region, partners, and planners; the need to integrate imaginative and intuitive insights into a structured analysis; the integration of decision-makers' commitment to a planning product as the route toward implementation; and expressing the different time-spans relevant to different levels of specification of the strategic perspective. Finally, with regard to the postulate that there is no one "good" or appropriate planning product (i.e., the product's effectiveness depends on the concrete context within which it is operationalised), a principle structure of strategy was proposed. This structure, although meaningless by itself, should assist planners in determining their specific direction and structure with which to direct regional processes. It should also be emphasised that a regional strategy is not the only planning product of the strategic perspective; the outcome of this approach may provide a base for devising several additional products.

The proposed strategic approach is argued to establish fertile grounds for planning practice. This is attained through a process of stimulating changes within key regional components, while working simultaneously in various dimensions that have the potential of establishing a positive cumulative effect, or encouraging development in the desired direction. Practicing this type of strategy is by no means an easy task, especially since it requires that planners constantly be alert to emerging changes, and demonstrate outstanding integrity, as expressed by their professional qualifications, their creative mind, and sensitivity, to establish their role in the relevant decision-making system. Indeed, problems are likely to arise in every step planners may take. Thus, it is the way in which they cope with these problems and constraints that is of immense importance for the content of the implemented planning initiative. Importantly, planners' actual attempts to promote the integration of a certain planning product into the political-administrative system is crucial, the planning product is most likely not be executed without such active role.

Following these arguments, the next part of this dissertation consists of the presentation and analysis of a specific case of actual struggle on the part of planners to make their planning initiative a sound one, and see to its implementation. It is a study of planners' role in regional processes, which analyses the planning experience in view of the major strategic perspective presented in this thesis. Specifically, reference will be made to the actual choice of

regional components and decision-makers as the cornerstone of the strategy, to the way in which the planners practiced their choice, as well as their way of interpreting actual working principles and procedures from their initial vision. This analysis aims to prove that implementation of a strategy depends to a large extent on the combined effect of planners' production capabilities and their active attempts to promote implementation through their skills in gaining access to major decision-makers. Put differently, lack of the above qualities is likely to have a negative impact on implementation, even if the strategy's professional competence is unquestioned.

Notes

(1) Later in this chapter, we shall suggest that a regional strategy for region A can encourage the plant to undertake the training scheme in region A, if this is considered desired for the region.

(2) "Need" as a guide for activities, as opposed to need as a "cover to distinguish between choices made on quite different basis" (Baur, 1977, p.671).

(3) A note from a discussion between planners employed in the WZO Planning Section, Haifa region office, dated October 1984.

(4) This observation is based on my work, as a member of the planning team of Project Renewal in Yeruham (a new-town located in the south of Israel) during the years 1978-80.

(5) This proposal was initially stimulated through my acquaintance with a former director of Intel Israel, Ltd. and the way this company inspires innovations, as compared with the public company by which I was employed.

Chapter 5: THE WESTERN GALIL

Introduction

The Galil is a hilly area in the north of Israel, noted for its spectacular scenery. At 1,660 square kilometers, it accounts for 8% of Israel's territory. Within this area, 610 square kilometers (3% of the country) are defined as Western Galil.[1] Map 1 illustrates its location.

Any study of the Galil as a whole, and Western Galil in particular, is a study of a sub-national physical area composed of different and independent socio-economic functional units, for many of which physical proximity is the major, if not the only, shared element. "Galil" is neither an administrative region, nor a unified functional system composed of closely interrelated socio-economic and political entities. The study of "Western Galil" is not a study of the type commonly seen in the literature, i.e., that of one regional system being affected by a major trend such as the rise and fall of a dominant industrial sector, with its consequent chain reaction of effects in the entire regional functional system. Rather, it is a study of a potentially emerging "region", of structural changes within different and separate functional units that through their combined effects planted roots for the establishment of a distinct "regional" entity in a specific part of the Galil (i.e., Western Galil).

Nevertheless, Western Galil shares in some of the major historical processes that characterise the entire Galil.


MAP 1: ISRAEL , GALIL
&
WESTERN GALIL
LEBANON
SYRIA
HAIFA
SEA OF GALIL
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
TEL-AVIV
JERUSALEM
JORDAN
DEAD SEA
16
15
14
13
4
3
7
INDEX:
International Boundary
Arministic Line 1949
Galil
Western Galil
Natural Area
N.A. Code
2

Source: C.B.S.

Among them are the Jewish settlement process, infrastructure development, and local political institutionalisation. All are strongly linked to the socio-economic and political processes that structure the Israeli system. They manifest themselves within a national spatial system that displays (and has displayed for some time) a clear tendency to centralise the vast majority of its activities and population in a small part of the country, leaving the rest (mainly the northern and southern regions) relatively unpopulated and heavily dependent on processes carried out in the country's core areas. Table 1 in the appendix illustrates this spatial distribution. In 1987, for instance, some 70% of the population occupied about 14% of the land, leaving 29% of the population with 86% of the national land reserves.

This issue of the spatial structure of the country is widely discussed in the literature. Scholars and politicians tend to agree that this kind of uneven distribution is undesirable. Their rationale rooted in the alleged structural inefficiencies that this state of affairs produces in the national socio-economic system (i.e., large congested urban areas vs. underdeveloped peripheries), and, in Israel's case, is further supported by arguments about the need to populate border areas. Yet, at 200 kilometers from the centre of the country,[2] Galil is indeed rather remote from Israel's major national centres of population, political affairs, and socio-economic activity; and it has been so for the past 40 years at least. Thus Galil, and Western Galil, have never attracted masses of people from the congested central areas, despite local advantages such

as low land prices. Neither has the region served as a last resort for land-intensive production processes, nor as an active national leisure area exploiting the beautiful, relatively untouched landscape. On the contrary, the situation in the Galil is such that physical and functional distance are directly related. This condition prevails even though the Galil is generally regarded as an area in socio-economic stress and with a strategic-defence importance (Hill, 1980), which has encouraged the initiation of different public walfare-economic policies and induced planners over the past 40 years to issue a wide variety of plans (national and Galil-specific) aimed at offsetting the spatial-functional centralisation trend and promoting social and economic development.

This begs the question connected with the nature of national public policies (i.e., expressed and salient objectives, coupled with the means adopted to implement them). Indeed, studies lead to the conclusion that even in the pre-state British Mandate period, the Jewish political system purposely fostered spatial and functional centralisation (Reichman, 1979). As to the Israeli political system, scholars (Horowitz and Lisak, 1977; Weiss, 1977) suggest that the underdevelopment of peripheral areas is explicable in terms of the central government's attempts to maintain its dominant role by limiting the power of local political institutions. Consequently, no thoroughgoing attempts have been made to develop areas such as the Galil. Other scholars suggest that the lack of an immediate need to deal with the Galil has precluded the political system becoming seriously concerned with its development; Sofer

(1985), for example, implies that although Western Galil has an Arab majority, the absence of basic signs of socio-political unrest among the Arabs has thwarted most controversy concerning, and, thus, political attention to, the question of the affiliation of this province with sovereign Israel.

The efforts of the government to maintain central control seem, on the whole, to provide the best explanation of the historical processes that established the functional peripheral role of areas such as Western Galil within the national system. Among the means invoked in pursuit of this control, scholars stress the fragmentation of local functional units and the delegation of only minor authority to regional institutions (Turgovnic, 1986). Since a thoroughgoing analysis of Israel's national political and socio-economic system is beyond the scope of this dissertation, we merely note that the situation of Western Galil as described in this chapter is intimately related to national-level political and socio-economic activities.

This chapter establishes the basis for the case study of a specific planning initiative and strives to reflect the major characteristics of Western Galil as identified during this planning process. Thus, general background information is provided on Western Galil and, when relevant, on Galil as a whole, describing the major areas of reference in the planning initiatives, and spelling out the issues with which planners concerned themselves. This being the goal, this chapter is mostly descriptive. It refrains from offering an in-depth analysis of processes and their future

implications, as this would exceed the scope of the dissertation.

5.1 Delineation of Boundaries

Having emphasised (Chap. 2) the importance of defining regional boundaries in a manner that facilitates the discussion of issues relevant to the most pertinent aspects of the intrinsically complex nature of any regional system, this dissertation now addresses itself to a specific planning process that proposed clearly articulated objectives as to the nature of expected change within a concretely defined section of the Galil, namely "Western Galil".

Although these areas are composed of several clearly identifiable geographic units, the terms "Galil" and "Western Galil" are variously applied to different areas. The vast majority of routine references to Galil (i.e., in newspapers, by politicians) tends to disregard these differences, although the term is used as a synonymous with the northern reaches of the country. Scholars are inclined to set boundaries in accordance with prevailing national administrative jurisdictions, which divide the country into districts, sub-districts, and natural areas. These divisions present an important advantage for data collection requirements. Indeed, the availability of a large official data base on the country as a whole and its specific administrative regions (maintained by the Central Bureau of

Statistics) is highly attractive for research purposes, especially since "regions" are not politically and economically established entities.

As previously argued, however, such boundaries may prove problematic if they force the analyst to treat an area that does not coincide with the processes being analysed. Nevertheless, since the spatial boundaries of Western Galil are well defined within the planning work discussed her, our task is easy, although one practical difficulty arise: the area of concern gradually expanded during the planning process, starting from the Segev Block in the south and middle of Western Galil, to a larger area embracing the northwest of the region.

As we wish to deal with one region only, we shall define Western Galil in accordance with the extended frame of reference used in the most recent planning initiative. This is further warranted because the area is rather small and well defined within the Galil; it possesses numerous similarities in terms of the socio-economic processes affecting it in the past few years. This decision leads to an important practical advantage: the extended area corresponds (with the exception of two small settlements) to the prevailing official administrative demarcation of "natural areas". Thus, it permits us to make use of the most solid and comprehensive national source of information, that compiled by the Central Bureau of Statistics; it also eliminates confusion regarding the areas included within "Western Galil", and facilitates historical comparison.

In practice, the "natural areas" defined as Western Galil under this rubric consist of numbers 14 and 15. Since

we shall compare Western Galil with the entire Galil, reference will be made to the "Galil" within its indisputable boundaries, embracing "natural areas" numbers 4, 7, and 13 through 16. All of these areas fall within the North District (see Map 1). They are confined to one morphological system - the mountainous part of Galil (excluding the Hula-Jordan and Yzreel Valleys), and create a sufficient basis for providing a general background on the Galil.

Map no.2 illustrates the major aspects of the spatial structure of Western Galil.


MAP 2: WESTERN GALIL
DISTRIBUTION OF
MAJOR LAND USES
Lebanon
NAHARIA
TEFEN
ACRE
SEGEV
Mediterranean Sea
HAIFA
TO TEL AVIV
Sea of
Galil
INDEX.
Western Galil
Industrial Zone
Misgav Community Centre
Settlements: Jewish- pre 1977 post 1977 Ma'alot Karmiel Outside W.G
Arab - W.G Outside W.G
Roads: motorway main regional local
International Boundary

5.2 Physical Structure[3]

Western Galil consists of several physical units that coincide with the basic structure of the Galil and its two major physical sections: Lower and Upper Galil (Upper Galil extends to the northern border of Israel). These sections differ in elevation, climate, landscape, fauna and flora, and settlement history. The major physical sections of Western Galil are:

a. The Segev and Zalmon[4] blocs, located at the south east extremity of Galil.
b. The Tefen Bloc and a small area to its west, located in the south of Upper Galil and to the north of Segev Bloc.
c. These sections are separated by the Beith-Hakerem Valley. The town of Karmiel, located in the centre of this valley, represents the physical core of Western Galil.

The topography of this region exerts a major effect on its socio-economic activities, as is inevitable in such mountainous zones. This terrain prevents convenient and direct connections between various parts of the region, fails to provide large flat spaces suitable for space-intensive activities, and, most importantly, increases the expense of any type of construction. These aspects aside, the region has a typical, comfortable Mediterranean climate and is noted for its marvelous landscape, both of which are thoroughly described and discussed in the literature.

Roads Infrastructure: The road network of Galil is characterised by its attachment to historical routes, which

were determined by the area's physical features. During the 1950s-1960s, when the major national road network was planned and constructed, planners' perceptions[5] supported the establishment of a main national road axis along the coastal plain, thus emphasising the peripherality of the Galil, and encouraging the integrity of the functional separation between the large urban areas and the peripheries.

Several major thoroughfares cross this region and connect it with other parts of the country, as illustrated in Map 2. The map gives the impression of a well endowed transportation grid linking all parts of Western Galil, and the entire region, with outside areas by a diverse system of roads. In fact, the system provides rather poor access both within the region and between it and other parts of the country, because of two major features (Katz, Menuhin, Ludmer, 1982): first, the existing roads are fairly narrow, poorly paved, and unsafe; they are also unsuited to the actual volume of transportation; second, Galil has no major, high-quality traffic route. Consequently, the system is detrimental to regional integrity, as it provides poor internal access and renders external access problematic; The substandard regional network constricts the development potential of the region, limits the availability of various activities for different customers, and reduces the extent to which local demand for services and goods may contribute to regional development. This, in turn, fosters the area's sense of being peripheral and remote from major national urban centres.

Communications: The existing regional communications

infrastructure, based mainly on the telephone system, is fairly poor, fails to meet the current regional qualitative and quantitative demand, and thwarts the utilisation of alternative means of communications (Kela, 1985 and 1990).

Admittedly, the problem of communications underdevelopment is shared by the entire country. However, its impact on present and future development in Western Galil is especially acute. The absence of a satisfactory system affects the development of production activities of all kinds, for which communication facilities are crucial. Unfortunately, communications in the Galil does not compensate for the region's distance from major national urban areas and its poor physical accessibility. With the communications infrastructure in its present state, the region cannot take full advantage of the major product of modern life: information. Although the future negative impact of this drawback in the regional system is far beyond our ability to estimate, it will surely be crucial.

To sum up, the physical structure of Western Galil is such that convenient access cannot be taken for granted, although it offers several inherent advantages (such as opportunities to avoid congestion and create spatial separation between different activities).

5.3 Demography[6]

The population of Western Galil (1987) constitutes about 45% of the Galil's and 4.4% of the total population of Israel. This population is composed of two major socio-religious groups: Jews and non-Jews (referred to in this dissertation as "Arabs"). The vast majority (83%) of the population of Western Galil is non-Jewish, of whom 53% are Moslems, 27% Christians, and 20% Druze and Bedouins. Western Galil's Jewish population comprises 1% of the total Jewish population in Israel and about 30% of the Jews in Galil. Arabs in Western Galil, by contrast, account for 20% of the total Israeli-Arabs in the country, and more than 50% of the Arabs in the Galil. Table 2 (appendix) summarises these figures.

This socio-religious disparity and, in particular, the majority of Arabs within the territory of Western Galil, is often referred to as "the demographic problem of the Galil", which "cries" for public intervention aimed at offsetting this "negative Jewish balance" (Sofer, 1985). In fact, the issue of the absolute and proportional volume of the Jewish population had always been an essential aspect of any concern (planners' included) with the development of the Galil; its Jewish population growth has been regarded as an indication of the region's overall economic growth and social stability. These disparities are the result of several crucial differences between the Arab and Jewish population groups (commonly referred to as "sectors"). Indeed, each displays distinct socio-demographic, economic, and political characteristics (although differences within

specific social groups of each sector are also relatively acute), which are briefly discussed below.

In general, the population of Western Galil has been growing steadily over the years, both in absolute numbers and in terms of its proportion of the national and North District population, as shown in Table 3 (appendix). An analysis of this trend indicates several characteristics:

a. Relatively high rates of population growth (between the years 1972-1987), especially in comparison with the national and North District rates.
b. Deceleration of growth rates between 1972 and 1978.[7]
c. Two salient inter-sector distribution attributes are: An increase in the proportion of Jews in the region's population[8] and higher annual growth rates in the Jewish sector,[9] although in absolute numbers, Arab growth is much greater.

The major reasons for these disparate growth patterns are basically related to the sources of population growth. The growth in the Arab sector is fueled by "natural increase",[10] which is higher than in Jewish sector, coupled with negligible emigration. The Jewish sector, in contrast, displays a negative migration balance (mainly in New Towns) and a lower rate of "natural increase".

In conclusion, assuming that natural growth rates are maintained, the only way to increase the size of the Jewish population of Western Galil is to stimulate Jewish in-migration.

5.4 The Settlement System

The settlement system of Western Galil is a product of historical processes that determined the spatial distribution and functional structure of settlements. These processes, affecting Western Galil as much as the entire Galil (and other regions), created a diverse system that is steadily developing a set of similar socio-economic features, although maintaining a clear segregation between Jewish and Arab settlement sub-systems.

a. Historical Background

The Galil has been settled continuously since the Bronze Age, with each period characterised by distinct and exceedingly diverse events and population groups (Yitzhaki, 1978). The present spatial system is based on the historical processes whereby settlements' location was determined largely by the region's physical structure (the preferred locations have always been near the existing east-west transportation routes and close to valleys' arable land).

The pre-statehood national processes (during the British Mandate), as noted, "planted the initial roots" of Galil's peripheral role within what was to become the Israeli national system. Galil did not fall under the major criteria for the Jewish land acquisition process[11] (Reichman, 1979). Thus, Galil was relatively neglected, leaving its Arab majority and traditional spatial system largely undisturbed.

The establishment of the State of Israel inaugurated a

new era in Western Galil (as in Galil and the country as a whole), in which the most salient change in the past 40 years has occurred in the settlement system. This change reflects the dominant political-instrumental perspective, by which the massive construction of new settlements is the major way to attain regional development objectives and pursue territorial control. Planning initiatives, too, have constantly been concerned with the issue of establishing settlements. In fact, most of the fundamental changes in the functional mechanisms of Israel's peripheral areas that have taken place since the foundation of the state have been directly or indirectly caused by the large-scale establishment of new Jewish settlements. In the Galil, this unique process, in which almost 100 new Jewish settlements were established, triggered a series of changes in infrastructure and housing development, service expansion, and structural changes in the Arab sector (urbanisation and physical expansion of built areas).

Jewish new settlements were established in three major "waves":[12]

* An initial spurt in the first post-independence years (1948-1955), in which one New Town and 33 small settlements were newly established in the Galil[13] Six of the small settlements were located in Western Galil.
* An extension of the initial building boom (1956-1969), with the establishment of another three New Towns and 12 small settlements in Galil[14] Two New Towns and four settlements were located in Western Galil.
* A third wave of massive construction (1975-1985) of 47

settlements in the Galil,[15] of which 31 settlements in Western Galil.

This process, in which Jewish settlements were located within the Galil "heartland" (i.e., mostly Western Galil and other areas until then scarcely populated by Jews), resulted from a national policy meant to settle the country, while decentralising the population and absorbing immigrants flowing into Israel from post-World War II Europe, Africa, and Asia (Brutzkus, 1964).

The mid-1970s stage deserves special emphasis. It began (as will be further discussed in Chapter 6) with the rapid construction of approximately 30 mitzpim (singular: mitzpe, a "watchtower settlement", in Hebrew), most of them located on the sites of permanent future settlements, for which Jewish-owned land was available for immediate needs. The "mitzpe" concept, first applied to a settlement process in the northern Negev (Israel's southern region) in the 1940s, refers to settlements that are a result of a process in which only the rudimentary facilities (temporary housing and basic infrastructure) are constructed before the permanent nature of the settlement is determined. The mitzpim process in Galil, therefore, enabled the establishment of settlements that varied in their basic characteristics (e.g., organisational structures, level of cooperation, and the local economic base), while still sharing several common features, such as the socio-economic complexion of the inhabitants, hilltop location (i.e., areas not populated by local Arabs), and, in most cases, physical proximity.

As a whole, this attitude toward the settlement construction process and the importance assigned to

settlements in the regional development process (that of Galil in this case) is thoroughly discussed in the literature; some scholars (e.g., Hill, 1980; Dror, 1964) view it as a distinct, and, in a sense, relatively "positive" element of Israeli public policy. They suggest that its advantages lies in that it enables state construction to take place under unusually difficult conditions (i.e., constant hostility from Arab nations, massive immigration flows, and a newly emerging state's administration). Others, however (e.g., Sofer and Finkel, 1988), stress the intrinsic disadvantages of the rapid, if not frantic, construction of new settlements, which ignored fundamental aspects of social economic infrastructure. In the context of Western Galil, any practical attempt to evaluate this process must take account of two facts: the actual regional role in the national system has not changed drastically over the years; nor has the relative size of Jewish population fundamentally changed, as contrasted to steady Arab demographic growth.

The development process within the Arab settlement system has been rather different from that of the Jewish sector. These differences manifest themselves in expansion of built-up areas and rapid population growth, reflecting the impact of the modernisation and urbanisation processes to which the entire Galil has been subject. Indeed, the Arab communities, unlike Jewish settlements, have undergone a "classic" urbanisation process within existing settlements.[16] Historical analysis suggests that whereas modernisation and urbanisation had been at work in the Arab

sector for many years, their scale and intensity may be linked to the Jewish settlement process in Galil, especially during the 1970s and 1980s. These changes affected the expansion of the built-up areas along major transportation routes, the development of mountaintop settlements, growing awareness of the importance of land ownership, and increased participation in the labour force (including increased propensity of women to work outside the home).

b. Structure of the Settlement System

The Israeli settlement system is often confusingly described, especially in relation to the notion of "rural settlements", commonly applied to various types of small Jewish localities that presumably exhibit socio-economic features distinct from large cities and metropolitan areas. Traditionally, this notion referred to all, mostly small, production-based (mainly agriculture) Jewish localities or communities with a certain degree of cooperativeness built into their organisational structure, such as Kibbutz, Cooperative Moshav, and Workers' Moshav.[17] Most of them are located in peripheral areas or spatially defined areas in the centre of the country. In this case, therefore, "rural" is synonymous with an agricultural economic base, cooperative organisation, and small size, thus distinguishing such settlements from other Jewish and all non-Jewish settlements. Some also refer to these settlements as the "working settlement system", still others utilise the term "rural settlement" in an unsystematic way, referring either to all small Jewish peripheral settlements, or to

part of them (for example, to those constructed by the Jewish Agency).[18]

This distinction, however, is no longer valid, for two reasons: First, some Arab settlements are still engaged in traditional, non-cooperative, family-based farming production processes, distinguished by specific socio-cultural features and spatial segregation from Jewish settlements. Second, Jewish "rural" settlements undergo, especially since the 1970s, an important change: existing settlements present a shift towards non-production-oriented communities), and non-cooperative and non-production-oriented settlements (i.e., those in which the internal production process is not an integral component of the settlement's functional system) are emerging. All create a "rural" settlement system that no longer performs any specific socio-economic roles distinct from cities and towns (as is the case in most modern capitalist societies) (Dunleavy, 1980a).

Alternatively, the national official approach (determined by the Ministry of the Interior), which defines "urban" as a settlement with population of 2,000 or more, smaller settlements as "rural", may be useful.[19] This "urban-rural" dichotomy is advantageous in creating one basis for defining all types of Jewish and non-Jewish settlements all over the country, overruling attempts to associate "urban" or "rural" phenomena with spatially distinct socio-cultural systems and economic activities. This definition, however, disregards the existence of major difference between Arab and Jewish settlements; whether defined as "urban" or "rural", they have specific socio-

economic and political characteristics that differentiate between them. This dissertation, therefore, will refrain from making an "urban-rural" distinction, referring instead to several types of settlements (whereby a "settlement" is taken as a broad notion, referring to any type of locality, regardless of its location, size, organisational and ethnic structure):

Metropolitan areas, or "large urban centres" - the chain of large cities located along the Mediterranean coastal plain and in the centre of the country. The major metropolitan areas are Tel-Aviv, Jerusalem, and Haifa.

New Towns - Jewish settlements established during the 1950s (with two exceptions in 1960s) in peripheral areas.

Various types of **collective settlements** - all Jewish, mostly small communities that structured on the basis of different levels of cooperation (i.e., from communal ownership and management of means of production, consumption, and most social facilities, to partial cooperation with regard to basic public services).

Arab settlements - mostly featuring an economic system based to some degree on agriculture, and forming socio-cultural and political communities distinct from the Jewish system.

On the whole, all settlements feature (following Dunleavy, 1982a, for example) social activities that can be defined as "urban". The differences between them express types of linkages to national political-economic institutions and specific local variants.

The major characteristics of the settlement system in Western Galil follow:

The Jewish sub-system is composed of New Towns and different types of collective settlements.[20] Although its population is a minority in the region, it is distributed across a much larger number of settlements than the Arabs, most of which are fairly small (an average of 200 inhabitants per settlement in most cases). The majority of the population, however, dwells in the New Towns, Karmiel and Ma'alot. With Karmiel in the centre and Ma'alot in the north of the Western Galil region, the spatial distribution of the collective settlements is rather systematic; they are located mainly on hilltops and mountain peaks, most of which previously were unpopulated. These settlements tend to be organised in clusters, although the physical proximity of the settlements' built-up areas is low due to large land reserves designated for future development. Nevertheless, settlements do not function as an integrated system, but rather as individual entities that cooperate either on the municipal level of organisation (within regional councils) or in national sectoral institutions (e.g., National Kibbutz Organization, The Moshavim Movement).

The Arab sub-system is distributed among a relatively small number of large (average population per settlement: 5,600) and rapidly growing settlements. Most settlements are situated along major regional roads, forming several large and densely populated spatial clusters. The Druze settlements tend to be congregated in upper Western Galil, the Bedouin townships mainly in the Zalmon area, and Muslim and Christian settlements in lower Western Galil. The built-up areas of these settlements are rather large and dense, since land reserves are not growing in accordance

with increasing demand (this is an important source of social unrest); internal infrastructure (roads, sewage systems) is very poor, especially in comparison to the nearby new Jewish settlements. Settlements are organised as individual economic and social entities, although cooperation between settlements is increasing, mainly for purposes of supplying public services such as education. They are composed of several ethnic groups, and are marked by a high degree of socio-political fragmentation (differences are to a large extent a function of the role of each ethnic group within the national system).[21]

Summing up, for many years, the actual existence of settlements, their spatial distribution, and their internal land uses, seem to have formed the major point of interest for political decision-makers, administrators, and professionals (planners not excepted). Intrinsic to their existence, settlements were implicitly assumed to have growth power and a self-generating economic system. Over the years, however, it became evident that important economic and social measures should be introduced in order to promote development of the masses of newly constructed settlements. Table 4 in the appendix lists the major characteristics of settlements in Western Galil. Map 2 illustrates their spatial distribution.

5.5 The Economic System

The nature of the regional economy is a combined effect of its role in the national system and the extent to which local economic forces may devise a "regional" sub-system. Processes identified in the past ten years, however, suggest that a distinct economic system is being established in Western Galil (distinct in relation to the entire Galil). This evolving "regional" economy is endowed with the following major attributes:

a. A relative importance to previously mentioned locational characteristics which put major constraints on economic activities. Certain types of economic activities (e.g., traditional land-consuming agriculture and industries highly sensitive to physical distance) cannot take place in the area, and accessibility between the different parts of the regional system and outside is difficult.

b. Dominance of the national political system in local-regional affairs: its impact, by means of direct financial allocations, indirect financial incentives (e.g., tax relief), and other policies does much to determine regional economic processes. Western Galil has no particular advantage over other peripheral areas in the case of incentives determined by locational criteria (e.g., assistance to "development areas"),[22] or over the country as a whole with respect to incentives allocated according to functional criteria, such as to export-oriented production firms, and housing liabilities (Ministry of Industry and Trade,

1989). These relations are further expressed in the high degree of dependence of the regional socio-economic components on public services, which are allocated and administered predominantly in accordance with criteria determined by national political institutions. This is an outgrowth of the fundamentals of Israeli public policy, which combines traditional welfare principles (grounded in socialist ideology).

c. Production activities of two extreme structures: small, mostly inefficient economic units in agriculture and industry are found in conjunction with large, private, and mostly sophisticated industrial and agriculture enterprises. The former are outgrowths of the traditional system; most of the latter developed in the past decade. This structure reflects changes in the national economy: the crisis in the cooperative production system and structural changes in production processes, which led to the ascendancy of privately owned, "high-tech" industries and the incursion of multinationals, the decreased potency of the Labour Union and its investment in peripheral areas, and structural changes in the labour force (i.e., increased participation of Arabs and women). Importantly, no major changes have occurred in the cost of labour, which remains rather expensive due to government and Labour Union control over this market (justified by the socialist ideology that has dominated State institutions) (Pat, 1990).

d. The industrial system Western Galil has some characteristics that suggest the existence of an

industrial development trend distinct from that of the Galil at large.[23] The major characteristics of the Jewish regional industrial production system are as follows: A great diversity of enterprises, functioning in different areas of production and vary in number of employees;[24] Most industrial plants are private,[25] with the exception of five plants owned by Rafael (the Authority for Combat Means Development) and the Labour Company;[26,27] 47% of the industries are "advanced" (according to Bergman's (1986) distinction between "advanced" and "traditional" industries), employing 67% of the labour in industry,[28] and devoting about 20% of their employees to R&D activities. Finally, 50% of the "advanced" industries[29] were established in the area during the 1980s[30] (from 1978 to 1980 there was a 360% growth in number of plants, and a 500% growth in employees). It should be noted that available data indicate that the Arab sector has made almost no private investments in large, "advanced" industrial plants.

By comparison, fundamental changes in agriculture are relegating this major traditional source of livelihood to a minor role in regional production activities. Its function today is largely its contribution to maintaining territorial control.[31]

e. Minimal cooperation on a regional basis among groups of similar settlements (moshavim or kibbutzim) or among nearby settlements, with the exception of small-scale activities in area of municipal services. This applies to both the Arab and the Jewish sectors. This

functional fragmentation is aggravated by the umbilical connections between local-regional individual economic units and their national organisations. Examples are the United Kibbutz Organisation and The Moshav Movement (affecting local socio-economic processes), or organisations such as Agresko, Ltd., a national exporter of agricultural products (and the sole option available in this field, for the most part).

f. The attributes of the regional labour force approximate the national averages.[32] The civilian labour force constitutes 88.5% of total employment, of which 45.8% are Jews and 54.2% Arabs (although the latter make up 83% of the total regional population).[33]

g. An in-depth analysis of the regional labour market reveals that the availability of abundant unskilled labour, mainly in the Arab sector and the New Towns, seems to meet the high prevailing regional supply of unskilled jobs (Jubran, 1983), especially in industrial plants. However, the total regional shortage of job opportunities leads to dependence on jobs in metropolitan Haifa, located within reasonable commuting distance (especially with respect to the Arab sector, within which the supply of jobs is less than 6% of demand; Jubran, 1983).

h. The major function of the Arab sector in the regional economy is that of a consumer of services and jobs. Capital within this sector is rarely reinvested in non-individual, non-family-based small enterprises.

j. Whereas agricultural activities are distributed among the entire region, the spatial distribution of the

industrial enterprises is rather clear: **the New Towns** (Karmiel and Ma'alot) host 61.7% of the region's industrial plants and 67.4% of industrial labour (about 50% of plants and 60% of employees are classified as belonging to "advanced" industries; 77% of these plants and 63% of their employees are in Karmiel); **The new settlements** (except Kfar-Havradim) are associated with 28% of the region's industrial plants and only 4.6% of its industrial labour. "Advanced" industries are in the majority, comprising 33% of the above plants and 44% of employees. Yet, although they account for 19.5% of the region's "advanced" plants, they employ only 3% of the region-wide labour in this category;[34] **Tefen industrial park (in the north) and Leshem complex (in Segev Bloc)** account for 10.3% of the area's industrial plants and 28% of its labour. Several (26%) are large industrial complexes, of which 80% are classified as "advanced", employing 78% of the workers in these areas. These plants tend to be privately owned; 30% function as branches of an external parent company, and 45% perform R&D functions. **Arab sector industry** is located mostly in the larger towns. Available data indicated that all industrial plants are "traditional", only 10% of plants employ more than 10 workers; only one (Kadmani Metal Industries, Ltd. of Yarka) employs more than 400 employees. An additional observation is the tendency of plants to be located in Druze settlements. This is probably a consequence of the privileged socio-political status of the Druze among the non-Jewish population.

Summing up, the major areas of economic development in Western Galil are largely a result of private initiatives rather than a purposeful public intervention. This is especially true with regard to industry. Agriculture, as a traditional source of subsistence and the economic base of settlements, was indeed subject to more intensive interventions, although along nation-wide principles.

5.6 The Institutional Structure

The institutional system is composed of elected and non-elected government bodies, an well as national and local non-governmental bodies. These organisations have separate administrative machineries to execute their policies. Importantly, most of them are nationally oriented in their policies (and structured in accordance with the national political Party system). Even the local authorities, which represent the major potential for non-national control, are vulnerable to the massive impact of the central government system. The great diversity of organisations connected with regional processes, the lack of coordination between them, and their strong links to the national political system, leave local organisations open to the massive influence of national policies, and thwart the emergence of a unified regional system of any kind.

This fragmented institutional structure was the subject of only a residual concern in planning practice. The latter tends to be exercised within public organisations, and to avoid questioning the given functional environment. This

system, however, is the subject of a growing academic concern that emphasises the links between the present characteristics of Western Galil (and Galil as a whole) and the public political-administative machinery, its impact on the region's processes, and the need to initiate changes in this machinery as a precondition for the promotion of Western Galil's development.

The major categories of organisations are briefly described below. It should be noted that throughout the dissertation we refer to two additional notions: "central government" and "local government" institutions. These represent the different public bodies that operate at the national level of decision-making, and predominantly non-national (regional or local) decision-making institutions, respectively. Both may consist of elected and non-elected bodies.

Local and Regional Authorities

These are elected bodies, which are discharge two major functions (Hoffman & Marcus, 1986):

a. Provision of local democratic representation within the national political system. Elections are distinct from those for the central government, although affiliations between local representatives and national parties are strong and direct (Lisak, 1977).
b. Delivery to the local community of three basic types of public services: nationally provided services (funded by central government and provided according to its guidelines), local compulsory services,[35] and local

voluntary services (as determined by the specific local authority).[36] In principle, local authorities are heavily dependent on direct and indirect government finance, although other sources of finance are available.

A wide variety of issues is subject to local public intervention, including land use planning (e.g., the provision of Building Permits, the initiation of local land use plans).[37] Differences between local authorities exist mainly in the quality of compulsory services and the variety and quality of complementary services.[38]

The local authorities in Western Galil fall into several categories:

a. Municipalities - towns with over 20,000 inhabitants, such as Karmiel.
b. Local councils - in settlements with 2,000 to 20,000 inhabitants, such as Ma'alot-Tarshiha and the Arab settlements.
c. Regional councils - incorporating several small settlements, as in Misgav.
d. Local Committees - within Jewish cooperative settlements (except for the Kibbutzim).[39]

On the whole, the local authority system is distinguished by high fragmentation (Turgovnic, 1986) and fairly inefficient spatial distribution (Kipnis, 1982).[40] Each authority functions as an individual entity, rarely integrating into a "regional" system, and at times, they compete with one another, to the detriment of regional

integrity. These kinds of relations make the Galil as a whole, and, at times, specific authorities, rather vulnerable to the impact of the central government system, which is highly dominant in any case.

Government Administration

The government system dominates Western Galil, with an actual and potential impact identifiable in almost every aspect of the regional system. Examples include prevailing patterns of physical development (the issuance of "building permits" through the Ministry of Interior, for example), the quality of the local road infrastructure and housing system (Ministry of Housing), and the diversity, quality, and spatial distribution of public services and economic development (the impact of ministries such as Health, Education, Industry and Trade, and Transportation, to name only a few).

This apparatus operates either through regional offices of specific ministries (i.e., Galil or North District) or directly through the head offices. The regional offices are by definition nationally oriented in their policies. Even when regional offices have some latitude in determining content of activities and their adaptation to regional requirements (Turgovnic, 1986), the nature of intervention is determined by the head offices.

Policies affecting regional processes fall into two major categories:

a. A territorially based policy that sets the extent of intervention and the nature of assistance in accordance

with the locational characteristics of regional systems or specific settlements (for example, border areas and the settlements located in them). This policy is based on the "positive discrimination" doctrine, by which the extent of public intervention is a function of assumed direct relations between physical location and the region's relative need for assistance. Indeed, it provides an "umbrella" for the determination and application of various socio-economic public incentives such as "encouragement of capital investment in industry" law, prices of industrial land and space, and road-building. In accordance with this doctrine, the country is divided into "development areas" ranked in descending order,[41] whereby intervention is determined largely by the status of each "development area".[42] Historically, this policy was meant to leverage development, mainly within the Galil and Negev peripheries.[43] In practice, however, the awarding of "development area" status has become largely a function of political considerations. The prevailing distribution of high-priority "development areas" indicates a clear decrease in the importance of the Galil (most of which, including Western Galil, is not given highest priority), and greater importance accorded to areas beyond the "green line".[44,45]

b. Non-territorial criteria, often applied in the policies of specific ministries that reflect national welfare policy perspectives. Two examples are the educational system and eligibility for housing mortgages, in which the determining criterion is the population's socio-

economic condition. In this regard, generally speaking, Western Galil as a regional system has no advantage vis-à-vis other parts of the country. Rather, the relevant unit of reference is the individual family, the individual settlement, or a specific sector of the settlement. Yet, because Western Galil tends to be included within reference to the Galil as a "region in distress", some of its economic units are eligible for most types of programs aimed at strengthening specific components of the regional system.

Beyond the above characteristics affecting the content of policies, it should be emphasised that Israel's central government administration is ramified and voluminous.[46] A major practical problem arising from this is the lack of continuous and comprehensive coordination between ministries (Hill, 1980). Since numerous regional processes and programs do require the involvement of several ministries, conflicting interests or mere inability to coordinate may make the actual result of intervention irrelevant or ineffective. This may create, for example, a possible situation in which the Ministry of Education wishes to expand services but cannot because the Ministry of Housing cannot, or does not wish to, provide required building facilities. Functional fragmentation is exacerbated by the distribution of political party influence within ministries, since each ministry's attitude toward the Galil (and different parts of it) is determined largely by its political stance and party affiliation (Bilski, 1980). This aspect has become more relevant since 1977 due to the growing government's preference for the development of areas

over the "green line" at the expense of peripheries such as the Galil.

Finally, the spatial distribution of regional offices (for those ministries that have such offices) is sometimes inefficient. Jurisdictions do not always coincide (Kipnis, 1982), causing, for example, two settlements under one regional council to fall under the authority of different offices of one ministry.

To sum up, government intervention in regional processes is clearly the most important public force affecting the relative condition of Western Galil and its development. Although welfare policies may treat the Galil as a "region in distress", entitling it to various kinds of assistance, territorially based policies emphasising production processes place the Galil and Western Galil at a clear disadvantage vis-à-vis areas over the "green line".

Non-Governmental Organisations

The non-governmental organisations of Western Galil are distinguished by several features (Menuhin, 1980, Meshorer, 1985):

a. The vast majority are quasi-governmental; only few are privately and publicly (non-governmental) owned entities.
b. Not only are most local organisations subject to central political control, they also tend to be branches of national organisations.

c. The organisations that operate in the region tend not to coordinate their activities.
d. They tend to fail to bring a regional perspective to their work, viewing the region rather from the point of view of national needs, interests, and priorities.

The important public organisations within the regional system of Western Galil are the following (Menuhin, 1985):

a. The Jewish Agency for Israel (JAFI).
b. Settlement institutions - the Moshav Movement, the United Kibbutz, the Herut-Beitar Movement, etc.
c. Quasi-governmental companies - Tahal and Mekorot Ltd. (water engineering and supply), the Israel Electric Company, the Egged transportation cooperative, the Ha'Mashbir wholesaling cooperative.
d. Women's organisations - Na'amat child-and-mother care and WIZO.
e. Regional marketing cooperatives (mostly operating before 1985).

There are, then, many organisations that function within the Western Galil or in direct reference to it. All of them form a system often referred to as "non-executant central government" (Dunleavy, 1980a), which reflects the distribution and extent of central control of the Israeli state system. Since a far-reaching extended discussion of their impact on the regional system is beyond the scope of this dissertation, only one category is discussed below: the JAFI, by virtue of its relevance to this study and the fact that its existence and function in the Israeli institutional system is an experience not a commonly shared by other

countries. The contribution of bodies such as the Settlement Movements and sectoral public cooperatives should not, however, be underestimated.

The Jewish Agency for Israel

The Jewish Agency for Israel (JAFI) is an international organisation founded in 1929 by the 16th Zionist Congress. The British government recognised the Jewish Agency for Palestine (subsequently the Jewish Agency for Israel) as the representative of the Jewish people in any issue concerning Palestine (The Hebrew Encyclopedia, pp.494-495). Thus, importantly, the JAFI, with its financial resources and administration, created a foundation for what became the Israeli Government. In 1947, with the adoption of the United Nations resolution for the establishment of the State of Israel, JAFI had discharged its initial task. However, it was not abolished and the vast majority of its institutions were maintained.[47] Since then, JAFI has consolidated its interest in various aspects of the state's functional system (such as education, Jewish youth, and rural settlement processes) and its administrative system swelled. Nevertheless, it is a predominantly non-Israeli controlled organisation, and, by implication, only indirectly linked to the Israeli electoral system.

This extensive functional existence of JAFI within the state apparatus was facilitated by JAFI's financial resources (originating in its ability to marshall funds from world Jewry), which the governmental system has always eyed

jealously as a potential additional source of revenue. This anomalous situation was further encouraged by the historical processes establishing the new state administration, which gave JAFI full legitimacy to develop its connections with the Israeli government. Consequently, the latter has allowed JAFI to function as a complementary authority, often unofficially including JAFI resources among those with which it may execute its plans. This abnormality, which is encouraged by the fragmentation of the Israeli government system, transcends that of a unique but questionable case of coexistence between state and pre-state governing bodies within a shared socio-economic and political system. In the paradigm at hand, a predominantly non-Israeli body is allowed to play an active role in the internal affairs of the state of Israel, functioning as a partner in national processes, even though the government of Israel is proscribed from intervening in any of its internal affairs.[48]

The Israeli section of JAFI is essentially controlled by its international apparatus, with its fragmented institutional and political structure. The Israeli system consists of several departments under an Executive, as illustrated in Diagram 2 (in the appendix). These departments, the major executive vehicles for the implementation of policies formulated by the Assembly and the Board of Governors, are divided by areas of responsibility and operate through regional offices. The system is therefore highly centralised and policies in Israel are directed by international bodies (e.g., the Board

of Governors and the Assembly). However, it is also subject to processes within Israel's national political system, because the basis of the political structure of JAFI and the Zionist congress is affiliated with the political party structure represented in the Knesset (the Israeli parliament). Thus, the management of JAFI functions under a dual set of interests - the Israeli system on the one hand, and the non-Israeli system on the other hand; these are not necessarily similar or coordinated.

As noted, when the Agency operates in areas under the overall authority of the government, its activities either supplant or augment traditional governmental activities.[49] Examples to the distribution of authorities include the following: Permanent housing - Ministry of Housing, temporary infrastructure of new settlements - JAFI; Primary schools (construction of building, teachers' wages, curriculum content - Ministry of Education, Teaching accessories, library and recreation facilities - JAFI.

The role of JAFI within the national system is notably problematic. Difficulties arise when government and JAFI operations overlap, and when the two agencies intervene in different ways. Indeed, it is often hard distinguish between the specific areas of JAFI and government competence. Other problems associated with JAFI intervention are byproducts of its great fragmentation. These problems arise when specific JAFI departments fail to coordinate their operations, compete each other, or disregard other departments' possible contributions. The absence of coordination has a crucial impact on regional systems, which fall under several

departments' areas of competence.

In all, then, JAFI is a very complicated mechanism, one prone to the influence of different, and, at times, conflicting interests of the Israeli system, the international bodies, and the various political parties of which both apparatuses are composed. Not only is the system beset by cumbersome administration, but the boundaries of its functional arena are not always clear. Thus, its activities lend themselves to confusion and misunderstanding within JAFI, in government circles, and among the population groups at which JAFI intervention is targeted.

CONCLUSIONS

Among the different characteristics of Western Galil, some discussed briefly and others at more length, several should be emphasised:

1. Industry as a basis for development.

   The industrial production system is subject to the dominant role of large private firms, most of which can be classified as "high-tech". This is the major source of regional job opportunities, and of attraction of various complementary services. Although the "parent firm-branch" structure of many industrial enterprises creates a situation in which capital is not necessarily reinvested in Western Galil,[50] their contribution is manifested in its potential attractiveness for additional entrepreneurial and complementary services (which can take advantage of the economies of scale and proximity slowly being created in Western Galil), and the attraction of potential immigrants (through jobs availability).

   The gradual expansion of industrial production activities that characterises Western Galil over the last 10 years distinguishes this area from other peripheral regions (especially those located far away from the coastal plain, such as East Galil, south of Beer-Sheva), and its effect extends over the entire regional social system.

2. A dual socio-economic system.

Western Galil is marked by social, economic, and institutional fragmentation. This applies to both Jewish-Arab relations and the different social groups of each sector. The vast majority (83%) of the population is Arab. This is different from the nation as a whole, in which Arabs form 4.5% of the total Israeli population.[51] However, the Arabs' specific quantitative advantage in Western Galil has no expression either in public policy concerning Western Galil or in their role within regional socio-political and economic processes.[52] In fact, the Jewish and Arab populations form two different functional systems, separate in their economic activities, socio-political institutions, and spatial distribution of built-areas. Very few points of collision, however, do exist, especially in the local labour market and the industrial demand for low-skilled labour.

The result of this situation is a highly fragmented and inefficient regional system. Fragmentation is further aggravated by the social structure of each sector.[53] This polarised socio-economic structure has a clear spatial expression, and is an important potential source of social unrest, which, although it has never fundamentally surfaced, undoubtedly thwarts regional social integrity.

3. Local labour force.

There is abundant low-skill labour concentrated in the Arab sectors and Jewish New Towns. In a country were

wages are to a great extent nationally controlled, and work costs are high, the ability to employ Arab labour, which is less protected by the Labour Union, results in decreased overall expenses. Thus, although Arabs are excluded from some jobs (those with defense security limitations), they form an attractive labour stock for industries requiring low-skill and relatively low-paid labour.

4. Western Galil from the perspective of political consensus.

The socio-economic structure of Western Galil is often referred to as "the demographic problem of Western Galil". This reflects discontent with the quantitative size of the Arab population - a socio-political minority group that is competing with the Israeli state for possession of territory.

In this regard, one can clearly identify an ideological consensus between the two large political parties, expressed in terms of "national interest" to offset this situation and secure a Jewish majority within the state's undisputed boundaries. This attitude, however, never actually led to public policies that favored Western Galil vis-à-vis other peripheries, and aimed to cope with the region's unique condition. An explanation of the actual attitude is linked to the following:

a. The "demographic problem" is treated by political decision-makers (and scholars) as an integral part of the the Israeli-Arab conflict. Consequently,

this issue is externalised from its immediate context in Western Galil, and thus justifies no particular long-run political initiatives to cope with this issue (one exceptional public response of the Jewish Agency will be discussed in following chapters).

b. Western Galil is generally a stable system that does not attract specific political concern. The "Earth Day" of 1986 (as specified in Chapter 6) was the only major case of an actual outburst of the fundamental historic social conflict between the local Arab population and the Jewish state institution. It, indeed, should have emphasised the need to deal specifically with the "demographic problem". However, the fact that this violent expression of discrimination feelings in the Arab sector lasted only few weeks, and did not spread into a county-wide protest movement, enabled the Israeli political system to avoid a direct confrontation with the problem, and refrain from a long-term commitment to the "issue".

c. Aside from the fact that the "demographic problem" gave rise to only one actual expression of social unrest, the distance of Western Galil from the northern international political borders (Lebanon and Syria) contributed to the lack of urgency in coping with its extremely inefficient socio-economic structure.

In practice, Western Galil is separated from Upper Galil. Located along the hostile Lebanese border,

the latter is generally considered more crucial to "defense" issues. Western Galil is also less attractive to public policy in relation to areas beyond the "green line".

d. Western Galil may be expected to receive special public concern based on its (or parts of the region's) status as a "distressed area". However, public concern with Jewish "distressed areas" in New Towns and "veteran" Moshavs is confined to the national level, externalising the specific locational context of socio-economic problems.

As for other characteristics of Western Galil, they are basically similar to those in other parts of the country. The agricultural system is subject to a structural crisis in its production units, administrative fragmentation, and a high degree of local economic and socio-political dependence on the national political and institutional system. All of them lead to a situation in which the "regional" level of activities hardly exists.

The social structure of Western Galil, together with its role in the national political system, has enabled this area to be "penetrated" by private productive entrepreneurship. On the one hand, the possibility now exists for businesses to take advantage of standard governmental incentives and abundant low-skill labour, while being able to attain large blocks of low-priced land for large-scale production plants. And on the other hand, the

combined effect of new industrial plants and new settlements seems to create a process through which some distinct system "Western Galil" is being formulated.

As a whole, an analysis of the major characteristics of the regional system enables us to state the following conclusions:

a. Western Galil is competing with Upper Galil and areas beyond the "green line"; both the latter are more politically "sensitive" with regard to the above-mentioned "defense" fallacy. Further, in terms of actual allocation of resources, industrial zones beyond the "green line" have the advantage (Center of Investments, 1989).
b. This area is also competing with the central metropolitan areas, the latter being the "heart" of the national business and administrative system.
c. The Southern periphery is subject to similar public incentives.

This competition takes place under conditions of:

a. National economic uncertainty and fluctuation in public policy.
b. Severe accessibility constraints.
c. Fragmentation of the public institutional system.
d. "Polarised" social structure.
e. A labour market that depends heavily on the Haifa metropolitan area.

The results of the above conditions are further discussed in Chapter 8, which attempts to describe the major changes of the past 10 years.

Notes

(1) Source: The Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1988 (no.39), Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem.

(2) About 200km separate between the centre point of the Galil and that of the country. "Centre" - merely in physical terms, regardless of distribution of population and such elements.

(3) Yitzhaki, 1988; See bibliography.

(4) Zalmon Bloc is a very small area located east of Segev Bloc.

(5) A perception represented by Mr. Brutzkus and Mr. Sharon.

(6) Source of data: Central Bureau of Statistics, publications for the relevant years (see methodological appendix).

(7) From 5.7% per year on average in 1972-1978 to 4.1% in 1984-1987.

(8) Jewish growth - from 9.2% in 1972 to 17.4% in 1987.

(9) Between 1972 and 1987, the Jewish growth rate was 16.4%, but only 4.8% in the Arab sector.

(10) "Natural increase" - births minus newborn deaths.

(11) Not buying land in the Galil had not been a matter merely of a shortage of financial resources, which in any case forced selective acquisition.

(12) After 1985, the construction of new settlements in Western Galil drastically slowed down, although not totally.

(13) Accounting for 40% of North District and 9% of all new construction country-wide.

(14) Accounting for 45% of North District and 25% of all new construction country-

wide.

(15) Accounting for 72% of North District and 21% of country-wide construction.

(16) New settlements were not built up, with few exceptions of Beduin temporary encampments that were turned into permanent settlements (mainly in Zalmon Bloc). This was a result of national relocation policy.

(17) These settlements are structured upon either family-base (Moshav) or community-base (Kibbutz) production units, and form rather close socio-economic communities.

(18) This approach appear, for example, in publications of the Centre of Settlement Research, Rehovot.

(19) According to this definition, the vast majority of Israel's population dwells in "urban" localities.

(20) Kibbutz, Cooperative Moshav, Workers' Moshav (Moshav Ovdim), and Community Settlement.

(21) Discussion of this complicated aspect, which requires to analyse the entire Israeli functional system, is beyond our scope.

(22) Refer to section 5.6 (particularly to the description of government policies).

(23) Sources: refer to the methodological appendix.

(24) The Western Galil industrial system is structured around two extremes: a large proportion of small plants (an average of 40 employees per plant, with 41% of plants employing 10 or fewer than 10 workers) and several (11.9%) relatively large firms, employing over 100 workers, of which 27% employ over 400 workers apiece, and together account for 68.8% of the total regional industrial employmen.

(25) "Private" - not owned by either the government or by the Labour Company.

(26) The latter, owned by the National Labour Union, had been a major force investing in industries located in peripheral areas.

(27) As a generalisation, the small plants tend to be locally owned and managed; 30% of the larger plants (over 100 employees) are subsidiaries of parent companies located outside the region.

(28) This differs from the Galil as a whole, in which 42% of industries and 40% of total employees are "advanced" (Chemanski, 1990, p. 195).

(29) "Advanced" industries includes the following categories of production determined by the C.B.S: electronics and electricity; chemistry and fuel; transportation; machinery and metal. "Traditional" consists of: mining; food and tobacco processing; textile, clothing and leather; carpentry and non-metal minerals; paper and printing; plastics.

(30) These account for 60% of the total plants established in this period.

(31) This does not apply to sophisticated and R&D agriculture discussed above.

(32) Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Publication no.848.

(33) Labour is distinguished as full-time (72%) and part-time (21.5%) workers, and the unemployed (6.5%). Although 27.5% of the total employees are women, they account for 52% of the part-time employees and only 20.5% of full-time ones. Finally, Jewish women have a greater propensity to work than Arab women: Jewish women account for 40% of total Jewish labour and 20.7% of part-time workers; Arab women account for 17.3% of Arab labour and 4.2% of part-time workers.

(34) 73% of the plants in new settlements are small (with 10 or fewer workers); about 45% of them perform R&D functions.

(35) Local services are allocated according to the Municiplalities Ordinance (1964) and Local Council Ordinance (1950) - the legal basis of their functioning.

(36) Voluntary services can be provided either to augment the other categories of services, or to widen the range of services locally provided. In practice, they serve as an index of the local authority's affluence and efficiency.

(37) Other areas of intervention are sanitation, land-use planning and engineering supervision, firefighting and security, education recreation and welfare services.

(38) These are a function of local demand for services, and the local tax base (i.e., residents' ability to pay in order to satisfy demand), the caliber of the local leadership, and political affiliation of the authority.

(39) Their existence is questionned in view of the recent socio-economic crisis (Gibton, 1986).

(40) Local authority jurisdictions vary according to number of inhabitants, the type of cooperative institutions they integrate, and size. The latter is nationally defined, and stipulated in master plans. Discussion of the inefficiencies of these jurisdictions is beyond the scope of this dissertation (e.g., Kipnis, 1982). It should be noted, however, that there is a major difference between the Jewish and Arab authorities. While the jurisdiction of the latter is largely confined to existing built-up areas, mostly under private ownership, the Jewish authorities are provided with large land reserves for future development.

(41) A++ - highest level of eligibility.

(42) Ostensibly, then, the designation of a region or any other area as a "development area" should provide an indication of its state of development relative to other parts of the country, and its eligibility for various public incentives.

(43) This was grounded in national goals concerning the spatial development of the country (i.e., the decentralisation policy previously mentioned), and was used as a means to implement the national priorities stemming from these goals.

(44) The term "green line" applies to the pre-1967 international borders between Israel and the Arab nations. Areas beyond the "green line" include the West Bank, Gaza Stip and Golan Heights, all captured by Israel during the 1967 Six Days War.

(45) According to information provided by the Investment Centre, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (May 1990).

(46) Almost every Ministry and public institution is represented by offices and sub-offices dealing with different issues, rarely cooperating with each other or sharing nearby locations.

(47) Only a few departments were shut down, their competence transferred to the Government of Israel.

(48) A thorough discussion of the dispute regarding the justification for JAFI is beyond our scope.

(49) Three major factors determine the role of JAFI within the Israeli national socio-economic and political system: a. The World Zionist Organisation and the Jewish Agency For Israel Status Law (1952, amended in 1975) and the Covenant between these bodies and the government of Israel. These documents determine the type of activities with which JAFI should be concerned, and the nature of cooperation and coordination between JAFI and the government. b. The priorities and political principles of world Jewry, (e.g., restriction of allocations to areas within the "green line"), its legal imperatives (e.g., tax regulations in their home countries), and organisational concerns in those countries (some resources marshaled on Israel's behalf are allocated to local Jewish communities). These principles are linked to the political structure of the Jewish organisations represented in the JAFI, and their at times different interpretations c. Relations between the international system and the Israeli section of JAFIspecifically, the extent of the latitude given the Israeli sections and Departments.

(50) Available data do not enable us to estimate patterns of capital investments. This argument is based on information provided by Mr. A. Eitan, the Treasury.

(51) This rate is relevant for 1987 - the pre-Russian migration.

(52) In fact, as a national minority group with highly problematic political and economic roles (linked to the Israeli-Arab conflict in the Middle East), the Arab sector is excluded from major social, political, and economic processes, which are predominantly geared toward satisfaction of the Jewish sector's interests, needs, and ideologies.
With this in mind, it should be noted that the specific ethnic groups within the Arab sector often exclude themselves from the "mainstream" Jewish state, in their attempt to maintain their socio-cultural and political identity.

(53) Although not different from other parts of the country.

Chapter 6:
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS

Introduction

Since the establishment of Israel, Galil has been, as noted, the object of various public initiatives aimed at increasing its Jewish population (both in absolute terms and as a proportion of the national population), expanding its settlement system, and developing its economy (with an emphasis on production activities). Marked changes have indeed occurred in the spatial-functional structure of Galil and Western Galil (especially in settlements' direct functional environment). Some of these changes can be connected with various planning initiatives that were designed to meet the above objectives and other goals discussed below.

Generally speaking, the planning process in the Galil was stimulated largely by the search for ways to attain a Jewish majority and distribute Jewish settlements' functional units (e.g., industrial parks) among the entire area. This official conceptual attitude toward desired changes in Galil and the national redistribution of social and economic components was basically accorded by planners and scholars. Thus, planning initiatives, mostly carried out by public bodies that play an active role in Galil's processes (e.g., the Ministry of Interior), are consistently guided by similar objectives and proposals for their attainment.[1] The important plans reflecting the planning

thought of the 1970s are:

a. **National Master Plan for the Distribution of Israeli Population of 7 Million.** By: Ministry of Interior; Published in 1985; Target year: 2010. Boundaries of plan: North District.
b. **Accelerated Urban Development in the Galil.** By: Ministry of Housing; Published in 1976; Target year: 1992. Boundaries of plan: North District, excluding areas south of Yzreel Valley.
c. **The Galil - A Proposed Planning Framework.** By: Israel Land Authority; Published in 1976; Target year: 1992. Boundaries of plan: Central Galil and the northern coastal plain.
d. **Industrial Distribution Plan for the Galil.** By: Industrial Building Company Ltd.; Published in 1976; Target year: 1992. Boundaries of plan: North District.

An analysis of the plans suggests that they are based largely on similar principles:

a. They are initiated under the "umbrella" of the national policy for decentralising population toward the peripheral areas. This implies acceptance of the ideology regarding the undesirability of the prevailing national population distribution, and the perception that attraction of population to the Galil (in our case) should be done on account of the central regions.
b. All the plans have clear physical expressions. In fact, there is a tendency to emphasise physical solutions (i.e., land use structure) when recommendations are

operationally expressed.

c. The plans deal with issues exceeding the authority of the specific organisation initiating the plan, though in some cases it is stated by the planners that policies of other ministries had been integrated into the specific plan. This tendency on the part of planners to extend interest to issues that are not under their direct responsibility represents an attempt to gain some sort of "holistic" (or "comprehensive") perspective on the regional processes. Nevertheless, the applicability of this perspective is problematic, especially in light of the actual minimal coordination between ministries or their specific functional units, such as their planning sections (refer to chapter 5).

d. Expected regional population growth is geared toward urban centres, several of which, though this varies between the different plans, are identified for intensive growth. In most cases Jewish migrants serve as the major means of attaining the plan's target population growth, a lthough the sources of migration are not discussed.

e. Major emphasis is placed on the development of non-local industrial activities (i.e., those not attached to specific settlements, either in their location or ownership and management conditions). These are seen as an alternative to the traditional agricultural base of settlements or to the small-scale industries in New Towns and small settlements. Indeed, all plans are concerned with the designation of regional industrial parks.

f. An important characteristic of these plans is their disregard of economic issues and policies; national monetary policies are not directly integrated into plans, and the financial implications of plans are largely ignored.

g. As for Jewish-Arab relations, all the plans aim predominantly at the Jewish sector. None of the plans are structured with the Arab sector as their central concern. Yet, there is a general agreement that cooperation between sectors should be encouraged in areas of land use distribution, employment, and some public services. In other issues, such as housing opportunities, the prevailing spatial and functional separation between sectors is maintained in all the plans. Moreover, the plans are distinguished by a lack of direct and clear references to the Arab sector, resulting in a situation in which the potential impact of changes in the Jewish sector on the Arab system is at most only implicitly raised, if at all.

These plans and others are widely discussed in the literature. Some studies (e.g., Vildavski, Law-Yone, and Meir-Brodnitz, 1988) conduct a comparative analysis among plans, examining their specific objectives, the extent to which they affected the regional system, and the nature of their impact at the point of occurrence. Other studies adopt a "goal-achievement" approach, comparing individual plans with actual and measurable changes in the planning areas (Sofer and Finkel, 1988). In all, although the various plans emphasise different physical planning areas and vary in their selection of issues and their concrete

recommendations, it is interesting to note that most of their goals and regional development perspectives have much in common. As for implementation of the plans and their effectiveness, some were partially implemented (with one exception, an Industrial Distribution Plan sketched after most industrial parks had been officially designated and some even constructed), whereas others never progressed past the document stage.

Among the public bodies at work in this area, the experience of the Jewish Agency Rural Settlement Department (Henceforth: RSD) is especially relevant to our concern with the role of planning in various regional processes. The choice to analyse the issue of regional planning with regard to the experience of the Jewish Agency for Israel (JAFI) was motivated by several considerations spelled out above (Chapter 1). The most important of them are:

a. An identifiable trend of thought that developed over several years of actual involvement by planners in some actions taken by public organisations with reference to the Galil in general and Western Galil in particular. Several of these actions can be credited to planning initiatives.

b. Unlike most other plans, which concerned themselves with only one point in time (with the exception of the Ministry of Interior's population redistribution plans), the combined effect of JAFI's plans and actions point at a long-term and, therefore, research-worthy concern with the Galil and its development process.

It will be argued that this combined effect gave JAFI a

leading role in the determination of structural processes in the Galil, and in the shaping of intervention throughout the entire governmental system. Thus, the present chapter describes the RSD's planning perspective regarding the nature of regional development processes, and its evolution over time. Issues related to the application of this perspective are discussed in subsequent chapters.

The Development of Planning Thought at JAFI

JAFI planning doctrine between the early 1970s and the mid-1980s evolved from a perception of a regional system that is a fairly homogeneous functional unit, composed of small groups of rural-agricultural settlements, to a perspective of a region as much more diverse, complicated, and larger-scale system. Previously, individual settlements had been treated as fairly independent and self-sufficient systems, the specific components of which (i.e., the settlement apparatus and its settlers) had been the center of concern. The revised perception was addressed to a wider range of functional units, the interrelations of which form the essence of the regional functional system. For example, this shift manifested itself saliently in the Segev area (in Western Galil), which previously had been regarded as structured of clusters of "industrial villages", but in recent years came to be seen within the context of the Region 2000 idea. Importantly, this change in planning perception evolved amidst the actual implementation of several planning initiatives and attempts to modify them in

accordance with changing circumstances in Western Galil, as discussed in detail below.

The revised planning perception originated in the search for "a different settlement structure" (RSD, 1974) that might offer an appropriate vehicle for Galil settlement under conditions of scarce agricultural means of production and harsh physical terrain. This initiative sought to provide an alternative to existing settlements in peripheral areas, which were traditionally based solely on agricultural production factors. It became a matter of concern in view of the stagnation of Jewish population growth in the early 1970s (especially in comparison with the rapid development of the Arab settlement system of Galil). This RSD initiative, taken with the cooperation of other public agencies, led to the "industrial village" proposal. The industrial village was defined as "a small rural settlement whose settlers work in an economic system not dependent on agriculture, live within closely knit communities, and belong to production and consumption cooperatives" (RSD, 1974). In fact, the "industrial village" concept suggests the abandonment of the hitherto obvious "rural = agriculture" equation traditionally applied in Israel and accepted as the very essence of "settlement" in Zionist ideology (Cohen, 1980; Hill, 1981). For the first time since the establishment of the state, JAFI was about to deal with settlements in which agricultural means of production would not constitute the sole source of livelihood, and "industry" would not be considered inappropriate for small peripheral settlements. Consequently, although the other elements in the traditional picture were not changed, the new interest

stimulated far more important changes in the RSD perspective of regions: The new settlements, like the old, would be organised as cooperatives, contain their own sources of livelihood, and their establishment would entail securing their economic base. Nevertheless, since it was necessary to cope with the problems arising from the diversification of the economic base of these small settlements ("the nature of the industrial production system requires larger scales of labour and services" [RSD, 1974, p.2]), planners concluded that the new settlements should be clustered in order to permit economies of scale and proximity.

From an historical perspective, the "industrial village" concept offered new possibilities of Jewish settlement in areas previously thought to be "off-limits" because of the lack of agricultural development opportunities. In Western Galil, this proscription had led to the concentration of the sparse Jewish population in a handful of New Towns and small collective settlements, leaving most of the region devoid of Jews. As noted by planners, "industrial villages permit the settlement of areas... where the veteran settlements failed" (RSD, 1974, p.1). Importantly, however, "the role of the industrial village does not replace that of the New Towns" (Op.Cit., p. 1) because the latter, small, urban settlements, would offer various types of jobs not necessarily available in the new settlements. In other words, the condition for abandoming the traditional individual oriented perspective had been established, and a shift of interest toward the extended regional-functional environment of settlements gradually evolved.

6.1 Segev Development Plans

Once the basic idea of the "industrial village" had matured, planners began to apply it to the regional system of Galil. The 1974 proposal for the development of the "Mountainous Galil" suggested that most population growth should concentrate in the New Towns. The "industrial villages" would contribute to the general effort by maximising the spatial distribution of the Jewish population in Galil. This task was to be accomplished by locating "industrial villages" in the unpopulated (by Jews) parts of the Galil. With these goals in mind, the 1976 Segev plan was an initial attempt to apply these principles within a regional context. Its major objective plan was "to provide a solution for the settling of areas with sparse (Jewish) population, through the application of the industrial village idea" (RSD, 1980). A secondary objective had to do with contributing to the national goal of population dispersion and peripheral development. Finally, the plan specified the number of settlements and the expected population of each.

The Segev plan is part of a wider Galil perspective that sets aside three areas for "intensive Jewish settlements": the Segev, Tefen, and Zalmon blocs (see map 2) (RSD, 1976). Within each of the new clusters, 15 sites suitable for settlements of the "industrial village" type are pinpointed, with their planned development based on the following four principles:[2]

a. **Size of clusters:** A threshold of 1,000 families in each block is determined to be a prerequisite for the provision of high-quality community services.

b. **Spatial structure of clusters:** Each bloc is to have one industrial zone and one service centre, both located outside settlements. The resulting efficiency in utilisation of space, coupled with economies of proximity potential, will spur industrial development.

c. **Functional structure of clusters:** The plans encourage the concentration of most expected industrial activities in the central zone (rather than in the individual settlements). This is meant to force the small settlements to cooperate, provide sufficient job opportunities for persons with different occupations and skills, and establish an efficient functional system by creating conditions conducive to economies of scale.

d. **Structure of individual units:** Settlements should be organised along the basic principles of the cooperative "industrial village".

Specifically, the Segev plan is composed of two elements:

a. Specification of required changes in terms of:
   * Population and labour force projection (based on a total of about 8,000 inhabitants by 1985).
   * Recommended types of services to be made available in the bloc's service centre.

* Distribution of land uses in the intra-settlement industrial zone, and determination of criteria for the selection of types of industrial plants to be located in this zone.
* Electricity, water, and telephone demand projections, including spatial distribution of facilities (e.g., a local telephone exchange units).
* Distribution of land use in recreation areas.
* Designation and general outlining of roads to be built.
* Preparation of specifications for architectural plans (e.g., size of houses).

b. Stages of development:

* Short term - construction of three settlements (50 dwelling units) and initial selection of settler candidates.
* Long term - implementation of the rest of the plan.

The 1976 plan was initiated by the Planning Section of the RSD North Region office. The timing of its publication lent it an immediate relevance; it came out during a period of socio-political unrest, manifested by a drastic change in the Galil Arab population's political awareness of its role in the national political system and its status in the functional system of this region. The watershed in Arab-Jewish relations was crossed on what later became to be known as the "Earth Day" (March 30th, 1976),[3] when the Arab sector in the north of the country declared a general strike

following the expropriation of privately owned land in Beit-Hakerem Valley (near Karmiel) and near Nazareth for reallocation to Jewish towns. The concrete event initiating the strike had been the destruction of illegal housing construction along the Akko-Karmiel road. The strike, and the rioting that erupted in its wake, brought three issues to the fore: the spatial distribution of land ownership in the Galil, the relative size of Arab population (i.e., the "demographic problem"), and anti-Arab discrimination. Only the first two issues were subject to public debate).

The official government response was rather moderate: it acted to contain the riots and declared a moratorium on land expropriation. The RSD took a different attitude altogether, construing the riots as "an impetus for the implementation of the 1976 plans as a way to demonstrate the presence of Jews in the Galil".[4] In practice, however, implementation of these plans required copious preparations, most of which entailed the reduction of the prevailing land use plan into practical increments (such as engineering planning of infrastructure, and architectural housing plans). The first problem to resolve in the course of this activity was that of land ownership. Since the land of Galil is a mosaic of Arab privately and Jewish publicly owned plots and parcels, and since the construction of settlements required the accumulation of land reserves in public hands,[5] the authorities (led by the RSD) had to purchase land from Arab owners, or compensate them with plots in other locations, before they could take any other action regarding the new settlements. Although settlement sites were

initially determined in areas where fairly large blocks of public land were available, most of these sites were riven by privately Arab-owned plots. Land transactions, therefore, commanded major attention for more than a year. The process was exceedingly complicated and time-consuming; land registration documents and procedures from the pre-state periods had to be tracked and owners had to be found. Some of the latter, it transpired, had either died or left the country. As a result of this process, the RSD was able to map most of the land of Western Galil by its ownership status, thus providing an estimate of the area's potential to absorb new settlements.

In the course of this work, however, a major conceptual change in settlement doctrine had taken place. Instead of stressing new Jewish settlements' functional structures (i.e., "industrial village" vs. traditional cooperatives), their spatial distribution was now viewed as the issue of greatest importance. The new Jewish settlements were now regarded as means not only to populate areas with limited agricultural potential, but also "to populate areas with political strategic importance"(Sofer and Finkel, 1988). This new conceptual approach, coupled with the newly acquired information about the distribution of land ownership, manifested itself in a "Proposal for Regional Comprehensive Development in Western Galil" (1978), formulated by the Planning Section of the RSD North Region office in Haifa on the basis of the development perspective of the 1976 plan.

The 1978 plan aimed to bolster the Jewish presence in

Galil by means of establishing new small settlements (not agriculturally based), strictly segregated from Arab settlements. In deference to the latter principle, for example, one physically suitable site was rejected because of its proximity to Sachnin.[6] In view of these aims, the essence of the 1978 plan is a detailed mapping of existing and proposed land uses in Western Galil (e.g., settlements, recreation sites, inter- and intra-settlement industrial zones, and nature reserves), coupled with detailed mapping and quantification of existing infrastructure (roads, telephone exchange units, water systems, and electricity lines) and an estimate of their potential capacity. The plan includes the actions needed for implementation, ranked in order of timing:

a. Obtaining the Department's (i.e., RSD) approval of the plan.
b. Securing Jewish presence in the land not immediatly utilised for settlements by means such as fencing and afforestation.
c. Determination of the settlement structure suited to this area.
d. Water and sewage planning.
e. Completion of the development plan.
f. Preparation of detailed plans.

Once the existing distribution of land uses was mapped and the areas sorted by ownership status, the immediate consequence was a decision by the head of the RSD (Mr. R. Weitz) to initiate the "Mitzpim project", which called for the rapid construction of some 30 "mitzpim" (see Chap. 5).[7]

As previously suggested, the essence of the "mitzpim" concept is the safeguarding of future opportunities to establish settlements on the foundation of the "mitzpim". The ideology underlying this practice is firmly rooted in Israeli history, which treats the "creation of facts" as a prerequisite for the handling of territorial issues (Akzin and Dror, 1966; Hill, 1980). The "mitzpim" project was based on one major component of the 1976 and 1978 plans: widening the spatial distribution of Jewish settlements and penetrating unpopulated areas. In this context, settlements were regarded as a means of consolidating the Jewish presence in Galil and attaining state control of nearly all its land.

The project was executed on the basis of several maps marked with the potential sites for new settlements. These maps rely on information provided in the 1976 and 1978 plans and include additional sites identified during the preparation of the latter plan (most of which were rejected by planners as inadequate for settlements). Never, however, was there one plan, a single coherent set of principles, or a unified list of the settlements to be incorporated into the project. Similarly, the project's objectives were never officially articulated in the form of a cohesive list. Rather, they were phrased and revealed by different political decision-makers and planners only on request (i.e., for research purposes, government resolutions, newspapers). These objectives, apart from the dispersion of Jewish population throughout the Galil, may be expressed as follows (Sofer and Finkel, 1988):

a. To secure state control of national land in areas sparsely populated by Jews.
b. To rearrange the government's priorities - drawing attention to the Galil and creating alternative settlement opportunities to those over the "green line".
c. To attract Jews to Galil and encourage young members of existing settlements to stay in Galil.[8]
d. To create opportunities for the consolidation of new settlement structures.

In practice, the settlement process spurred by the "mitzpim" project took place in 1979-1982, during which time over 30 new sites were equipped with the basic accessories for permanent settlements. Of these, 27 sites were located in Western Galil, and were added to the area's four existing Jewish settlements (one was dismantled after a short time), as specified in Table 4 (appendix). Although some of the above sites had been planned previously (especially in 1976 and 1978 plans), they may be identified as one bloc because all were similar with respect to structure and course of action. Importantly, the decision to establish the "mitzpim" inaugurated an exceptional experience. The Jewish Agency RSD set the stage for a new settlement process in the Galil, to which the entire governmental system was attracted at subsequent stages. While JAFI established the actual existence of new settlements (by means previously specified), the governmental system was called on to take responsibility for these settlements and to further their development, although it had neither planned nor intended to

start such a process (as discussed below). For example, while temporary housing was provided by JAFI, assistance in the construction of permanent housing was provided by the Ministry of Housing in accordance with its standard policy in "development areas" (see Chap. 5). Nevertheless, some government agencies were incorporated into the process from the start; examples are the Ministries of Interior, Communication, and Education. This is discussed further in Chapter 8.

In all, the "mitzpim" project may be viewed as a partial accomplishment of the 1976 and 1978 development plans, satisfying the objective of securing state ownership of land and respecting their proposed spatial distribution of settlements and economic activities, though disregarding many other aspects of regional development. Indeed, in the first years of the project (1979-1981), the RSD had to pledge most of its human and capital resources to the mass construction of settlements. Once the settlements' existence was no longer in doubt, however, the planners shifted their concern to the issue of the settlements' future development (economic base, social structure, community services, etc.). The major question at this stage had to do with the settlements' ability to function as independent socio-economic entities, and hence to grow. This question had important implications in every aspect of community life. For example, the settlements were struggling to consolidate their productive systems, seeking industries suited to conditions of resource scarcity, limited labour potential, as well as the intrinsic difficulties caused by their

location (i.e., distance from major national business areas), and lack of an adequate communication and highway infrastructure. The attraction of new settlers, too, was constrained by the settlements' strong dependence on JAFI, which practiced a selective candidate-acceptance policy.

As time passed, planners were increasingly preoccupied with the modification of plans in view of changes that occurred as the settlements developed. These modifications found their expression in the Segev Regional Development Plan 1983-1992 (Buzi, 1983), which reflected the following changes:

a. A shift from the "industrial village" as the dominant settlement form to a diversity of forms (Kibbutz, Cooperative Moshav, Community Settlement).
b. A shift from the idea of functional settlement clusters to the establishment of a regional council (e.g., Misgav) as the functional organisation embracing new and existing settlements (i.e., cooperation in municipal and other public services between a larger number of settlements than in the "clusters" idea).
c. Concentration on means of production within settlements rather than in the regional industrial zone (even though the latter paradigm is not abandoned).
d. Acknowledgment of the inability of the local economic system to provide sufficient job opportunities. Accordingly, the principle of economic self-sufficiency of each settlement was abandoned; commuting to jobs outside the area was permitted.

The 1983 plan is the most coherent document expressing these modifications. However, it continued to view the individual settler and the individual settlement as the basic objects of concern, refraining from any attempt to regard them as components of a wider functional environment within which solutions to prevailing problems might be found. As such, it is merely a detailed land use plan that, while articulating the spatial aspects of conditions in the new settlement area, undermines these settlements' future prospects and interlinkages. In fact, problems related to the future development of settlements had been accumulating for some time, and the need for a change in planning perspective regarding the settlements' development (i.e., a reconsideration of the conventional JAFI emphasis on the individual settler) was perceived. It was at this stage, then, that the introduction of the "Region 2000" idea to RSD planers seemed to provide some "light at the end of the tunnel".

6.2 Region 2000 Development Strategy

The history of Region 2000 goes back to 1978,[9] when the Minister of Industry and Trade (Mr. Y. Horovitz) appointed a committee "to promote the establishment of a science-based industrial town in the Galil",[10] its major task defined as "the exploration of opportunities for the development of such a town as a means to increase the Jewish population of Galil".[11]

This professional committee, chaired by Prof. Efraim Katzir, the fourth President of Israel (henceforth: the Katzir Committee), initially concerned itself with the development of Karmiel as a way of stimulating development in the Galil. However, aware of the specific characteristics of this region, especially its peripheral role within the national economic-political system, the committee sought to treat the functional hinterland of Karmiel as the appropriate environment for attaining this goal. Accordingly, the committee's task was redefined: "to develop a region in which man will draw upon the limitless possibilities generated by post industrial technology in order to shape a better world ... in Galil and Israel" (Katzir Committee, undated, p. 2). The essence of the idea was "the integration of advanced technology and a society shaped by the highest ethical and moral values of Jewish heritage" (op. cit., p. 2). Indeed, the Region 2000 idea, credited to Prof. Efraim Katzir, initially focused on the content of socio-economic activities, whose aggregate performance would express the "best" qualities of modern life or those characteristics thought of as most desirable in the 21st century. This performance, in the context of one specific regional system, comprises the Region 2000 idea. Accordingly, its cardinal principle is the combination of certain types of activities, whereby the physical context of these activities is perceived as a framework within which the combined activities may be developed and managed.

The expectations for the desired socio-economic system were construed in terms of the following changes:

1. The development of science-based industry supported by R&D activities and the application of modern technologies. These types of production activities were deemed desirable because of their potential impact on the regional system, namely, their attractiveness to professionally skilled immigrants and their potential liaison function vis-à-vis institutions of higher education and research. This kind of development was also regarded as an important potential contributor to the national export base and an important source of highly qualified job opportunities. In other words, it seems the committee had in mind a "Silicon Valley" type of regional development.[12]
2. The attainment of a high quality of life, in which the integration of modern technologies manifests itself in reforms such as broader individual opportunities to choose working and study patterns (e.g., work at home); greater leisure time and the ability to take advantage of it; and an intensification of social and community life. These reforms were especially sought as an alternative to the social alienation processes that characterise modern industrial communities.
3. Encouragement of private sector investments in the various components of the regional system productive activities (industry and complementary services), housing, and socio-cultural services. Prof. Katzir's use of the term "private sector" clearly refers to both Israeli and non-Israeli entrepreneurs, thus investing Region 2000 with an element of "international" interest. Importantly, emphasis on the important role

of the private sector in the development process sets Region 2000 apart from most previous initiatives to develop Galil.

As described thus far, the Region 2000 concept is applicable to any regional context. Once applied to the specific regional context of the Galil (specifically, Western Galil), the idea was associated with this region above all others, because the development process of Western Galil had been the major concern of the Katzir Committee and the official reason for its appointment. Over the time, however, the concept of "Region 2000" became a synonym for an idealisation of regional processes, especially regional development. Accordingly, some politicians (and administrators) applied the term not only to Galil but also to the Negev region. Both of these areas, to be sure, are physical and functional peripheries that seemed to justify public intervention.

The Katzir Committee discharged its official duty in 1982 by presenting the Minister of Industry and Trade with its conclusions and recommendations. Simultaneously, however, it took two major initiatives aimed at ensuring the fulfillment of Region 2000 and the recommendations. This was, in a sense, a way to ensure the committee's involvement in future Region 2000 processes:

a. The establishment of "Fellowship 2000" (1983), a non-profit company to which most members of the Katzir Committee belonged. Its tasks were defined as taking

"action for the establishment of Region 2000"[13] and "leadership of Region 2000".[14]

b. Appointment of a planning group, which "should be able to tell us what do we want to do in the designated region".[15] The fellowship was supposed to provide a basis for the management of the planning processes.

Seeking support for these initiatives, the Katzir Committee and Fellowship 2000 approached JAFI for a financial allocation. In 1982-1983, the chairman of the JAFI Executive indeed proffered this assistance.[16] At that time, however, JAFI evinced no further concern in the project. It was not until the planning function was established (i.e., a contract with the Lichfield and IDC planning group - L&IDC),[17] and some output of the planning work was available, that an interest in Region 2000 evolved in the JAFI. Specifically, it was the first draft of the Region 2000 development strategy that motivated the vice director of the RSD Planning Authority, along with the corporation of the Planning Section of the North Region Office, to propose an alternative development strategy for Region 2000, as discussed below.

The RSD was motivated to take part in the Region 2000 planning process in view of its perceived implications for the development of Western Galil, which became relevant during the period of RSD planners' increased concern with the above-mentioned stagnation in new settlement development, as well as on the basis of the strategy's criticised content.[18] As noted, the Region 2000 concept

marked a new trend of thought in the attempts to develop the settlement system in Western Galil. It offered the RSD planners a more relevant framework of concern with Western Galil, and provided a new conceptual basis for promoting the development of productive activities. Therefore, once the initial draft of a proposed regional development strategy had been presented by the L&IDC group, its content, and the criticism it attracted, legitimised the formulation of an alternative strategy by RSD. Notably, the timing of the presentation of the proposed strategy was important. The intensive process of constructing and populating new settlements was over; this was the right time for the RSD planners to consider settlements' future development.

On the whole, the Region 2000 concept presented the development of Western Galil with an immediate challenge; the criticism surrounding the initial Region 2000 strategy provided RSD with legitimate reasons for active participation in the project, although initially it was not assigned by the Katzir Committee with any planning role. Indeed, two agencies, L&IDC and the RSD planning groups, presented Fellowship 2000 with two strategic proposals in March 1985.[19] Consequently, the Fellowship asked JAFI that "the planning section of the RSD's North Region Office (Haifa) ... will begin formulating the more detailed plan of Region 2000".[20]

Specifically, the RSD development strategy contained the following objectives (Gilat and Duchan, 1985, p. 4):

a. The Katzir Committee objectives:

* To attract 100,000 Jews to the area by the year 2000.
* To promote industrial development that would generate exports in excess of $1 billion by the year 2000.

b. Operational objectives:

* To provide the planning group with the legitimacy it needed to function within the project.
* To establish an initial conceptual framework regarding the improvement of the relative status of Region 2000 in the national political system, and create irreversible facts.

The essence of this strategic perspective was an attempt to establish a breakthrough from the conventional Israeli regional development approach (including that of JAFI), in which attempts to achieve comprehensiveness frustrated the implementation of regional strategies (as further discussed below). Indeed, the RSD strategy was based on the principle of selectivity. Only a few elements of the regional system were chosen as the objects of intervention, while assuming that such interventions would give rise to many other changes, possibly in the desired direction. An additional principle underlying the strategy was related to its execution: In view of the "mitzpim" experience and the development processes that followed it, the RSD planning team considered repeating the initial investments approach, in which RSD activities would "leverage" the involvement of the entire governmental system in the project.

This strategy was regarded as a necessary continuation of the regional processes undertaken since the mid-1970s, which had not yielded the desired scale of change. However, unlike previous attempts to treat separately the different functional subunits of Western Galil (i.e., the "collective settlements", New Towns, and the Arab sector), the Region 2000 development strategy assumes that the essence of any attempt to initiate changes lies in the integration of the various functional subunits. This was indeed a difficult task, since the "region" at hand did not exist as a functional system. Moreover, Israel's entire state system lacks this intermediate functional level (i.e., that between local functional units and the central government). In fashioning this potential system, then, the strategy stressed the relationship of Region 2000 with other regions and placed special emphasis on the role of Region 2000 in the national system. The latter role, in fact, was treated as crucial in view of the country's centralised political, economic, and administrative processes. Accordingly, any recommendation was judged by its impact on the role of the regional system within the national functional system.

Finally, the strategy concurred with the Katzir Committee in assigning the private sector a crucial role in the development process. In view of experience with private entrepreneurs in the Galil, a restructuring of the prevailing relationship between the public and private sectors was proposed. The public sector was to invest in components of the regional system that were not likely to attract private investments; in so doing, it was to create

suitable conditions for the attraction of private investments to other regional activities. Public sector investment in roadbuilding, for example, was proposed as a means of improving regional access, and thereby furthering the economic viability and "investability" of ventures dependent on physical connections with other parts of the country.

In sum, public intervention would be channeled into four key components of the regional system, defined as "key factors of development" (Gilat and Duchan, 1984): the industrial system, infrastructure, education, and regional administration. This choice was guided by the following criteria:

* Concern with processes identified as important mainly for their potential "chain reaction impact" on other components.
* "Public goods" - regional components in which individual functional units (i.e., entrepreneurs, local authorities) were not likely to invest, but whose improvement would benefit the entire system.
* Areas in which there was no need to reform the entire state system, thus permitting existing units to continue functioning.
* Aspects of the regional system in which reform might prove attractive to the private sector.

In addition to these principles, the strategy

emphasised several major characteristics of the regional development process:

* A perception of Region 2000 as the hinterland of the country's major coastal metropolitan areas (mainly Tel-Aviv). This explains the cardinal importance of establishing linkages with these areas.
* Initial emphasis on development in the centre of the region, along the "north-south axis", leaving the rest of the region to be affected as the development processes become consolidated.
* A strong regional administrative system, developed in several stages and embracing all Jewish authorities, is viewed as essential for securing long-term future changes. The strategy espoused no particular doctrine with respect to the Arab sector.
* Because of the prevailing fragmented regional political-administrative system and its role in the national political system, JAFI is designated as the major vehicle for the allocation of initial investments, thus forcing the government to enter the project at a later stage. In practice, the RSD was expected to function as a "development authority".
* Consolidation of long-term changes should integrate proposed projects for short-term implementation.
* Political decision-making processes are suggested as the grounds for implementation of the strategy.

After defining the four key regional components of development and the principles guiding the future nature of "Region 2000", most of the planning work focused on further

elaboration of the strategy and its specific details. The important task was to identify concrete elements within these fairly broad components of the regional system, which were assumed to create a basis for the initiation of change (e.g., the telephone-based network, the Segev-Haifa highway, and high schools), and formulate detailed plans for implementing the strategic perspective. At this stage it became necessary to subcontract with specialists in communication networks, industrial development, education, and public administration. Thus, the planners devoted their time to a search for competent professionals and articulating the demands to be presented to them. Because these professionals had to be paid from the RSD's budget, however, it was necessary to modify the strategy in three respects:

a. Additional attention to processes within JAFI-sponsored settlements.[21] This contradicts the principle planning attempt to promote the "regional" entity and concentrate only on the key regional components.
b. Abandonment of the idea to permit the expansion of JAFI-sponsored settlements beyond the size initially planned by the RSD (i.e., to enable some settlements to reach the size of 1,000 families rather than their planned 200 families, on average). This had been considered as a way to generate immediate absorption potential (which is theoretically possible in these settlements) without massive investments in infrastructure.
c. Abandonment of the idea to promote several short-term

projects as a way to bring about an initial consolidation of the project's functional system and enhance awareness of Region 2000 among local authorities and inhabitants.

These modifications were forced on planners by the director of the RSD North Region office who controlled available funds for Region 2000; the director justified the changes as "being in accordance with RSD intervention principles". The incorporation of these modifications, however, inaugurated a process in which every Region 2000 action that required official RSD approval imposed various constraints on the planning function and the project as a whole, as discussed in the following sections of this dissertation.

In all, the strategic principles were expressed in the development strategy document presented to Fellowship 2000, a document that was regarded as the initial output of the planning work. Once it was approved by the Fellowship, further actions were initiated, as discussed in the following chapter.

Conclusions

This chapter presented two basic "blocs" of planning thought, as manifested in several plans:

a. **The "settlement plans".**

Several attempts were made to establish a "new" socio-economic subsystem in an "empty" part of Western Galil. This system was designed to be relatively self-sufficient; collective and small settlements were chosen to make up the proposed subsystem in a manner best suited to the conditions prevailing in Western Galil.

Over time, attempts to implement this "grand idea" led to growing concern with the minutiae of the settlements' internal structures and an increasing disregard of their regional hinterland. These changes were expressed in the various Segev development plans formulated from 1976 to 1983.

b. **"Region 2000" development strategy.**

This is an attempt to recast the system of individual settlements into the contexts of the wider regional hinterland and the national political and economic system. It articulates broad principles on the proposed nature of Western Galil and the means to attain it.

In contrast to the emphasis on detail evinced in the "settlement plans", this strategy document ended at precisely the stage at which the details were supposed to be formulated (although few attempts in this direction were made).

The "settlement plans" represent a process of "trial and error", in which the plans were designed to accommodate themselves to changing conditions created in the course of implementation. As such, they were notable for a rather short-term concern with the specific issues associated with planners' involvement in regional processes, as will be discussed further.

Once the basic elements of a new settlement array were founded, the planners realised that the initial principles governing the structure of the system had been abandoned. It also became apparent that the existing system suffered from fundamental deficiencies intrinsic to its small dimensions and its location in Western Galil. In other words, they realised that no self-sustaining growth process in this area had been secured. This led to the conclusion that a new perspective was needed. In this sense, the Region 2000 strategy was an outgrowth of the earlier planning process, reflecting an accommodation of the previous basic planning perspective to prevailing conditions in the region and to the evaluated impact of previous planning initiatives. Therefore, unlike modifications of the previous set of plans that concerned themselves with the specific structure of individual settlements, the essence of the shift to the conceptual approach articulated in the "Region 2000 Development Strategy" was the need to place these settlements in a wider regional context and to deal with somewhat different issues.

This change originated in a different perspective on "regional" systems. The "Segev" plans assumed that development (i.e., increase in number of settlements, the

Jewish population, and the scale of economic activities) was an immediate and necessary consequence of the establishment of new settlements and the attraction of small groups of settlers. Region 2000 holds this condition to be insufficient, as demonstrated chiefly in the Segev experience. The New Town experience further supports this premise, demonstrating that a self-sustaining development process requires more than housing and population. It requires a certain combination of elements, such as ability and desire of the local population to participate in the labour force, basic infrastructure for public services and business activities, as well as favourable institutional conditions that facilitate the absorption and initiation of productive activities.

Both sets of plans attempt to modify the relative role of Western Galil in the national political and economic system. However, whereas the "settlement plans" chose means that basically accorded with the prevailing nature of public intervention, the Region 2000 strategy sought to effect structural changes within this governmental system. Implicitly, then, the latter assumed that in the existing intervention paradigm, Western Galil had no chance of undergoing the drastic changes that would improve its position within the national system. Specifically, the first set of plans reflected the traditional central government way of coping with territorial issues, which measures "control" in terms of the volume of land (acreage) occupied by settlements (Israeli history is replete with such examples). Region 2000, by contrast, emphasises the quality

of activities within a given space. It may be argued that the shift in planning perspective became possible only after the previous perspective had been applied, creating conditions that permitted a reevaluation of the region's development potential. This issue, and the important implications of the differences between the planning doctrines in terms of their integration into regional processes, is discussed at greater length in the following chapters. The following comparison table summarises the differences between these schools of thought.

Criterion	Segev Plans	Region 2000
Initiation of planning function	Established within the RSD system.	Katzir Comm.: "Planning is a necessary part of regional development".[1]
Declared need for planning function	Inherent part of the planners' job.	"Tell us what to do[2] ... and make sure the work will begin soon".[3]
Objectives	* Disperse Jewish population.[4] * Establish a new settlement system.	* Increase Jewish population. * Develop the region's industrial base.
Regional role within the national system	Planning initiative as a response to local processes and enhanced by national processes. Planning output avoids reference to national processes.	Initiation of Region 2000 as a distinct part of the country. Planning output is based on an attempt to place the area on the national decision-making map.
Regional perspective	* Concentration on Jewish "rural" settlement clusters. * Disregard of immediate functional hinterland. * Emphasis on connections within settlement clusters. * Connections with outside metropolitan are out of actual concern.	* The region as consisting of all prevailing socio-economic units. * Purposeful avoid concern with Arabs. * Linkages with central parts of the country are deemed crucial.

Criterion	Segev Plans	Region 2000
Boundaries of concern	Local public institutions and government regional offices directly and actively associated with processes within Segev spatial boundaries. Boundaries evolving through implementation	Region 2000 embodied within a perspective of national political institutions. Boundaries defined at an initial stage of strategy formulation.
Identified "key factors of development"	* Land use patterns. * Direct "settlement components", e.g., housing, infrastructure in settlements. * Organisational structure of settlements. * employment base.	* Regional physical infrastructure. * Organisational structure of the region. * Industrial production processes. * Educational system.
Issues of concern	* Settlement location. * Physical structure of settlements. * Settlement organisation. * Community services. * Production base in settlements.	* Quality of telecommunications. * Regional organisational opportunities. * Ways of attracting industrial enterprises.
Strategic Perspective	* A "step-by-step" approach - once one change is consolidated (e.g., construction) further changes are considered. * Concrete and measurable changes.	* Principle of selectivity, coupled with a "holistic" perception of each selected component. * Inability to interpret most issues into measurable changes.

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1. Minutes of Katzir Committee meeting, dated 24.2.1982.
2. Ibid.
3. Op. cit., 25.2.1982.
4. Some of the aspects concerning national ownership of land had been adopted in the "Mitzpim" project.

Considering the major characteristics of the "settlement plans" and the Region 2000 strategy together, one may question the extent to which they provide planners with a firm basis for promoting the implementation of these plans. To answer this question, we must analyse the political and administrative system within which the planners functioned and which formed the "final test" of the applicability of the specific planning initiatives. Although a more substantial discussion is presented in the following chapters, several aspects should be raised at this stage.

As suggested in Chapters 3 and 4, the notion of vulnerability of decision-making determinants may be useful for planning practice, in enabling planners to explore their operational environment and determine appropriate strategy and means to promote implementation. A ccordingly, several elements within plans may be used to assess their application potential and possible constraints. These are related to the extent to which planners were able to utilise plans to promote their implementation, and the extent to which they were aware of such qualities. Here we present those elements of the plans that planners could or could not have used. The following chapters further discuss these aspects.

a. Attitude toward "change"

The "settlement plans" envisage changes confined chiefly to land uses in Western Galil - from agricultural uses to "urban" type of uses (i.e., housing, services, public facilities, and industrial zones). A byproduct of this kind of change is the redistribution of land possession

along population group lines, that is, the creation of segregated Jewish and Arab blocs of land. Region 2000 proposes a functional change within existing land uses. For example, industrial activities are concentrated only in 3 of many designated zones, encouraging inter-regional linkages with the urban centre of Karmiel, which constitutes a core area for activities such as business, personal services, and regional organisational functions. Thus, whereas the "settlement plans" attempted to establish a rather closely knit functional subsystem that could be added to other such subsystems in Western Galil, Region 2000 strives for coordination among the area's sub-functional units.

Further, the "settlement plans" were rather vague with regard to the future nature of the proposed subsystem; their long-run perspective was confined largely to the mere existence of new settlements and their population sizes. Region 2000, by comparison, presents a fairly clear perspective on the future nature of the area, but it does not clearly specify short-run changes and processes.

Finally, as stated, the "settlement plans" permit public organisations (i.e., JAFI and government ministries) to practice intervention along prevailing lines. Region 2000, by contrast, demands changes in the basic nature of public institutional intervention (e.g., in resource allocation and in the region's organisational structure).

b. Issues of concern

Most of the "settlement plans" (i.e., those pursuant to the 1976 plan) were the outputs of actual implementation processes, which implies a high degree of flexibility on

the part of planners to deal with issues as they arise during "everyday" operations. Despite this potential flexibility, however, these plans were concerned above all with specific issues related to the direct establishment of new settlements, such as housing construction and absorption of new settlers, while avoiding concern with such "non-immediate" local issues. Region 2000 takes the opposite approach, dealing with issues related to regional organisation within the national political system, and the nature of public incentives required to make the area more attractive. Thus the plan rejects planner involvement in tenanting procedures, and purposely avoids concern with settlements' internal affairs, which are left to local control.

Notwithstanding, it is important to note that the preoccupation of the "settlement plans" with issues traditionally connected with standard paradigms of public intervention (especially that of JAFI) helped further a process in which Western Galil was gradually (after the Earth Day incidents) distanced from public debate and consciousness as a problematic area in which Arabs had been deprived of their land. This enabled the planning-execution process to continue. Region 2000, by contrast, addressed itself to an important issue that has become quite politically sensitive of late: modification of the local-regional political organisational system and election procedures.

Further, the "settlement plans" were noted for their highly detailed articulation of specific recommended changes and means to implement them. Region 2000 strategy tends to

the opposite extreme: a high level of abstraction and reliance on the reader's (e.g., politician, scholar) imagination.

c. Distribution of costs

The "settlement plans" were only implicitly concerned with the costs of implementation, as expressed in terms of the direct construction of a new settlement area. They seemed to assume that such direct costs would be covered by public institutions, chiefly JAFI. Reality demonstrated the truth of these assumptions. Region 2000 makes reference to two types of costs: those incurred in the course of implementing plans (e.g., roadbuilding) and those accruing to any economic activity in the area, in compensation for the region's distance from major national business areas. Whereas the public sector is asked to cover the former costs, the latter are considered potential savings, to be effected once the structural changes in the regional system are consolidated.

d. Timing of presentation

The 1976 Segev Development Plan was presented during a period of heightened political awareness of "the demographic problem of Galil" and a declared public need to bolster the area's Jewish population. In this sense, its publication provided an immediate framework within which JAFI could pursue its attempts to cope with the problem. Region 2000 strategy had no similar advantage. It was published during a period of national political disregard for the social and

economic issues related to Western Galil (or other peripheries located in the "green line").

In view of these perspectives on plan-making, each with its advantages and disadvantages, expectations, and constraints, the following chapter discusses the environment within which they were put into practice.

Notes

(1) For an extended discussion of the development of Israeli planning thought, its operationalisation and other relevant issues (such as the interactions between the planning system and the political apparatus) refer, for example to Bilski, 1980; Brutzkus, 1964; Cohen, 1970; Vildavsky, Law-Yone, and Meir-Brodnitz, 1988, to mention only the few studies that are referred to in this dissertation.

(2) As most coherently spelled out in the Segev Plan, 1976.

(3) In Israel, the notion "Earth Day" is different than in many western countries, where it is associated with the natural environment and human actions devoted to its flourishing.

(4) Mr. Y. Freidman, interview, Tel-Aviv, September 1990.

(5) To "accumulate land" - to create continuity of state-owned land which will provide sufficient space to construct new settlements.

(6) Op. cit., note no.2. to check

(7) Different documents refer to different number of planned "mitzpim"; some include sites designated in 1976 plan, others also count the sites identified and tenanted during the execution of the "mitzpim" project, although they were not mentioned in the initial documents. Our reference is to all settlements established during the period of mass construction of settlements that was stimulated by the "mitzpim" project.

(8) New Towns and Moshavim were especially subject to conyiuous out-migartion of young and socio-economically stable population.

(9) Similar timing of the "mitzpim".

(10) The Committee's terms of reference. Source: the private files of Prof. Katzir.

(11) Ibid.

(12) While disregarding problematic and, at times, inaccepted aspects of such regional processes.

(13) Minutes of Katzir Committee meeting, dated 5.2.1982.

(14) "fellowship 2000 Constotution" (1982). Source: Vix Archives.

(15) Op. cit., note 13, dated 24.2.1982.

(16) 1/3 of the committee and the fellowship budget. Source: Accounting Report 1982-1984, private files of Prof. Katzir.

(17) Nethaniel Lichfield & Partners and Industrial Development Corporation Ltd.

(18) An internal correspondence in the Planning Section (RSD North region office), marked "after meeting with Iyur & Einav, November 1984". Source: working files of the Planning Section, the RSD North region office, Haifa.

(19) a. Lichfield & IDC., 1984; b. Gilat and Duchan, 1985. See bibliography.

(20) A letter from Prof. Katzir and the Minister of Economy and Planning (Mr. Ya'akobi) to the JAFI, dated 25.12.1975.

(21) "JAFI-sponsored settlements" - those constructed during the "mitzpim" process and others heavily supported by the JAFI finance and administrative apparatus.

Chapter 7:
POTENTIAL ABILITY OF PLANNERS TO FUNCTION

Introduction

The planning philosophy behind Western Galil development, as it evolved during the 1970s and 1980s (described in Chap. 6), suggests the existence of some correlations between regional processes and planning practice. To further the understanding of these possible correlations, this chapter reveals the nature of the planning process in relation to the socio-political system in which the major planning products (i.e., the "settlement plans" and the Region 2000 development strategy) were expected to be applied. Several previously elaborated arguments are especially important for this analysis: Insofar as it is the result of interactions among the three components of a theoretical "region-planner-decision-makers" triangle, the planning process affects the regional system largely as a function of the way in which a planning initiative is structured into the socio-economic and political system that determines the decision-making processes concerning the region in question. Since planners are highly dependent on socio-political institutions in their quest to implement the planning product, it is the combination of both elements - the institutional context within which planners function, and the planning product itself, that determines the content of a planning process and the implementation of a planning product. In this

regard, the notion of commitment of decision-makers to a planning initiative offers a measure of the extent to which the planning process is integrated in the political-administrative decision-making system and, hence, to some socio-economic processes that affect the region's relative condition; the commitment of decision-makers to certain changes or actions proposed by plans implies a willingness to function within a known framework of activities and work toward a specific objective(s). This being the case, it was argued that planners should attempt to maximise the decision-makers' commitment to the planning product. In so doing, planners are expected to promote favourable operational conditions (i.e., mitigating the inherent risks of any action taken with regard to the region, such as a firm's decision to relocate and individual migration considerations). Finally, in order to generate the initial commitment that will promote the above conditions,, planners are given an opportunity to exploit several determinants of the decision-making processes that can be directly affected through the planning process, especially the determinants that can be defined as relatively "vulnerable" to the planning process.

In practice, therefore, the analysis of the planning process should concentrate on two major questions:

a. Under what conditions have the planners functioned?
   The term "conditions" refers on the one hand to the basis, created by the planners, of their communication with decision-makers (i.e., a basis structured within the planning product) and, on the other hand, to the nature of the political-administrative system with

which they had (and were expected) to cope, and toward which their planning product was addressed.

b. How have the planners actually performed?
This question examines the means invoked to promote the integration of the principle planning perspective into the prevailing system of decision-making.

This chapter address itself to the first question, and uncovers the potential basis for planning actions. Chapter 8 considers the second question, exploring the ways in which the theoretical ability to perform was manifested in actual planning experience during the years covered by our research (1975-1986).

The potential ability of planners to function (i.e., to promote the implementation of the planning product) is, as stated, partially connected with the nature of the planning product. The planning product, in turn, expresses the planners' understanding of the social, economic, and political system that concerns them, and their estimation of the types of required and feasible changes. Specifically, we contend that this connection of planning product and implementation is affected by the way in which planners treat the issues subject to their concern: the articulation of the recommended change and its practical implications, timing of the presentation of plans, targeting of decision-makers, and the clarity of the perspective from which planners view future regional processes. All of these aspects can equip planners with important tools in their attempts to structure the planning product in a way that

will help marshall decision-maker commitment toward the planning initiative and thus contribute to its implementation. The attention drawn to these aspects of the planning process suggests that were planners able to structure the "right" type of planning product, and if there were a "right" product at all, political decision-makers and socio-economic units would adopt and apply the product almost automatically. The present discussion, however, shows that the task of creating a planning product that will stimulate and lure public intervention in regional systems is a far from simple matter. First, different features of the planning product may contradict each other. For example, the planners' wish to be specific about the nature of proposed change, although important, may force them to focus immediately on issues that they would prefer to postpone to a more advanced stage of the planning process, since they are regarded as hard to promote at so early a stage. In our planning process, had planners been specific about the nature of the Region 2000 elected council, an important aspect of the area's development, this might have caused the immediate rejection of the entire strategy. In this case the dilemma was whether or not to be specific about the proposed change. The planners chose to stay with an abstract description of this issue, but this resulted in certain drawbacks. Second, whether planners like it or not, many processes are neither predictable nor controllable, as will be seen, for example, in the case of planners' "unproductive" choice of "partners" for implementation, and their inability to control the timing of the presentation of plans to the political-administrative system. The extent to

which it was possible to maintain an overall future perspective on regional processes under conditions of constant variability and complexity, the ability to make the "right" choices and promote the implementation of the planning product - these indeed constitute the essence of planning function. It is therefore in our interest to analyse the way in which planners have treated these matters.

Beyond that, however, assuming a hypothetical case in which all the above features of the planning product are structured in a way that makes this product highly accessible (i.e., easily understood and acceptable) to decision-makers, the actual factors governing the making of decisions, and hence the planners' ability to function, remain less than completely vulnerable to planning initiatives. The second part of this chapter indeed proves that decision-makers may take an attitude toward the planning initiative that has nothing to do with its content. The response of decision-makers to the planning product in the case considered below was often based on the roles of specific decision-makers in their functional system (e.g., political party) rather than on the content of the planning product itself.

The issue of the potential ability of planners to function is discussed in light of Rural Settlement Department (RSD) plans (presented in Chap. 6), and is explored from two complementary perspectives:

a. The nature of the planning product as a medium of communication with certain decision-makers. Assuming

that these have the power to execute plans, the aim is to create a product that will motivate them to intervene within regional systems and guide this intervention. In this fashion we deal with the way in which specific planning products treated the vulnerable determinants of decision-making.

b. Locational characteristics, that is, the institutional context in which the planners operated, as a framework for promoting the execution of their planning product. How capable are the regional and national institutional systems of absorbing the planning initiatives, both as presented by planners and regardless of the specific content of the planning product presented?

7.1 The Written Planning Product

As argued in Chapter 4, plans are written products of the planning process, reflecting the planners' state of mind regarding an issue or set of issues of concern to them at a specific juncture of the process. Plans do not necessarily articulate all elements of this state of mind; nor need they express the full range of considerations behind the planning perspective. Planners may choose not to specify the considerations that guided their work. They may also present different parts of plans to different decision-makers. As such, the essence of the planning product should be the provision of means to stimulate, direct, and, at times, even control the interactions between decision-makers and regional systems. However, it is the actual articulated

product, rather than unarticulated thoughts, that forms the basis for eliciting responses to planning initiatives.

Since planners do not function independently of the political and administrative decision-making system - they depend on the ability of this system to bring plans to fruition, implementation is largely a function of the planners' ability to produce a product addressed to those actors in the socio-economic system who have the potential to execute plans. These actors, whom we call the "partners" (see Chapter 3), may, for example, be economic entities expected to invest in specific enterprises, government ministers expected to affect allocation of financial resources for regional infrastructure, or various other decision-makers. Implementation also depends on the ability of planners to create a framework for actions in which the relationships between different regional processes are clarified. This is important for mitigating the inherent uncertainty in any type of economic and social activity. In regional plans, which concern themselves with a very complex system, it is crucial.

It follows that plans should be analysed in view of several major aspects:

a. The attitude toward "partners" - how clearly they are defined and how relevant are the means of addressing them.
b. Potential access to "partners" that stems from the nature of the plans themselves - the extent to which the "picture" is complete, specific, or abstract.
c. Timing of the presentation of plans. This may affect

the decision-makers' initial attitude toward the plans.

d. Strategic perspective - the extent to which a clear perspective on future changes affects the "accessibility" of plans.

e. The personal characteristics of the planners and their influence on the planning product's accessibility. To assess this aspect would require reference to socio-anthropological and behaviour observation studies, which could lead to issues transcending the scope of this dissertation. Therefore, although it is relevant, it is not thoroughly analysed here.

f. The issue of the planners' authority, and the nature of "partners" with whom planners must deal, is the theme of the second part of this chapter.

The present discussion, unless specifically stated otherwise, refers to plans that fall into two "blocs" - the "settlement plans" and the "Region 2000 strategy". These blocs of plans differ in their basic structure, as explained below.

7.1.1 The choice of "partners"

Generally speaking, the "settlement plans" are concerned with issues under the official responsibility of the Jewish Agency Rural Settlement Department (i.e., issues of constructing and establishing "rural settlements"). The planners, as employees of the RSD, sought RSD approval of their plans. Thus, by presenting the plans to the director

of the RSD North Region office, who would presumably transfer them "up the ladder" in the system's hierarchy, the planners had in fact chosen the RSD as their major "partner", expecting its administration to act in accordance with the plans when operating in Western Galil. Other public bodies were disregarded at this stage, their potential contribution in specific issues being identified in the midst of various actions. This process, however, received no special attention: planners merely followed prevailing procedures, whereas the "partnership" with the RSD administration was intrinsic to their role in this organisation.

In Region 2000 strategy, by contrast, the process of determining "partners" was much more complicated, and the planners were conscious of the issue. The initial reference was to Fellowship 2000. As the body most interested in promoting Region 2000 and integrating the planning function into this project, Fellowship 2000 was thought to be the most relevant "partner" for the implementation of the strategy. About six months after the strategy was publicised, however, the planners realised that apart from granting them the legitimacy to function within this project,[1] Fellowship 2000 lacked execution power (i.e., it had neither political authority nor financial resources). Consequently, planners sought a different "partner", approaching the senior executives of the RSD and attempting to convince them to assume responsibility for the project and the strategic recommendations. This shift came at a price; it exposed planners to fierce criticism from M. Drobles, a co-chairman of the RSD, who resented the

planners' having "approached the RSD after the strategy had already been presented to other bodies"[2] (i.e., Fellowship 2000, which had already circulated the strategy among government ministries). Moreover, this shift underscored differences between the articulated principles of strategy and the official policy of the "new partner". Indeed, after approving the Region 2000 development strategy, the RSD administration asked the planners to modify its content in several ways, so that the revised planning product would "satisfy RSD objectives and interests".[3] These changes were specified in Chapter 6.

Nevertheless, planners were still not consistent in their attitude toward the RSD. Although they regarded the RSD's contribution to Region 2000 as crucial in the initial stage of the project, difficulties in securing RSD commitment to the project led planners to ask members of Fellowship 2000 to help achieve this goal.

These experiences suggest two practical implications regarding the choice of partners:

a. The way the "partners" are chosen may affect their initial attitude toward the planning initiative. In the case of the "settlement plans", the planners' quest for "partners" was precisely the kind of action they had been expected to take. As planners employed by the RSD, they were supposed to "plan", and they did so before forwarding responsibility for implementation to the regional office and the national administration. Having approved these plans, the RSD administration's cooperation in their implementation was almost a

foregone conclusion, in the sense of fulfilling its role within the system.[4] In the case of Region 2000, the planners were fairly aggressive in attempting to generate the RSD's involvement. By gaining the approval of Fellowship 2000, the planners, employees of the RSD, actually forced the RSD's hand; the RSD had little choice but to approve the strategy (at least officially). Yet in doing so, the planners overstepped their official brief, namely, to "plan" within the RSD's official areas of concern, rather than determining where the planning should take place. Thus they presented an initial discouragement to RSD cooperation.

b. The choice of "partners" may necessitate different layouts of the planning product. The "layout" of a plan refers both to the content of the planning perspective and the way it is articulated. Thus, it is possible that in structuring the planning product, planners may also affect the extent to which potential partners accept it. The original layout of the Region 2000 strategy was highly appealing to Fellowship 2000 but inconsistent with the expectations of the new partner, the RSD, as is discussed below. By comparison, the application of the 1976 and 1978 plans during the "mitzpim" process indicates that both the planning recommendations and their articulation suited the RSD's expectations regarding the required changes in Western Galil.

In all, the "settlement plans" referred to the RSD were congruent with the planners' official scope of activity.

Thus the planners were spared the need to struggle at length to locate an executive partner and foster this partner's desire to cooperate. The question is whether an initial approach to the RSD for partnership in Region 2000 would have made the project more acceptable. It may have required a different layout for the initial proposal, especially in the proposal's articulation, but it may also have ameliorated the planners' muddling treatment of the partnership issue. For example, the strategy could have emphasised the positive consequences of the proposed changes for the development of new settlements, indicating where RSD influence should be maintained or initiated. This would have given the RSD an opportunity to estimate its role in the region's processes and determine its policy priorities.

Subsequent discussion will show that official approval of a planning product does not secure its implementation. The reasons for the RSD's rejection of the long-run commitment proposed by the Region 2000 strategy were much more profound than the strategy's specific layout. Thus, another question must be asked: should the planning perspective be accommodated to suit the partner's interests and needs? Possible answers, and the implications of such accommodation for the planning process, are discussed in the conclusions to this dissertation.

7.1.2 Relations with the partner's official policy and presumed interests

Both blocs of plans essentially are concerned with the issue of public intervention: where and how it should take place. Both were based on a political consensus on the need to develop the Galil.

The "settlement plans" were based on the RSD paradigm of settlements in the context of territorial issues (i.e., they accept the principal view of settlements, regardless of their size and functional characteristics, as a way to establish and demonstrate Jewish control). These plans also adopt the standard RSD model of settlement structure (especially the post-1976 plans, designed during the plans' implementation). Accordingly, these plans dealt with issues under the official responsibility of the RSD - the construction and consolidation of small collective settlements and their immediate functional environment. In particular, they dealt with questions such as the settlements' location, the number of families expected to populate them, and the allocation of basic means of production and public facilities. All of these were part of the existing RSD operational machinery, which set implementation procedures and financial allocation principles. Accordingly, planners did not concern themselves, for instance, with the suitability of RSD financial allocation quotas.

Region 2000 strategy, by contrast, addressed itself to a wide range of issues for which the RSD had established neither an operational apparatus nor an official policy. For

example, even though the RSD officially has no concern with New Towns,[5] the strategy suggested that the New Town of Karmiel be viewed as the core area of Region 2000 and, thus, as the centre of RSD attention.[6] The strategic proposal to promote the growth of new settlements to magnitudes (i.e., number of settlers) much higher than traditionally planned by the RSD represents another aspect in which the Region 2000 strategy deviated from the "mainstream" policy of the RSD. An even greater departure was the planners' belief that the promotion of development in the Arab sector should be made an integral part of the Region 2000 project.[7] Although this belief was never interpreted into specific recommendations, it was an issue totally out of JAFI's official scope. In fact, the strategy rejected the RSD's traditional short-run preoccupation with a set of predetermined increments within small, territorially defined functional systems. Instead, it suggested that the traditional RSD approach to "settlement" processes was no longer valid in the Western Galil of the 1980s. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 6, the Region 2000 strategic perspective provided planners with an alternative to the 1976 and 1978 Segev plans, especially in view of the fact that the region's condition had not fundamentally changed as a consequence of their implementation. For the RSD (and other public organisations), however, this conceptual alternative was far too radical, as it challenged its role in Western Galil in three aspects:

a. The power base of the RSD.

   The "settlement plans" implied an increase of the territories and volume of population dependent on the

RSD (i.e., its financial resources, social-organisational facilities, and role in the national political system).

By contrast, Region 2000 proposed, for example, larger settlements with a smaller management role for the RSD, the development of larger intra-regional industrial zones at the expense of small industrial areas already existing in the new settlements, and the promotion of linkages between new settlements and Karmiel. All of these changes (e.g., minimisation of RSD involvement in local decision-making processes, its inability to determine migration quotas for collective settlements, and abandonment of the cooperative production structure of the settlements) created a potential for the elimination of the RSD power base. They also implied a potential overlap between RSD activities and those of other JAFI departments and government ministries.

b. The functional base of the RSD.

The "settlement plans" maintain prevailing patterns of public intervention in regional systems. They even imply that such intervention is highly desirable to secure the protection of national land and the development of new settlements in Western Galil.

The opposite attitude is taken by the Region 2000 strategy, its essential recommendation being to restrict the role of different public agencies (chiefly the JAFI-RSD and government ministries) in the regional system, limiting their intervention to investments in physical infrastructure, thus leaving most regional processes to be determined by market forces. Therefore,

not only does Region 2000 reject the traditional patterns of public intervention by suggesting the redistribution of public authority, it emphasises the case for eliminating the power of public agencies (such as the RSD) to affect regional processes. As expressed by N. Zvili (a co-director of the RSD) in the debate around Region 2000, "such changes will force the Department to re-define its justification to function, both in the national government system and in the entire JAFI system, thus we should consider whether we want it or not".[8] In terms of the government apparatus, Region 2000's recommendations also imply a shift from the welfare attitude and direct public involvement with all aspects of regional processes, toward a much more limited scope of intervention.

c. Practical constraints on institutional reorganisation. The task of redistributing public intervention, proposed in the Region 2000 strategy, implies structural changes to which large public organisations like the RSD and government ministries would have difficulty in accommodating. As to these bodies, the strategy had similar practical implications: First, redistribution of the authority of different public bodies and the proposed regional elected body, would require a fundamental change in the national political and administrative structure, thus necessarily leading to a curtailment of the control presently exercised by national and local bodies, and thus is difficult to accept. Indeed, these proposals created a potential base for Fellowship 2000, the Ministry of Economics and

Planning, and possibly the Mayor of Karmiel to increase their control over Western Galil, as will be specified further. Second, changing the patterns of intervention in a way that will enable the private sector to have a stronger impact would require changing the basic perception of intervention held by the national political system. This also would be difficult to absorb. Third, as changing the intervention machinery is a matter of practical complication, there is the need for great dedication and a particular (negative or positive) political situation that will create the incentive to initiate such changes.

Therefore, it is contended that the fact that the "settlement plans" did not deviate from prevailing policy and fit the operational machinery of the RSD, contributed to their general appeal to the Department, in contrast with the difficulties encountered in approving the 1985 Region 2000 strategy.

7.1.3 Concreteness of proposals

The "settlement plans" are basically a detailed description of the proposed changes and a specification of various actions to be taken in order to realise them. As such, they provide a firm basis for determining the required actions and their priorities. They also enabled planners to identify the roles of different public agencies in the

process of realisation of the plans (e.g., the role of the Israel Land Authority in allocating land reserves for different land uses, or the role of the Ministry of Housing in road construction).[9] Evidence indicates that plans' implementation indeed followed the principal means specified by them.[10]

By comparison, the Region 2000 strategy is a relatively abstract framework for identifying the aspects of regional processes on which efforts to initiate changes in the regional system should concentrate, the organisational structures for the realisation of the proposed changes, the prospected public intervention, and the priorities between issues and activities. It is, indeed, a strategy, in the sense of providing the direction of recommended changes and the conceptual context into which specifically recommended actions should fit. Specification of this broad perception, however, was never accomplished by the planners. In practice, the strategy's abstraction initially proved to be an advantage - it satisfied the interests of different partners. The "other side of the coin", however, was that this abstraction created grounds for different interpretations that were not in accordance with its principal approach, and led to demands to change this approach (such as the case of the "settlement" issue, specified in Chapter 6). In the long run, the lack of further specification or concretisation of the strategy became a major obstacle to its application in practice.

With this in mind, it may be concluded that regardless of the content of the specific proposals, greater

concreteness of a planning product provides planners with a more comfortable ground to communicate with decision-makers. Since concreteness implies greater ease on the part of decision-makers to estimate, for example, future actions and costs, it is likely to be positively correlated with the extent of implementation of plans. It should be emphasised, however, that the planners were aware of the need to specify the strategy. Although efforts in this direction were made, specification of the strategic principles was too limited and took place at an inappropriate stage of the planning process (as will be further discussed). This limited specification of the strategy into a set of concrete actions can be partially explained by the institutional context of the planning function (discussed in the following section), and the planners' difficulties in accepting the compromises required in making the shift from abstraction to concreteness. This lack of specification represents a major drawback of the strategic perspective, which bore very fragile links to actual reality.

7.1.4 Distribution of costs

None of the plans produced an analysis of the costs created by the recommended changes and the distribution of economic units which should, or are likely to, bear them.

By assuming the maintenance of prevailing public authority, "settlement plans" implied that the financial burden of establishing a new settlement area in Western Galil would initially be imposed on the RSD, and gradually

be transferred to government ministries. Individual and economic enterprises in new settlements were, presumably, to be subject to standard (i.e., heavy) financial public assistance. In this sense, these plans suggested actions whose direct and short-term costs could be estimated rather accurately by the existing public system (Reichman and Oren, 1984). Nevertheless, the plans did not bother themselves with external costs such as the damaged natural environment caused by construction of new settlements and infrastructure (Sofer and Finkel, 1988), or their impact on the Arab population.

The Region 2000 strategy adopted a similar approach, but unlike the previous case in which the direct costs imposed on public agencies could be estimated, the recommended changes in Region 2000 (especially since they were insufficiently extrapolated to concrete actions) were difficult to estimate. The proposed changes in patterns of public intervention left the question of immediate costs open to speculation, since such costs did not fall within prevailing public allocation procedures. They also did not enable the estimation of the duration of investments. For example, although it was suggested that the RSD allocate initial investments to the development of regional infrastructure, no concrete proposal was put forward as to the volume of required investments and the RSD-government relations necessary to secure the continuity of allocations.[11] Further, by giving the private sector an important part of the task of investing in Region 2000 under the above conditions, the strategy imposed a theoretically crucial cost on this sector, stemming from their presumed

interest to invest in an area where basic facilities are insufficient and their development process is yet undetermined.[12]

7.1.5 Timing of presentation

As mentioned, the 1976 Segev development plan was published during a period of social unrest in the Galil, in which riots in the Arab sector over the issue of land ownership raised a political debate concerning the question of Jewish existence in the Galil. This debate did not last for more than few weeks, nor did it have a country-wide effect (e.g., demonstrations were mainly confined to the local Arab population, and took place in the Galil). Nevertheless, in this context of events, the presentation of the 1976 plan provided it with immediate relevance, especially for the director of the RSD of the Jewish Agency, who was provided with theoretical and practical guidance regarding the way to cope with the implications of these riots and the importance given to the Arab-Israeli territorial dispute. Thus, although this plan addressed itself to a problem that planners thought important before the "Earth day",[13] the specific combination of events and the political perspective of the RSD director that gave this plan its immediate relevance was not and could not have been predicted. Accordingly, it is difficult to infer from this case any ability on the part of planners to create specific "favourable" conditions during the initial introduction of a plan. Moreover, one cannot even conclude that the existence

of public debate is necessarily an advantage to the planning process, especially since the public debate provoked by the "Earth Day" was very short and limited in its scope. In this regard, some studies (Sofer and Finkel, 1988; Lifschitz, 1990) imply that the fairly rapid decline in importance of the "demographic" issue in Western Galil was of major advantage for the RSD "mitzpim" project - had the public debate persisted longer, it would have been much more difficult to execute the project. In any case, from the planners' point of view, their involvement in any kind of public debate was irrelevant.[14] The case of Region 2000 further emphasises this problematic aspect of the planning process: the strategy was published during a period in which the Galil and Western Galil were not on any particular public and political agenda. Although the publication of the strategy led to a few publicly articulated reactions from several politicians, these gradually dissipated, leaving open the questions of what "favourable" conditions are, and how long can they last.

In all, assuming that "favourable" public conditions are those enabling planners to promote integration of plans in the execution mechanism of forces related to regional processes, the above examples might suggest that such conditions are totally remote from the potential impact of the planning process. Yet, they do not rule out the idea, explored at a later stage of this dissertation, that planners may utilise different marketing procedures to create public awareness of plans, thus possibly creating "comfortable" conditions in which to function.

7.1.6 Strategic perspective

The discussion in Chapter 4 suggested that a strategic perspective on long-run regional changes may provide a useful framework for guiding decision-making processes in political-administrative systems and economic and business forces.

In this regard, the initiation of the Region 2000 strategy indicates the planners' dissatisfaction with the prevailing lack of a long-run perspective guiding the different public activities charged with the task "to develop Western Galil", and the "settlement plans", which gradually accommodated themselves to the ad hoc nature of the RSD's intervention. This strategy assumed that a strategic perspective would enable the identification of those aspects of regional systems most requiring attention, and which thus should be subject to planning efforts. As stated in the introductory comments to the strategy: "such a perspective should offset the planners' tendency to concentrate on day-to-day affairs that results in a total unsystematic concern with regional processes and inability to encourage important changes in the region's relative condition" (Gilat and Duchan, 1985). In practice, however, was this the case? Did the strategy guide planning function away from its traditional concern with ad hoc solutions to current problems and ongoing processes? Further, as an alternative approach to regional processes, did the strategy provide additional or different means to cope with planning tasks?

The answers to these questions are not simple, since,

from a pragmatic point of view, the fact that the strategy was not actually implemented might lead to a rejection of any other potential contribution of this strategy to planning practice in general. Nevertheless, putting aside the content of the strategy (which, it will be argued, posed an almost impossible challenge for the public execution system), the strategy offers several guidelines that may be useful for future planning practice: First, the strategic perspective redefined the scope of regional planning by limiting the areas and issues concerned, with these to be determined in connection with the potential "partner" in their execution (the latter affects the scope of change that may be attained). Indeed, in view of previous experience whereby the traditional issue-wide planning approach proved insufficient for pursuing the development of Western Galil, the task-oriented approach may well be relevant for improving this area's relative condition. Such an approach may prevent a "spreading out" on many issues that is almost necessarily done at the account of a thorough understanding of and intensive involvement in issues concerned. It may prove especially relevant under conditions of economic recession when public allocations must be restricted and their objects should be clearly identified. Further, given the problematic status of planners in political and administrative decision-making processes (discussed in section 7.2), it seems that the consideration of potential partners as an integral part of the production of a strategy (or other planning products) offers planners an opportunity to increase the initial accessibility of the planning product. Second, the strategy provided specific criteria for

continuing the attempt to advance planning initiatives. In our case, the criteria were linked to actual changes in public intervention: since the prevailing patterns of public intervention seemed to prevent any attempt to establish important (as determined by the planners) changes in the region's relative condition, the planners' inability to change these patterns was given as grounds for abandonment of the entire strategic perspective and efforts to advance it. In other words, a strategic perspective cannot stand by itself; it is context-specific and impermanent.

In all, Region 2000 initially enabled the planners to find their way through the muddle of specific issues of regional processes which, in their prevailing treatment, they believed led to a "dead end" in actual regional conditions. This turned planning practice into a task-oriented and conditional function, and thus worked against the common tendency on the part of planners to be content with mere involvement in regional processes regardless of their consequences.

Summary

This part of the chapter departed from the assumption that the planning product is an element of the planning process that highly depends on the planners' skills and sensitivity to shape it in a way that will promote its integration into the decision-making system. Analysis of the planning experience (of the two blocs of plans) shows that even if planners are provided with such a potentially wide

base for determining the nature of the planning product, their actual ability to structure a suitable product (for their needs) is nonetheless challenging.

Presented as a tool for communication with decision-makers, the discussion of the planning experiences highlighted the dilemmas planners face, areas where their influence is very moderate, and the principles they should respect; the major practical dilemmas surround the alternatives of concrete versus abstract articulation, and the choice of partners. Although any planning product should stem from the planners' clear and fairly concrete picture of the desired and expected future, the different experiences show that whereas great specificity may lead to a somewhat technical and narrow-minded treatment of regional issues, abstraction by itself is insufficient for operating. This is further linked to the choice of partners for execution - different target partners may require a different set-up of the planning product and possibly compromises on its content, some of which are difficult for planners to accept. These dilemmas are reinforced by the fact that planners have a limited influence on suitable timing of the presentation due to their inability to affect the course of events; thus, they can be solved only in practice, if at all.

In the course of the planning process, planners should therefore bear in mind the following principles: a clear perspective on the future is crucial for planning practice; an abstract strategic proposal must be followed by its concretisation; distribution of the estimation of costs cannot be disregarded; and distributional effects should be considered since they are among the expected consequences of

planning practice.

In this regard, a question is raised as to why planners need to communicate. This dissertation assumes that the need to communicate is inherent in the planning function, or in the work of those planners who expect to be involved in the implementation of plans. Therefore, the question to be asked is: How is communication stimulated?. Such "communication" requires that planners be clear about their thoughts and set up the planning product in a way most accessible to the chosen "partners". Further, even where a planning initiative is basically accepted, the actual process of communication requires planners to compromise on some issues and means so as to make proposals feasible in certain execution situations (this assumes that communication by definition implies compromise). Indeed, this section showed that in terms of clarity of ideas, the "settlement plans" where fairly accessible to decision-makers, in that they were clearly articulated and dealt with issues with which the "partners" were familiar. "Region 2000", by comparison, in its abstraction of issues and its concern with unfamiliar aspects of the regional system, was at times difficult for potential partners to grasp. Moreover, even though the strategy attempted to tackle the politically unquestioned "demographic problem" of Western Galil and its moderate economic development, the proposed means to tackle these problems made it less attractive to the political and administrative system. Nevertheless, while the above elements may facilitate communication, the most important issue is the content of the planning product, on the basis of which communication is developed.

In practice, apart from the fact that the task of formulating an accessible product is by itself "tricky", the result of communication may or may not be its official approval. Still, approval and integration into actual activities may lie in quite different dimensions of response to the planning initiative, or reflect two different patterns of commitment: both products discussed in this chapter were approved by the RSD, although resulting in different patterns of RSD commitment to their content and practical recommendations. Were these reactions merely a function of the different characteristics of the planning products? Had this been the case, we might be arguing that the planning process depends totally on the planners' professional and personal characteristics,[15] and that planners are capable of forming the "right" planning product. If so, then we might also suggest that the nature of the planning product could be "prescribed". For example, it would follow that since the "settlement plans" seem to have promoted execution, a planning product model developed on the basis of these plans should be applied in other cases. By implication, had the Region 2000 strategy contained features similar to the 1976 and 1978 Segev plans, it would have been executed by the RSD of the mid-to-late 1980s. The following discussion, however, overrules these conclusions, suggesting instead that although we can offer several characteristics that planning products should contain in order to promote their execution, the implementation cannot be secured.

7.2 Institutional Locational Characteristics

As noted, certain qualities of the planning product may enhance its becoming a source of reference for decision-makers associated with, in our case, the specific region. The question of the potential for planners to function, however, extends beyond these qualities of the planning product. Planning, indeed, involves more than producing a written document. It is the process by which planners exert influence through their involvement in decision-making processes related to the region concerned; their opinion is considered, they are consulted about procedures, and they are required to assess actions. The question is, also, whether the political-administrative system permitted the planners to act in this interactive mode to implement the plans.

This role of planners is closely linked to the institutional context of planning function (or, the planners' institutional location). By "institutional context" we refer to the combined effect of the organisations' characteristics within given stages of the planning process and specific regional processes on the role of planners in these institutions at any given time. By implication, the planning process is largely a function of its institutional context.

Indeed, the links between planning function and its institutional environment are thoroughly discussed in the literature, and are subject to much debate as to the specific elements that most affect planning practice and implementation. Beyond the general agreement on the

importance of understanding the planning institutional context in the sense of "know your partner or enemy", scholars emphasise several elements in these relations, each important in itself: the institutional complexity associated with the planning process, and the consequent inability to fully preconceive the nature of the institutional context; the possibility that decisions in areas unrelated to the planning product actually affect its implementation, along with the problematic status of planners. All necessitate that planners carefully determine their proposals and expectations (Baer, 1977; Baum, 1980; Forester, 1981; Friend, 1976 and 1980; McAuslan, 1979).

Although it is beyond our scope to present in full the different arguments of the scholars mentioned above (and many others), the following discussion shows their immediate relevance and demonstrates that the different institutional contexts of planning initiatives (e.g., the different characteristics of the organisations associated with Western Galil and the changing role of planners in these organisations) had crucial effects on the planners' ability to operate. This part of the chapter, therefore, addresses itself a major question: The extent to which the institutional context of the planning processes in Western Galil during the relevant years permitted the adoption of planning initiatives and contributed to their execution. This requires, first, to discuss the basic characteristics of this context.

A wide variety of organisations form the institutional context in our specific case: government ministries and governmental bodies, local authorities, the Jewish Agency for Israel (JAFI), and other public bodies such as Fellowship 2000 and the political "settlement movements". The discussion, for practical reasons, distinguishes between "direct" and "indirect" institutional contexts. The former is the system in which the planners' basic conditions of functioning are determined by virtue of their being employed by or contracted with it - the RSD in our case. The latter category refers to the various institutions that form part of the entire socio-political and administrative environment to which planners were related in course of the planning process. In the latter, interactions between planners and others do not involve formal "boss-employee" relations, but they are not necessarily any the less binding for planning function. Clearly, the institutions in this category are not equally relevant.

Differences in planning processes are expected to occur as a result of the planners' role in their direct institutional context and their relations with other institutions. Accordingly, the questions posed above are tackled in two stages: first, there is an attempt to analyse the major characteristics of the RSD and its structural changes that affected the status of planning function and the planners' ability to take part in regional processes. This is followed by a description of the relations between planners and other institutions related to the specific planning initiatives. This path of analysis permits us to concentrate on the areas in which planners were involved,

and avoid a thorough discussion of the entire national political and administrative processes during the years covered by this research.

7.2.1 The direct institutional context of planning function: The Rural Settlement Department (RSD) of the Jewish Agency

The RSD is the organisation that employed the planners subject to our analysis during the years 1975-1986. Hence, we are concerned here with the extent to which the RSD's apparatus affected planners' ability to initiate plans and promote their implementation. Since this potential for operation changed over the years, the following discussion emphasises the historical processes in the RSD that determined the role of the planning function in the system's internal decision-making milieu.

The Rural Settlement Department, as noted in Chapter 5, is part of the Jewish Agency for Israel (JAFI), the latter being a unique quasi-governmental by virtue of its relatively high executive power and fair degree of independence from government policies and executive machinery, although it is authorised to function in areas under basic government responsibility.

The relations between JAFI and its specific departments are such that the basic principles of policies are determined by the JAFI Executive. The departments are authorised to interpret principles into specific policies and to execute them; thus, they can be fairly independent in

that they, rather than the JAFI international institutions, can dictate policies in their areas of concern. Planning functions are mainly confined to the specific departments, with regional planning the domain of the RSD. Within the RSD, regional planning takes place in the regional offices.[16] The fragmented JAFI system results in a situation whereby policies oriented to internal Israeli affairs are largely a result of the specific departments' initiatives and their actual application. Accordingly, the strength of the RSD stems from its substantial control over numerous collective settlements scattered all over the country. This also is linked to the traditional national political-ideological importance assigned to the "settlement processes" (Chapter 5).

In practice, the processes characterising the RSD during the years 1975-1986 had clear implications in terms of its ability and will to take advantage of its potential relative independence from JAFI, the coherence of its executed policies, and their impact on regional processes. These processes were expressed at all administrative levels of the RSD: from the national management, through its regional offices, to the individual professionals. They can also be associated with the planning function that is structured in this system. In fact, the year 1983 can be identified as the point in time at which the accumulated effect of the different processes characterising the RSD during the 1970s and 1980s made itself felt in the entire system, resulting in the creation of virtually a different RSD apparatus system, and a different environment for

planning functions. This changing structure of the RSD can be further associated with the two "blocs" of planning initiatives discussed in Chapter 6 - the 1970s "settlement plans" and the 1985 Region 2000 development strategy, each belonging to a different RSD apparatus. Several institutional changes in the RSD were particularly important for the practice of the two blocs of planning initiatives. To discuss these processes, the information presented in Chapter 5 should be extended in one aspect, to note three trends in nation-wide processes that affected the socio-economic system in which the RSD operated:

a. The 1977 general elections to the Israeli government that resulted in a Liberal-Revisionist alliance ("right-wing" or Likud) government after 30 years of Labour-Zionist control. The immediate effect on the RSD came through the change in the political party coalition of the Zionist Congress, leading to the appointment of two directors to the RSD. This, however, was only one aspect of the different socio-economic system, previously governed by Labour party institutions, with which the RSD had to deal. Further effects included, for example, changes in public intervention priorities (i.e., "anti-socialist" policies and different territorial preferences), the jolting of traditional administrative procedures, and creation of expectations for minimized social discrimination.
b. From the mid-1970s, the country has been experiencing an increasing growth in the importance of industrial

activities and a shift away from the traditional importance of agriculture, especially agriculture applying traditional technologies. Since agriculture was the economic base of most of the settlements under control of the RSD, and since "agriculture" created the ideological foundation of RSD intervention and its operational machinery, the introduction of industrial activities posed a difficult challenge for those aiming to promote the development of RSD-sponsored settlements, and forced different operational conditions on the RSD: first, the RSD lacked the normative procedures and resources to deal with industrialisation of settlements. Second, some settlements lacked the skills and the incentive to acquire the know-how for either modernising agricultural production or integrating industrial activities into their economic base. Third, agriculturally based settlements formed the electoral base of N. Zvili (a co-director of the RSD) and the Labour party; structural changes in these settlements may have meant a loss of this power.

c. The mid-1980s are marked by a deepening economic and social crisis in the cooperative settlement system, seen in the disintegration of the family productive unit and the cooperative principle on which most collective settlements are structured. This structural crisis grew out of previous years of uncontrolled spending in consumption and minimal allocations for the productive base of settlements, especially during the post-1977 nation-wide economic euphoria (Ravid, 1986;

Gibton, 1986). Since the cooperative settlement system was the traditional environment of reference of the RSD (i.e., its source of legitimacy and official authority), the collapsing system raised questions regarding the contribution of the RSD to this socio-economic system, thus forcing the RSD to take action with regard to the collapsing settlements, and allocate to them large parts of its budget.

In all, these trends, which had measurable expression from the mid 1980s, are undoubtedly rooted in pre-1980 national socio-economic and political processes, as much as in the pre-1980 RSD management and policy determinations that failed to perceive the coming changes in the country and especially in the collective settlement system. Most important for our discussion is that these processes introduced to the RSD unfamiliar issues and problems to cope with, some even beyond its official scope of intervention. Accordingly, the issues and problems planners had to deal with were also affected, creating different challenges for pre-1980 and post-1980 planning initiatives: Pre-1980 planners operated on the "safe" base (i.e., a stable role of the RSD in the collective settlement system, and a general satisfaction with their existence). Post-1980 planners, however, functioned during a period in which most of the principles of RSD intervention and the structure of collective settlements were being questioned.

Apart from these changing conditions, several additional changes in the administrative structure of the

RSD are particularly important for our attempt to understand planners' functional conditions. These changes occurred in the two major segments of the RSD's hierarchy (diagram 2, appendix): The national apparatus, which consists of the Director(s), General-Director and several vice-General Directors (the latters are in charge mostly of the professional divisions) (diagram 2),[17] and the sub-national system - regional offices. Five regional offices operated (until 1990) (their distribution of authority is determined by territorial criteria): Galil, North, Central, Jerusalem, and Negev. The North Region office, the subject of this case study, is composed of three professional sections:[18] Development Planning, Construction, and Water. Regional planning is confined to the "planning unit", classified within the Development Planning section. This unit operates under dual subordination: the regional office management and the professional control of the "planning authority" (mutually controlled by the RSD and the Ministry of Agriculture.)

The following changes in the RSD, all specifically relevant to the role of planners, are therefore specified according to the RSD's basic structure.

7.2.1.1. Changes in the RSD national management system

a. The Structure of Management:

Until 1977, the RSD was headed by one director, R. Weitz - a charismatic leader who was well appreciated in JAFI and maintained continuous contacts with its

international bodies.

From 1977 to 1988 two political nominees of the two large political parties (i.e., Labour and Likud) served as the RSD's co-directors. During most of this period the management was shared by R. Weitz and M. Drobles, their coexistence facilitated by a clear distribution of authority, although Weitz was undoubtedly the dominant.

In 1983, with the appointment of N. Zvili (a member of the Labour Party) as co-director with M. Drobles, RSD management procedures became problematic; while both lacked a dominant role over the department, cooperation was prevented due to the importance given to political party considerations in the directors' decision-making, and to the resulting development of a dual execution apparatuses. Consequently, the selection of settlements, issues, and regional systems subject to the concern of either of the RSD directors was consistent mainly with Party's considerations, resulting, for example, in situations where two settlements in close physical proximity were supported by two different directors with their sometimes conflicting policy principles and instructions. Since each director attempted to increase control over settlements, competition between directors was unavoidable, thus creating crucial inefficiencies in managing the RSD activities, especially those affecting regional systems, since they consist of many settlements, involve various issues, and require cooperation.[19]

b. Toward administrative disorder:

Up to 1983, the RSD functioned as a highly centralised system that maintained a clear administrative hierarchy. Overall policy determination, and the provision of assistance to regional offices (assistance mainly was given on the latter's request) was done at the national level of management. Regional offices were given a wide authority in executing the department's policy.

The 1983 change of directors created complete chaos in the hierarchy: these directors became involved in the small details of actual execution of policies, approaching different administrative and professional functions regardless of official role in the system, thus paralyzing the Director General's coordination of the RSD's activities, and confusing the regional offices with their conflicting instructions. Importantly, this situation increased the importance of informal relations between personnel, the directors, and other managers of the system - all involved in a "mismatch" of policy determination and internal management affairs.

c. Toward disintegration of departmental policy:

Until the early 1980s, the RSD had a clear view of its role in the national social-economy, and had solid policy principles. Indeed, over the years, its coherent resource allocation policies gave it a dominant role in areas where collective settlements existed. In administratively defined regions, RSD policy was oriented toward the expansion of the settlement system. High priority was given to peripheral areas within the "green line", although other areas were

also subject to intervention.

The period from the early 1980s saw a growing confusion and inconsistency in policies. Conflicts arose around several issues: The extent to which the RSD should maintain its intensive intervention in collective settlement areas. This traditional role was questioned mainly by the JAFI international institutions; The extent to which the RSD should take over government responsibility for the economic consolidation of collective settlements. This debate arose in relation with the economic crisis of the 1980s in the settlement system;[20] The determination of areas that should be ranked with high priority for RSD intervention. Importantly, this period was marked by a growing emphasis on political considerations in RSD decision-making, and by attempts on the part of the directors to utilise professional units in justifying the different policies. Consequently, it became difficult to formulate long-term, department-wide policies and provide a solid base for future intervention.

d. Decreased independence of the RSD vis-à-vis JAFI institutions:

The importance of "settlement" issues to the Israeli and the JAFI political systems is evident in view of the appointment of two directors to the RSD, each representing a different government political bloc. This, however, did not imply immediate support of RSD policies by these political systems. Under Weitz's directorship, the RSD was highly independent in determining its policies and activities, for which it enjoyed full JAFI backing while attracting a large

portion of the total JAFI budget. By comparison, after 1983, the two-director structure seemed to justify the intervention of JAFI international institutions in RSD policy-making and internal management[21] As a result, the RSD's ability to determine its own policies independently of JAFI decreased drastically, as expressed, for example, in its growing difficulties in attaining approval of its requested budget, not to mention the difficulties inherent in making possible changes in policy orientation or taking over other departments' tasks, as implied by the Region 2000 strategy.

e. The role of regional offices:

Weitz's pragmatic management approach and the wide authority he gave the regional offices implied his acceptance of changes in RSD policy resulting from policy execution. Regional offices were, indeed, relatively free to determine specific programs, and in many cases to establish the role of the RSD in regional systems. These offices also were fully backed by Weitz in the government and JAFI systems. By contrast, the administrative disorder prevailing since 1983 resulted in an unclear role of regional offices and a selective backing of their activities. Although these offices gained some freedom to determine their activities (a consequence of the lack of a departmental policy and minimal central control), this was not a result of a purposeful decentralised authority, and, in many cases, the offices were paralysed by conflicting instructions and inefficient management.

In both periods, the regional offices were viewed as a

major professional segment of the RSD. Differences, however, existed in the extent of the management's commitment to professional recommendations: such commitment was greater during the first period, whereas after 1983 there was a tendency to adopt those proposals that complied with the directors' political interests. In fact, the role of regional offices in RSD decision-making reflects the major characteristics of the department's apparatus system, especially since its actual intervention was activated through these regional offices. To conclude, one should note the example of the Avtalion settlement in Western Galil, whose establishment (in 1985) was directed by M. Drobles, in spite of strong opposition of the co-director N. Zvili and most of the North region planners. This case reflects the lack of RSD policy priorities and the total disjunction between the interests of the directors.

7.2.1.2. Processes in the RSD North region office

Apart from the above processes, several other elements in the specific region office authorised to deal with Western Galil determined planners' direct functional environment. The director of the Haifa Region office Y. Friedman (until April 1983), in accordance with the general departmental attitude toward regional planning function, assigned planners a crucial role in his decision-making: "having realised that an efficient management of activities and determination of `a regional perspective' is a function of planners' integration in decision-making processes",[22]

planners were, indeed, incorporated into most of the office's decision-making processes and were provided with a wider authority than that required by their official brief. Planners enjoyed the freedom to initiate projects and manage different activities, and to established their professional status in the RSD.

The appointments of E. Schmidt (April 1983 to April 1984) and M. Cohen (April 1984-1988) were marked by these directors' efforts to eliminate the role of planners in the regional offices. This was expressed by conflicts between them and the head of the Planning Section (T. Duchan), in difficulties for planners to operate, and in their growing exclusion from the office's decision-making. This conflict was exacerbated by the administrative disorder in the RSD, which, at times, enabled planners to bypass the regional offices through the support of one of the co-directors of the department (mostly N. Zvili). Planners, indeed, attempted to take advantage of this administrative fragmentation, but without much success, as will be discussed further on. Their professional subordination to the Planning Authority (refer to diagram 2) further enabled them to initiate plans remotely from the North Region office. Indeed, this ability was encouraged by the vice-director of the Planning Authority (the former director of the RSD North Region office, Y. Friedman), who controlled its planning functions. There is evidence, however, that although the North Region office's planners were embroiled in the above conflict, this conflict was not so much over the role of planners in the regional office, as was initially thought, and that planners were merely a "ball" in

the game between the directors of this office. As noted by Mr. M. Cohen: "since he (Y. Friedman, O.G.) expected, through planners, to maintain control over the regional office, I was left with only the alternative of excluding planners from decision-making processes in the regional office. This proved to be a mistake, since after you (planners, O.G.) left the regional office, we did not know what to do in relation to numerous projects, especially Region 2000, which was most important".[23] Nevertheless, during most of the period from 1983 on, the ability of planners to function was constantly disrupted and their work jeopardized, as will be discussed below.

To sum up, the above processes in the RSD indicate that the planners' degree of operative freedom was positively correlated with RSD functional integrity: During the first period, planners were part of a stable decision-making system and an orderly operating mechanism, in which planning function had a clearly defined role. This period is also noted for the strong position of the RSD vis-à-vis the entire JAFI, resulting in a large budget for, and hence great executive power of the RSD. The "settlement plans" of the 1970s represent a situation in which planners were able to take full advantage of the authority to initiate plans and promote their implementation through the plans' integration into the department's decision-making system. Being backed by the RSD gave planning initiatives the credibility and access to resources required for implementation. This in turn created the ability to incorporate different non-JAFI institutions and individuals

into the planning process, as will be discussed in the following discussion.

The economic crisis of the 1980s in the settlement system heavily sponsored by the RSD and the disjointed RSD apparatus, created difficult conditions for planning practice. Under the dual-director structure, the unofficial relations that dominated the decision-making processes gave planners some potential for initiating plans with the backing of some of the RSD managers. The Region 2000 strategy represents an attempt by planners to generate RSD patronage of the project, by taking advantage of these elements. Implementation of this strategy, however, proved almost impossible: having had to deal with different personnel conflicts and indirectly to satisfy the political interests of the directors, the planning function found itself subject to the changing RSD commitments and inconsistency in its performance. This further damaged the planners' credibility, and did not contribute to the creation of any "risk-elimination" conditions.

7.2.2 The indirect institutional context: non-JAFI organisations

The "indirect institutional context" of the "settlement plans" and Region 2000 consists of all non-JAFI organisations. All comprise this category for the sole reason that they did not employ the planners initiating the plans discussed here. The "indirect" status has two major implications: first, all bodies, with the exception of Fellowship 2000, were incorporated into the planning process after plans' initiation within the RSD. Their incorporation reflects the mechanism of the plans' implementation, through which the types of issues and the bodies affiliated with these issues are determined. Once the initial links of these bodies with the plans are determined, their role in the planning process is dictated mostly by their interest in different aspects of the plans and the target region. Second, the lack of boss-employee relations enables planners to avoid involvement in internal institutional affairs (such as the RSD personnel conflicts) that might divert their efforts to irrelevant issues. It should be emphasised that being classified in the "indirect" category does not suggest anything about the nature of these organisations' involvement in the regional (in our case) and the planning processes. In fact, the incorporation of non-JAFI organisations into the planning process is important, especially since the RSD does not operate in a vacuum, and the plans assume that overall public intervention principles will change in Western Galil (at least).

Our concern here is with the extent to which the

indirect institutional context contributed to the potential for planners to function, and the degree to which it affected their role in the plans' implementation. Since we are dealing with RSD planners and predominantly RSD activities (especially up to 1983), the questions are whether there was cooperation with RSD initiatives, and what was the planners' role in these relations. The first question will be assessed through the discussion of the role of public organisations in Western Galil: the potential case for establishing cooperation with RSD activities on the one hand, and the organisations' actual attitude toward issues connected with the planning initiative on the other hand. The second question is tackled in the following chapter.

7.2.2.1 The distribution of organisations' official authority

This section attempts to demonstrate a potential case for cooperation with RSD activities and its planners, as a function of the authority of the organisations constituting this "indirect" category in their operation in Western Galil during the relevant years. In principle, this context of the planning initiatives is notable for its fragmentation, minimal coordination, and basically nationally oriented policy-making regarding regional affairs (as specified in Chap. 5). The processes related to the "settlement plans" involved an extremely wide variety of public organisations, most of which were traditionally involved in Western Galil. The Region 2000 strategy, which was subject to very limited

implementation attempts, necessarily generated the involvement of a limited selection of organisations. "Necessarily", since it is assumed that implementation is a major process generating involvement of different public and private agencies in the regional activities.

The following list of public organisations briefly presents those that, through their activities in Western Galil during the years 1975-1986, were linked to the RSD planning initiatives. Emphasis in on the organisations' official authority (Menuhin, 1980) and the areas of "collision" and convergence with RSD activities. The latter are important insofar as RSD activities can be associated with the planning initiatives. This information enables us to reveal the organisations' relations with planners and the general conditions under which they functioned.

a. Government ministries

* **The Interior Ministry** - this office is the national planning authority (e.g., it allocates Building Permits, determines national master plans, and approves regional master plans). Equally important are its other roles, mainly refereeing local authorities and regional councils, and controlling the population register. As the highest national planning authority, this ministry potentially serves as the overall coordinator of numerous public and private initiatives with some land-use expression. Its links to local authorities are a further source of power. Its lack of an execution budget (and machinery), however, is a major constraint to its potential coordinating power.

Interactions between this ministry and the RSD planning

initiatives were supposed, by law, to be established at early stages of the plans' formulation, and before their implementation. In practice, however, the construction of new settlements ("mitzpim") was launched without the official approval of the North District Commission[24] (as further specified in Chap. 8). Nevertheless, at very early stages of the "mitzpim" project, the North District commissioner was approached by the director of RSD North Region office and its planners. This was meant to legalise the settlement.[25] Once the project was introduced, the cooperation between the RSD and the commissioner was established with regard to all relevant RSD activities. The case of Region 2000 was different. The ministry was represented in Fellowship 2000 by Mr. Y. Golani, and the North District commissioner (Y. Kening) was also associated with it, but no contacts with the RSD were developed on the basis of this project. Mr. Golani, the chairman of the national planning commission, opposed the RSD planning initiative on the grounds of "undesired involvement of the RSD in a government project"[26] (and probably also because of his involvement with the first planning group headed by Lichfield and Partners).

* **Ministry of Agriculture** - the national authority for managing agricultural activities. Among its tasks are the determination of production priorities, production quotas for nationally controlled agricultural products, and the allocation of nationally owned means of production (water, land).

Since RSD-sponsored settlements were traditionally based on agriculture, the relations RSD-Ministry of Agriculture were

obvious; for years, clear working procedures and distribution of authority prevailed. Cooperation in planning was carried out by the Planning Authority (whose vice-director general has the same status in the RSD). For example, settlements' programs prepared by RSD regional offices are approved by the Planning Authority.
The establishment of new settlements in the Galil took place in full cooperation with this ministry. Over the years, the shift away from agriculture decreased the need for such cooperation, although the Region 2000 strategy created a new area of cooperation. In fact, the Planning Authority had an important role in promoting the strategy's approval, as will be discussed in Chapter 8.

* **Ministry of Housing** - authorised to deal with two distinct issues: "public housing"[27] and road construction. Until 1978, most collective settlements were established by the Rural Building Administration (planning and execution) of this ministry. Assistance to housing is currently confined to the allocation of financial assistance to individuals (i.e., mortgages).

As noted, the "mitzpim" project changed the status quo in the relations between this ministry and the RSD: the RSD initiated the construction of new settlements, and only later applied for the Housing Ministry's assistance in the establishment of permanent housing and standard roads leading to these settlements (i.e., the temporary housing arrangement). This ministry was represented in Fellowship 2000, and its Programming Unit (headed by Ms. Eldor) contributed to the formulation of the first strategic

proposal (presented by the Lichfield and IDC group). Beyond that, this ministry did not participate in financing the Fellowship, nor did it show a particular interest.

* **Ministry of Communication (and Bezek, Ltd.)** - the national authority for telephone system development and maintenance. It also controls other means of communication (e.g., operating licenses for satellite stations). .pm .50"

This ministry was incorporated in the construction of new settlements, limiting its concern to the establishment of the required infrastructure according to national standards. The way it was initially incorporated is described in Chapter 8. A major role in the promotion of Region 2000 was given by Fellowship 2000 to the development of the telecommunications infrastructure. The chief scientist of this ministry (Mr. Y. Kela), a permanent member of Fellowship 2000 (until 1987), was particularly interested in Region 2000, which he thought to be "an appropriate opportunity to set up a different standard in the national communication infrastructure, and seek for solutions that will enable the country to accommodate its infrastructure to available modern technologies" (Kela, 1986). In his work with the RSD he guided planners' attempts to mold strategic principles into concrete actions. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to convince the minister (Mr. Rubinstein) to utilise Region 2000 as a model for country-wide improvements.

* **Ministry of Industry and Trade** - the major government authority in the area of industrial development (though not the only body affecting such activities). Unlike in most other areas of public intervention, direct construction of

industries is rare. Rather, this ministry makes its impact through the allocation of various incentives, mainly to means of production but also to productive activities. In some cases, this ministry manages (through the Industrial Building Company, Ltd.) the physical development of industrial parks and buildings.

The role of this ministry in the industrial development processes of Western Galil is fairly significant: promoting the relocation of large firms (especially export-oriented industries), enlargement of existing industries, financial contribution to R&D activities, and the development of two large industrial parks (in Tefen and Karmiel). Links between the new settlements of Western Galil developed mostly from the beginning of the 1980s, and occurred on an individual basis (i.e., between the ministry and individual firms or settler-entrepreneurs). Project Region 2000 was initiated in this ministry, and in a 1985 government resolution this ministry (under a different minister) was given official (though not sole) responsibility over the project. This, however, did not imply its continuous commitment to the committee's recommendations. Over the years, this ministry provided about 50% of the Katzir Committee's and Fellowship 2000's budget. Further, the chief scientist and the minister's assistant were constantly associated with actions related to the Region 2000 project. However, due to the minister's (Mr. A. Sharon, since 1985) opinion that Region 2000 should be integrated into the ministry's standard activities rather than designated as a "model area", the interest of this ministry was gradually limited to its theoretical development and not to its implementation.

Moreover, since he thought this project should be controlled by the ministry and not become subject to "cooperative government concern",[28] any other body's independent involvement in the project was rejected, especially that of the ministry of Economics and Planning and the RSD.

* **Ministry of Economics and Planning** - created as a result of the coalition agreement between the two large political parties. Its authority lies in the area of macro planning of economic development. This ministry lacks an executive capability (i.e., no administration and budget for executing its plans), and execution of its proposals depend heavily on government resolutions and the Treasurer's policy. By definition, this ministry is not involved in the non-national levels of processes. Exceptionally, the minister (Mr. G. Ya'akobi) was allocated some authority by the government resolutions related to Region 2000 to coordinate government activities. Indeed, Region 2000, in which this ministry expressed high interest, provided him with the opportunity to extend the range of issues under the ministry's concern and inaugurate its association with regional-level economic activities. The minister's interest was particularly notable in his attempts (following Fellowship 2000) to establish a "coordinating government body" (chaired by this minister) and a private firm that will carry out most developments in Region 2000.[29] During the few years of its involvement in this project, some relations between this ministry and the RSD developed, as will be discussed further.

* **Ministry of Defense and the Israeli Defense Forces** - these bodies, as their names indicate, are concerned with

defense issues. They are associated with Western Galil and its related planning initiatives in several aspects: first, the military is an important element in the distribution of land uses (i.e., large land reserves are designated as "closed military Fire Areas" excluded from any non-military use, and their distribution create a situation whereby most land-use projects require coordination with the Armed Forces). Second, The construction of new settlements is associated with close links between this ministry and the RSD: mutual needs, interests, and plans were coordinated on a regular basis by a specific staff member of each body. Third, the military and semi-military industries located in Western Galil (e.g., Rafael industrial plants in Karmiel and Segev) are an important element in the region's industrial development and the attraction of migrants to the area. Region 2000-associated activities were geared to the military industrial plants. Relations with them were confined to members of the Fellowship 2000 executive, and they were essentially for the purpose of sharing information rather than coordination of plans and development strategies (especially from the side of the military).

b. Regional councils and local authorities

This category refers to the existing system of local political institutions in Western Galil, as specified in Chapter 5. Among the different bodies, the Misgav regional council and the municipality of Karmiel developed particular relations with the RSD. The Misgav regional council

maintained close relations with most of the RSD system, the latter heavily affecting the settlements' social and economic structures. Planners, especially during the years 1978-1983, worked with this council on an almost daily basis, sharing plans, needs, problems of any kind, and in fact almost any issue with which the council was dealing at the time. As this council's apparatus was established, links with the RSD were limited to the specific aspects over which the RSD had authority, thus moderating the personal relations that accompanied the first period.

Karmiel municipality had no official relations with the RSD. However, as an active member of the Katzir Committee and Fellowship 2000, the mayor of Karmiel (Mr. B. Vanger) encouraged relations with the RSD, whose importance was viewed in two complementary aspects: "as an important source of financial resources to the project, and a source of highly qualified professional assistance from the North Region office's planners".[30] Moreover, as a member of the Labour Party and a political associate of Mr. Zvili (RSD co-director), Mr. Vanger made numerous attempts to promote RSD commitment to Region 2000.

c. Government companies

Government companies are numerous, dealing with a wide range of issues and political-economic activities. These companies basically are related to one specific ministry, and they are partially autonomous in determining their

activities, especially since their management is nominated on a political basis. The importance of such companies varies according to their specific area of authority, the historical processes that affect the extent of their control over resources, and the extent of their affiliation with dominant political ministers. We shall specify only three such companies.

* **Israeli Land Authority (ILA)** - the national authority for the management of state-owned land reserves. Its major authority and strength lies in land allocation for different private and public purposes. By law, for example, the ILA's approval is a prerequisite of any building permit. It can substantially affect urban development (mainly in peripheral areas) by determining the extent of land to be made available for different uses.

Close relations of the ILA with the RSD characterised the "mitzpim" project and its subsequent land development activities; these were based on the ILA's and RSD's mutually shared interest to increase Jewish land control in Western Galil. The interest of the ILA in Region 2000 was provoked by Mr. Ya'akobi's idea to establish a private firm to manage the land development process. This created a "danger" for the ILA, in terms of losing control over its assets in Western Galil (and probably in other parts of the country later). Consequently, its Director General (Mr. Lipka), in coordination with the director of the RSD North Region office (Mr. Cohen), acted to scuttle the idea. This was justified on the grounds that "the state cannot afford to allocate large parts of its land reserves to one or several private developers, who will realise easy-to-come benefits

and may later dictate to the state where and how to act".[31]

* **TAHAL** - the Israeli water planning authority. Any proposed regional plan with physical implications requires its approval, although execution normally takes place through Mekorot, Ltd. This is especially relevant in cases of large-scale plans (and is of no concern at the level of private housing). Accordingly, these companies played an important role during the construction of new settlements.

* **Mivnei Ta'asi'a, Ltd. (Industrial Building)** - specified under the Ministry of Industry and Trade. Although a fair degree of cooperation between the professional staff of this company and RSD planners prevailed during the entire period discussed, the tight control of the Minister of Industry prevented any cooperation in areas not directly confined to the company's concrete authority. Region 2000, for example, was completely out of its authority.

d. National non-governmental organisations

This category also comprises a wide variety of bodies, mostly nationally oriented in their policy determination and strongly linked to the political-governmental structure. A few are worthwhile to mention, especially for demonstrating the types of organisations RSD planners were dealing with.

* **The Jewish National Fund (JNF)** - an independent body within the WZO (see diagram 2). Its main relevance for our case stems from the work of two of its sections, Forestation and Land Development, through which most initial land development processes were executed by the RSD. For example, the actual construction of the "mitzpim" started with the

request of the Department to the JNF "to start immediate execution of 7 Mitzpim" (Law-Yone, Lifchitz, 1990).

* **Settlements Movements and the Ministerial Settlement Committee** - the machinery through which the influence of the political parties in new collective settlements is exercised. Each settlement is affiliated to one "settlement movement" - a political body representing one of the large national interest groups. The Ministerial Settlement Committee approves establishment of settlements and their distribution to different settlement movements. These bodies were active during the construction of new settlements. Since competition between the movements characterises their principal relations, when coordination was required, it was carried out mainly by the RSD, and within it by directors of regional offices or of the RSD. Planners' relations with these movements were for the purpose of executing RSD's decisions. No relations were developed around Region 2000.

e. Katzir Committee and Fellowship 2000

The Katzir committee presented its conclusions and recommendations to the Minister of Industry and Trade in 1982 and to the Ministerial Committee for Economic Affairs in March 1984, and by that was discharged of its official task. In practice, however, the committee assumed a major executive role in the implementation of its own recommendations, as attested by its working patterns and structures. Indeed, in 1983 it established Fellowship 2000 - a non-profit organisation, as the legal entity through which the implementation of the recommendations could be managed.

This initiative was not approved (though it was not opposed) by the government, and thus, in fact, neither its official authority nor its budget were commensurate with its new task. The Katzir Committee in its new form as "Fellowship 2000" remained a voluntary body whose mandate stemmed from the high status of its very well-known members from the public and the private sectors, especially Prof. Katzir, the fourth president of Israel.

The initial relations with the RSD were confined to the allocation of financial resources from the JAFI Executive to Fellowship 2000. the latter's approval of the RSD planning strategy for Region 2000 marked a change in its attitude toward the RSD, which gradually became to be seen as "the only body that can manage such a project".[32] These relations were stimulated by RSD planners, who were granted with the initial official legitimisation to operate, while forcing the RSD's involvement in the project.

In 1987, after the Jewish Congress, during which it became clear that the RSD will not resume its expected role, Fellowship 2000 changed its entire approach toward the project.

7.2.2.2 The operational basis of the planners' "indirect institutional context"

A limited selection of the wide variety of public organisations associated with Western Galil was presented above. The list, nonetheless, introduces the major bodies that had some links with the settlement process of the late 1970s - early 1980s and the Region 2000 initiative.[33] The distribution of authority between these public organisations, and their different official relations with the regional processes, suggest that as a potential base for practicing the RSD planning initiatives, the "indirect institutional context" did not provide favourable conditions for the management of regional processes. This stems from several major characteristics of this context:

a. Since different components of the regional system are under the official responsibility of different bodies, each component is likely to be treated from a fairly narrow, issue-specific perspective (for example, considerations of education programs and facilities disregard the regional industrial system). Accordingly, activities related to these regional components are budgeted according to the priorities determined by the specific organisation authorised for them, while these priorities are rarely coordinated on a regular base. Further, since most public institutions are nationally oriented in their policies (chapter 5), the above "issue-oriented" perspective and resource allocation criteria tend to be determined by non-regionally specific requirements.

b. This distribution of authority suggests that those bodies with a limited executive budget are likely to be more vulnerable to actions of bodies with available resources and executive machinery. The experience of several ministries (e.g., Housing and Interior) during the years of mass settlement construction supports this conclusion (as further specified).

c. The institutional fragmentation suggests that coordination between these bodies and others is crucially important any attempt to affect resource allocation processes related to Western Galil. Yet, such a task of coordination can be practiced only at the level of the national government. No region-specific body is authorised to coordinate the numerous public bodies that operate at the regional level of activities.

d. The organisations had neither a commitment nor an official obligation to consider the RSD planning initiative. Needless to say, the RSD had no official authority to coordinate the different organisations' activities.

There is indeed ample evidence that the extent to which planners were able to cope with the fragmented institutional system and to operate in areas controlled by other organisations was a function of two elements: the role of "partners" (mainly the RSD) in the region-related decision-making process on the one hand, and the content of the planning initiative on the other hand. These aspects are discussed below.

The case of the RSD's integrity in pursuing the planning initiative, and promoting regional development in accordance with the principal planning perspective.

Clearly, the RSD played a dominant role in the Western Galil processes from 1976 to 1981, as manifested by its ability to mobilise the entire public intervention in a new direction (i.e., the impact of the construction of some 30 new settlements on the functional system of Western Galil cannot be regarded as residual for the support systems that had to be established). In practice, although the plans to establish new settlements and the decision to implement them were initiated apart from the government system, and although implementation of these plans in cooperation with the entire government was considered (by both the RSD management and planners) essential for the successful establishment of new settlements, the actual force bulldozing the public system was the RSD, with its available resources and execution machinery. Nevertheless, other organisations were integrated as implementation advanced and their contribution was required. One should note the RSD attempted to avoid an aggressive "takeover" of other organisations' responsibilities; in the case of "temporary housing", for example, since the Ministry of Housing was unable to cope with the task of mass construction of new settlements, the Director General of the RSD (Mr. S. Ravid) introduced the idea of "temporary housing" to be built by the RSD as an immediate housing solution until the ministry could allocate assistance to permanent housing. In this way, the official role of the Housing Ministry was maintained,

while the construction of new settlements, directed by the RSD, also was ensured. In other cases, the cooperation with RSD initiatives was established on the basis of the RSD's power (i.e., resources and executive machinery), which permitted it to make "tradeoffs" of its support for other ministries' policies in exchange for their support of the settlement process in Western Galil. For example, the approval of RSD plans by the Minister of Agriculture (Mr. A. Sharon) was obtained through the promise of Y. Friedman (director of the RSD North Region office) to promote the development of the Iron Valley settlement area. The latter area was important for the Minister of Agriculture.[34] The same "method" was applied to the Ministry of Interior, with the result that the North District Commissioner became a full participant in the process of establishing the new settlements' legal status.

During the entire period of new settlement construction, since the RSD operated according to the guidelines set by the "settlement plans", these plans became the major source of reference for most public organisations associated with processes in Western Galil, with each organisation concerned about its "share" in the overall process. Over the years, as the role of the RSD was gradually adjusted to match its official proportion, enabling public organisations to take their standard role in the new settlements' affairs, the role of RSD planners was similarly restricted to RSD areas of intervention. This was, indeed, one of the tasks of the "settlement plans". Yet, the substantially modified role of the planners affected their

future ability to promote other projects that penetrated other organisations' areas of authority, as the experience of Region 2000 indicates.

Region 2000 was initiated in an institutional system which, in its fragmentation and nationally oriented policy determination, was basically similar to that of earlier periods. Other aspects of the planning institutional context were different: this was a period in which several organisations (i.e., Fellowship 2000, the Ministry of Economics and Planning, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, and the municipality of Karmiel) were seeking to attain a dominant role in Region 2000 processes, but none actually had a significant advantage vis-à-vis the others. In view of the Fellowship 2000's unsuccessful attempts to enhance the RSD's interest in the project or provide an alternative backing system for the planners' initiatives, the basic "alertness" of other organisations to the previous experience (in which they were forced into a settlement process that without the RSD's role probably would never have occurred), created near-impossible conditions for planning practice and planners' attempts to function in their indirect institutional context and promote implementation of the Region 2000 strategy.

The practical implications of cooperation with the planning initiative in terms of its interference with the organisations' prevailing decision-making systems and functional mechanisms.

As noted, the rapid construction of new settlements in Western Galil (and other parts of Galil) was guided by the major planning objective of integrating this new system into the existing regional social economy. Although initiation of the process disregarded other organisations' opinions, policy priorities, and will to cooperate, the actual result not only did not eliminate the public system's role in the region but increased its areas of intervention. In this way, public control was maintained and the status quo in distribution of public authority respected.

Region 2000, by comparison, defined changing the above political status quo as its highest priority. In its proposals to create a "regional" system that does not exist in the current state system (i.e., the intermediate "tier" between local and national institutions does not exist), and to provide private capital with a major role in turning Western Galil into a large business center with massive capital inflow and Jewish immigration, Region 2000 theoretically endangered the political system, which did not ease its access to the indirect institutional system. Indeed, evidences prove that the attitude of decision-makers to this planning initiative was predominantly a function of their reaction to the degree of "political power" inherent in this project, i.e., the ability to impose one's own principles and desires on others, stemming from the extent of one's control over material and political resources that may become available in Region 2000. Theoretically, one could argue that the changes endorsed by Region 2000 have the potential to yield massive resources, enabling those who are in control of these resources to increase their power

related to the region, its specific segments and the nation. By this rational, the proposed changes should basically be acceptable to most decision-makers. Alternatively, these changes might be rejected, since creating a "regional" system implies a projection of authority from the national system to the "region". This is likely to result in a diminishment of the existing functional sub-regional units' and the national system's control over local systems. Further, turning Region 2000 into a large business center could yield financial resources (generated, for example, through taxation), enabling the "regional" decision-making system to function in relative freedom vis-à-vis the national political system. In other words, creating the "missing niche" in the political system implies decentralising the national political system.

In practice, an analysis of patterns of involvement of decision-makers in Region 2000 indicates that the "missing nisch" paradigm provoked those decision-makers who were actively involved in Region 2000. It explains attempts by the Minister of Economics and Planning to advance the project, by which means he expected to add the "executive function" to his office, and Mr. B. Vanger's (the Mayor of Karmiel) attempts to integrate the various local functional units into one large "regional entity". In the same way, it explains the opposition of the Minister of Industry and Trade and the Director General of the Israeli Land Authority, who attempted to prevent the relocation of parts of their power base to other ministries and the private sector. Therefore, the proposed redistribution could not

have been acceptable to all political decision-makers, and the attitude of those currently more powerful in terms of control over resources (e.g., the Minister of Trade and Industry) was the dominant one.

Finally, an analysis of the processes related to Region 2000 indicates that the official attitude of public organisations also was a function of their attitude toward its major strategic proposal: leaving aside the redistribution issue, the political system was unwilling to accept the proposal to distinguish Western Galil from other peripheral areas. This refusal to provide Western Galil with high priority was expressed at every possible occasion. The government resolutions on Region 2000 are good examples of that.

In all, several government and JAFI resolutions (approved from 1987 to 1985) related to the planning initiative, reflect the essential attitude of political decision-makers toward the planning initiative. These resolutions state a fairly general approval for the issues concerned: the "mitzpim" project and Region 2000. However, they are distinct in several aspects: first, whereas the 1979 government resolution specifically refers to the "mitzpim" in the Galil project, all other resolutions extend their reference to other regions, mainly the Negev (the southern periphery). This is a clear attempt to avoid distinguishing the Galil from other parts of the country. Indeed, this reflects the basic traditional political approach of the past 40 years, according to which the Galil does not have any special problems that justify its positive

discrimination from other peripheries. In fact, it is precisely this non-discriminatory attitude that all the RSD planning initiatives attempted to change, but only the "mitzpim" project met with success in this: by not demanding any commitment other then general approval of plans, the RSD actually put it into practice. These resolutions further differ in the ways they determine distribution of official authority. Most resolutions (except those of 1984 and 1985) fully legitimise the RSD to function on behalf of the government and JAFI. By contrast, the 1984 and 1985 resolutions concerning Region 2000 allocate responsibilities to three ministries: Treasury, Economics and Planning, and Industry and Trade. In other words, only the resolutions regarding Region 2000 gave such "shared" authority to government ministries, disregarding all other bodies (especially Fellowship 2000 and the RSD). This can be explained in terms of the nature of political control over the areas of concern that is implicit in these initiatives; the "mitzpim" project was executed by the RSD in accordance with its basic official authority (although there is a question regarding the extent to which the government fully appreciated the project's consequences and its required future contribution to the Galil). As opposed to that, not only had Region 2000 been initiated within the government, but control over this project could potentially change the prevailing distribution of authority between ministers, which otherwise could not be realized without considerable difficulty. Thus, to allow the RSD to control Region 2000 was politically impossible.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter dealt with two categories of planning function determinants:

First, the nature of the planning product as an expression of the planners' "state of mind" and a function of their capacity to estimate the ability of the executive system to absorb it. Theoretically, the nature of the planning product depends totally on the planners' perception. However, the need to promote its acceptance within a given political-administrative system and its executive machinery, may affect the articulated perception, and hence the planning product. The question to be solved only in practice is how can planners find the proper balance between their "state of mind" and that of the system within which materialisation is expected to be carried out?

Second, the nature of the institutional context of the planning process, as establishing potential conditions of operation. In view of planners' lack of political and executive power, the institutional system within which planners operate becomes a significant determinant of their functioning potential. The associated questions are: Where did the institutional system permit planners to stress their perception, and do planners have the tools to cope with "institutional" processes, which may not necessarily be related to the content of the planning product? The discussion distinguished between two basically different planning products and two different features in the performance of the Rural Settlement Department (RSD) of the Jewish Agency for Israel as most important in determining

the planners' base of action. The indirect institutional context was important for planning functions only insofar as the RSD permitted connections with it.

On the whole, the potential for planners to operate in a way that promotes the implementation of the planning product is by now fairly clear. The simplicity and concreteness of the recommendations of the "settlement plans" that were provided in connection with one, clearly defined sub-system of Western Galil, and the conformity of planning principles to the prevailing RSD attitude toward the issues of "settlement process" and "regional development", paved the way for integrating these planning products into the RSD decision-making system. In practice, commitment of the entire RSD system to these planning products was generated by satisfying the immediate interest of the head of the RSD (Mr. Weitz) in the area, permitting him to authorise immediate actions and determine the scale and especially the speed of the plans' execution, in ways not foreseen by the planners.

By comparison, the abstract and "different" thoughts expressed in the Region 2000 strategy were very appealing to different decision-makers, both in the RSD and in other institutions, but only to the degree of generating official approval of the planning product, the lowest level of commitment. By not making the strategy more concrete, or reducing it to a set of operational programmes, planners failed to provide a basis for commitment to concrete issues and actions. Admittedly, Region 2000 may have been made more

concrete over time, as planners indeed attempted to do. This, however, was almost impossible under the fragmented conditions of the RSD system, and the political interests that the project created in the government and local political systems. This experience emphasises that in such cases a strategy that lacks programmes or any type of specificity is useless for the purpose of generating the commitment of "partners".

The next chapter attempts to shed light on the way in which planners coped with their potential for functioning that was imposed from outside, and the potential they created.

Notes

(1) Fellowship 2000, minutes from a meeting, dated 15.3.1985.

(2) Minutes from RSD Executive meeting dated: 26.7.1985.

(3) Ibid., and minutes of meeting between the director of RSD North region office (Mr. M. Cohen) and the planners of this office dated 3.5.1985.

(4) This is not to suggest either that official approval of plans necessarily implies their implementation, or that plans that accord prevailing rules and operational norms are necessarily implemented. The following discussion shows that in the case of the "settlement plans" implementation was largely a function of particular RSD needs which they served, though their accordance with prevailing operational norms should not be underestimated.

(5) New Towns are subject to concern of another JAFI department.

(6) This principle accord the main perspective of "Katzir committee".

(7) This was expressed in the initial working draft, Gilat and Duchan, 1984, See bibliography.

(8) Minutes from RSD Executive meeting, 10.7.1985.

(9) Although planners' ability to take advantage of this quality of the planning product developed only through implementation, as will be showen later.

(10) This assertion is based on the analysis of the decision-making processes, as appear in the working files of the RSD North region office and RSD Archives, Jerusalem.

(11) The relationships between the JAFI and the government are very complicated. Refer, for example, to the letters between the minister of Economy and Planning (Mr.Y.Modai), the JAFI Treasurer (Mr.A.Lvinski), from September to June 1986. We shall refrain from a thorough analysis of this aspect, as it is irrelevant to this study.

(12) Planners' assumption that the private sector will be interested in Region 2000 was based on "Katzir committee"'s perspective, according to which the potential long-run benefits in operating within this area will exceed the short-run, direct and indirect, costs. Essentially, benefits are expected to be created due to the unique status of Region 2000 in the national and international economy.

(13) The existence of large areas unpopulated by Jews.

(14) Freidman, interview, Tel-Aviv, September 1989.

(15) Aassuming these guide their work in creating the planning product.

(16) It is interesting to note, however, that in past years the Director-Generals were regional planners by profession, and there were cases in which a regional planner was appointed as an assistant to the Director-General and the Director of the department.

(17) This categoty include also the direct subordinates of the above positions, i.e., those not employed by regional offices.

(18) This structure is a result of historical interpretation of RSD tasks and historical importance of issues related to settlements' functional base.

(19) These inefficiencies were recognised by JAFI, and in 1989 the one-director structure was reestablished.

(20) This crisis, in fact, required growing financial allocations and changes in principles of intervention.

(21) This is not the suitable context to deal with the question of whether the latter resulted only from the RSD inefficiencies, since the changes in JAFI political priorities were fundamental by themselves.

(22) Op.cit., note 14.

Chapter 8:
THE PLANNING EXPERIENCE IN WESTERN GALIL: 1975-1986

Introduction

The previous chapter explored the functional environment within which planners operate, and the possible modes of functioning open to them stemming from their input into the process and their locational context. The discussion took into account the importance both of the institutional context of planning, which in Chapter 3 was shown to establish the basis of planning practice, and the "clues" planners should be aware of in their attempts to promote a certain planning product (e.g., the range of possible reactions on the part of decision-makers that might be elicited by the planning product's treatment of long-term processes and complex systems). In view of the suggested usefulness of a strategic approach for coping with regional systems and attempting to generate the commitment of decision-makers to certain planning products Chapter 4), the major elements of the actual planning products concerned (Chapter 6) and Western Galil's major characteristics (Chapter 5), we may now ask the following questions: At what point in the process characterising Western Galil had planners been during the late 1970s and early 1980s? And what was their contribution to the settlement process and to the subsequent Region 2000 initiatives to foster the area's development?

(23) Interview with Mr.M.Cohen, Tel-Aviv, September 1989.

(24) This refers to Western Galil "mitzpim", other "mitzpim" required approval of other district commissions.

(25) The process of approval prolonged into the mid-1980s due to the need to change the North District master plan by the national planning commission).

(26) Minutes from Fellowship 2000 meeting dated 15.3.1985.

(27) In Israel, this notion officially refers to appartment blocks directly built by this ministry. It may also apply, in my opinion, to the private construction of housing in peripheral areas that are heavily financed by this ministry.

(28) Mr. A. Sharon, 17.7.1985. "Coordination and Development of Region 2000 in the Galil. A document attached to the proposed government resolution no.931, Supplement A, Appendix A. Source: The Knesset Secretariat.

(29) Mr.G.Ya'akobi, "Region 2000". A paper prepared for the "Ya'akobi committee" meeting scheduled for 19.3.1986.

(30) A letter from Mr.B.Vanger to Prof. Katzir dated 29.11.1987.

(31) Mr. Lipka, as quoted by Mr.Cohen in his report of a meeting with Mr.E.Gera (the minister Ya'akobi's assistant) dated:28.3.1986. Source: Working files of the Planning Unit, RSD North Region office, Haifa.

(32) Mr.S.Drori (13.3.1988): A reports summerising his period of employment as the Director-General of Fellowship 2000. Source: Private files of Prof. Katzir.

(33) This list does not consist of private bodies since the planning process and the planners concerned had almost no relations with such bodies.

(34) Op.cit., note 14.

In order to facilitate the discussion, the following summary of the information presented in the previous chapters may be helpful.

What was the process in which the planners took part?

We are concerned with a process by which one segment of Western Galil (i.e., the areas where settlements were rapidly constructed in the late 1970s and early 1980s) was designated for high-priority intervention. As the new settlements were the result of the RSD's policy to populate areas with no Jewish presence, however, their consolidation required their integration into a wider functional system. Indeed, although this initially was not anticipated by the RSD, the Western Galil functional system provided the immediate environment for promoting the new settlements' development; its emerging industrial development, which encouraged similar activities in new settlements, the established public facilities made available to new settlers, and the existing job opportunities, all encouraged the new settlements' economic and social growth. Over the years, the new settlements gradually became part of the Western Galil functional system, and the various public bodies (mainly the RSD) reverted from direct intervention back to their traditional roles as overall public policy-makers.

The RSD's role in Western Galil, imposing important changes on the area's functional and spatial system and impelling numerous public organisations to collaborate in its activities, can be classified, according to Hill (1980), within the "initiatory" planning system. In his reference to

the Israeli planning system, Hill made a distinction between "statutory" and "initiatory" planning systems, with the former referring to the formal, governmental statutory system pertaining to the Ministry of the Interior's legal control over land-use patterns. This system tends predominantly to serve "negative regulation" functions. The latter category, however, refers to public and semi-public organisations (such as the Israeli Land Authority) whose control over resources and availability of executive machinery enables them to bypass the formal statutory system in their attempts to further their development initiatives. With this process in mind, Region 2000 initiative was meant to designate the entire Western Galil (still only part of the Galil, and a small part of the entire national peripheral areas) for special public intervention, and to establish its distinct status vis-à-vis other parts of the country. In so doing, there was a hidden attempt and a presumed ability to coordinate all political and economic forces associated with this area toward one commonly shared goal. However, given the lack of any organisation with the political or economic power to lead such a coordination, this initiative vanished in the "stormy sea" of conflicting political interests. Whereas the process originated in the 1970s by the RSD was justified on the grounds of competition between Arab and State land occupation interests (and it was initially managed through decisive actions meant to restructure the region's distribution of land uses) Region 2000 redefined the debate over land use distribution: the previous preoccupation with Arab-Jewish land control was replaced by the question of Jewish-Jewish political control

over the region's land resources.

In practice, although the governmental system did not consider introducing long-run solutions to the Israeli aspects of the Arab-Jewish conflict that provoked the 1976 "Earth Day", the RSD's initiative for coping with the problem (i.e., the "mitzpim" project) was initially not considered by the political system as a deviation from its broadly defined official authority (e.g., its right to dictate issues such as the determination of settlement sites and their internal land use structure, or the designation of forests and nature reserves, was basically accepted), and the construction of the "mitzpim" took place at a speed that did not leave much opportunity for opposition (Lifschitz and Law-Yone, 1990). However, with the emerging interest in Region 2000 and its implicit issues of political control of elements such as the region's means of production, non-productive land uses, and the area's potential tax base, no political body was eager to cede straightforward control to any other organisation.

From the planners' point of view, the course of events during the 10 years from 1975 to 1986 went as follows: The planning functions associated with the "settlement plans" were fairly diverse, reaching a peak of activity during the construction of the new settlements of the "mitzpim" project (mainly 1978-1982). As an integral part of the RSD machinery, the planners were fully dedicated to realising this project. The Region 2000 experience was altogether different. It was characterised by a constant series of struggles with two major aspects: generating public

commitment to the project and interpreting the strategy into concrete actions. Moreover, in its attempts to resolve these aspects under conditions of inefficient RSD machinery, this planning function which initially took place within a basically given policy framework was gradually geared toward "policy-making" and promoting changes with nation-wide implications.

With this process in mind, the present chapter addresses itself to two major sets of questions:

a. In which dimensions of the planning process did the planners operate, and what were their major means of promoting the materialisation of their planning initiatives?
b. To what degree did planners take advantage of their potential conditions for functioning? Which actions can be associated with their theoretical potential to operate?

These questions are tackled in two stages: first, an attempt is made to reveal links between the planning product and the regional processes. This, however, does not necessarily imply direct links between the regional processes and the planning practice.[1] Second, we discuss the actual planning dimensions in which the planners were involved, and the extent to which their involvement can be associated with each of the elements determining their potential for functioning.

8.1 The Planning Product - Western Galil Links

During the 10 years from 1975 to 1986, Western Galil underwent several changes in its spatial and functional system. Some of these changes can be linked to the planning initiatives discussed in this dissertation. "Linked", in the sense of there being an identifiable harmony between specific planning recommendations and actual changes, or known connections to activities with which planners were associated).

In theory, since the plans proposed the notion of "regional development" as a very general objective for the area and as the desired consequence of the plans' implementation, all types of positive regional processes can be linked to these plans. "Positive" - in the sense of being in accordance with expectations for improved relative condition of the region, measured, for instance, by population growth or intensification of industrial production activities. None of the plans, however, provided concrete measures of "development" and the extent of desired "development"; the only criteria that were specified were the volume of additional settlements and their population capacity, as well as the desired export value of local industries by the year 2000. Indeed, notwithstanding this general definition of "development", not all changes in the regional system can be credited to the RSD planning body's actions, as is evident in the case of the industrialisation process. In such cases, one may seek indirect links to overall RSD activities in the area, with the suggestion that

its intervention affected the intervention of other bodies' (for example, creating opportunities to establish non-public settlements, or improving the image of Western Galil). Partial assessments of these possible links appear in two recent studies (Sofer and Finkel, 1988; Lifschitz, 1990). Such an evaluation is beyond our scope. We shall concentrate on issues with which planners were concerned that can be associated with concrete regional processes. The written planning products will be emphasised, as these were utilised as the major tools for promoting the planners' ideas.

a. The relative volume of the Jewish population

The issue of Jewish population growth and especially its volume relative to the Arab population appears in all plans concerning Western Galil; most of them pose it as their major concern. Some plans propose concrete targets: for example, 2,000 families (about 8,000 inhabitants) in the 1976 plan,[2] and 100,000 Jews by the year 2000 in the Region 2000 development strategy. All plans maintain (implicitly in the Segev plans, explicitly in Region 2000) the role of Karmiel as the area's largest centre of population.

In practice, Jewish population growth did occur during the years 1978-1987. Table 5 in the appendix indicates a population growth of 100% during these years, thus increasing the size of the Jewish sector in the total regional population (from 12% in 1978 to 17% in 1987), and increasing the population's size relative to other parts of the country (Table 6, appendix). This growth (from 16.4 thousands in 1978 to 33.2 thousands in 1987), however, did not match the planned targets. Further, of the total Jewish

population growth, 57% was contributed by the growth of Karmiel, 28% by growth in new settlements, and 3% by growth in pre-1978 collective settlements (Table 7, appendix). Moreover, about 20% of the new settlements' population growth was contributed by the private settlement Kefar-Havradim. Finally, although the Jewish growth rate was higher than that of the Arab sector, the Arab population remained the clear majority (88% in 1978, and 83% in 1987). Therefore, Jewish population growth during the relevant years is credited primarily to the development of Karmiel.

These growth patterns indicate that the planning objectives in this respect have not been satisfied; less than 30% of the targeted 8,000 inhabitants was achieved in the new settlements, and Region 2000 achieved about 30% of its expected 100,000 inhabitants. Assuming that 1978-1987 growth trends will be maintained, the Region 2000 population may reach its target of 100,000 Jews in the year 2022. The 1988-1990 trends, however, suggest that this projection is unrealistic.[3]

b. The spatial distribution of Jewish settlements

All plans are concerned with the spatial distribution of Jews. The 1976, 1978, and 1983 Segev plans are particularly concerned with distributing new settlements, and their task is two-fold: to disperse Jewish settlements along the entire Western Galil, and to populate areas previously unpopulated by Jews. Table 8 in the appendix indicates a drastic increase in Jewish settlements, especially during the years 1978-1983: from 11 settlements in 1978 to 42 settlements in 1987. Map 2 illustrates the

distribution of new settlements; these undoubtedly established the existence of Jews in new parts of Western Galil, and changed the region's spatial distribution of land use. In fact, this map should be observed in view of two additional aspects of the spatial changes during the relevant period: first, as noted in Chapter 6, construction of Jewish settlements required reorganisation of land ownership. Before 1977, all land under the new settlements' jurisdiction, industrial zones and service areas, consisted of private Arab-owned plots. After 1977, Arab-state land transactions redistributed land ownership and created larger concentrations of land plots with similar ownership status. Hence, most new settlements and associated land uses marked on Map 3 reflect these transactions. Second, public intervention affected the actual quantity of land designated for specific land uses. In contrast to the pre-1977 period, in 1990 most land is allocated to specific uses, mainly settlements' land reserves and public uses such as forests and nature reserves. Kipnis (1990)[4] calculated that the total land under national ownership increased by about 10% during the past 15 years[5] and that the volume of land actually in use increased from 54% to 84% of the total national land. Sofer and Finkel (1988) concluded that "this settlement process liquidated all land reserves in the Galil ..." (p. 47).[6] These changes in the region's land use distribution, which were established in statutory master plans, had undoubtedly been part of the settlement process of the late 1970s and 1980s, and were strongly linked to the RSD planning process.

In all, these changes can be associated directly with the "settlement plans" and their implementation.

c. Socio-economic population characteristics

A recent study (Carmon, 1990) suggests that the socio-economic status of the population of the new settlements is higher than the Western Galil average.[7] It is also argued (Sofer and Finkel, 1988) that the current social structure of the new settlements is closely linked to RSD construction procedures: First, the method of populating the settlements - the RSD purposefully selected settlers with the above characteristics, and the selection criteria are likely to be maintained throughout the years of RSD control over these settlements; Second, the method of constructing the settlements, which attracted only those who could afford the risks associated with settling in such "experimental" settlements ("afford" in terms of money, and in the assurance that alternative jobs and means of livelihood could be found in case of departure from the settlement); and third, the unique social ideology and financial commitments between settlers that form the basis of many settlements also tend to attract people from middle-to-upper socio-economic classes.

Since the settlements are still very small, questions can be raised as to whether these distinct characteristics will persist once and if they grow in size and population. To be sure, this new settlement social structure has not yet been extended to the entire Western Galil.

These characteristics cannot, however, be linked to specific planning initiatives. As a consequence of the

standard RSD perspective on and mechanism for populating settlements, planners disregarded the issue of the settlements' social composition in their initial recommendations. At most, links to the planners' work can be found in the actual assistance they provided to RSD selection and absorption procedures. The Region 2000 strategy treats this social structure as a given parameter of the area, and assumes it will be maintained.

d. The region's physical infrastructure

An integral aspect of a region's development processes is its physical infrastructure, particularly its accord with changing demand. In practice, changes in the region's infrastructure were made in areas such as water and sewage systems, electric lines, and telephone lines and exchange units. Here, "changes" refers to provision of these facilities to the new settlements (which in most cases required their construction from the bottom up). Such facilities were regarded as necessary in the "settlement plans", and their development basically matched the outlines and estimated demand put forth in the plans. Among the infrastructure components, most plans identified the road and communication systems as crucial for regional development. In this regard, Chemansky (1990) calculated that during the relevant years, improvement of existing roads and new road construction permitted the regional population to save, on average, one hour per working day for each commuter (pp. 183-184).

However, most construction was directly related to the

new settlements' immediate needs. Although they affected Western Galil's spatial and functional systems, regionally oriented planning recommendations were largely disregarded by the RSD and other public organisations (except in the case of the Karmiel-Segev road).[8] A particular example of the discrepancy between planning initiatives and the operating priorities of public organisations is the telecommunication infrastructure (Kela, 1990), and none of the planners' efforts (except one specified later) succeeded in affecting the relevant organisations' priorities and allocation principles(chapter 5). Even an attempt by the planners, in cooperation with the chief scientist of the Ministry of Communications, to obtain a legal permit to construct a satellite station in the Segev area was a complete failure.[9]

e. Industrial development

The period analysed here is notable for the important changes that took place in the industrial system. This applies mainly to the Jewish sector, since Arab industrial enterprises are still very scarce. These changes are specified in Chapter 5.

All plans rank "industrial development" as the most important element in generating the region's economic and social development: the "settlement plans" reflect the attempt to establish settlements on an industrial rather than agricultural economic base; Region 2000 urges the creation of favourable conditions as a means to foster the area's industrial expansion. Yet, an analysis of the actual

industrial processes reveals meager links to RSD planning initiatives. This is true even in the case of the new settlements, where production processes were found to be related only indirectly to RSD initiatives. Unlike the construction of new settlements or development of public facilities, in which most RSD activities can be traced back to the planning documents that specified these actions, industrial development was mainly the result of private initiatives. The RSD's involvement was mainly upon request of individual settlers-entrepreneurs. Moreover, even when the RSD was involved, this was separate from any planning function. Needless to say, industrial enterprises in non-RSD settlements were separate from the RSD planning system.

f. The region's administrative structure

Chapter 5 described the administrative fragmentation of Western Galil. Within this system, however, the process that led to the foundation of the Misgav Regional Council (in October, 1982) is a direct result of RDS planners' actual involvement in the region's processes, and it is the only such case. Unlike Region 2000 strategy, which identified the reorganisation of this system and the establishment of a "regional" administrative entity as crucial, the "settlement plans" did not call for a change in the system. Rather, planners, in the course of activities, were actually driven to take part in foundation of the Misgav Regional Council. Initially, the new settlements' needs for municipal services were satisfied by their integration into existing nearby regional councils. This arrangement proved unsatisfactory

(Kipnis, 1982). Consequently, the head of the "settlements committee" (Mr. A. Raz) and an RSD North Region office planner (Ms. T. Duchan) agreed "to seek for a way to reorganise new settlements within one administrative system, thus enabling cooperation between settlements with similar interests".[10] This initiative was realised in several stages. First, an agreement was reached between the above parties on the type of administrative structures relevant to Western Galil. Second, a professional analysis of these alternative structures was ordered. The "Proposal for Municipal Organisation of New Settlement Areas in The Galil" (Kipnis, 1982), financed by the North Region office, was presented to the director of this office (Mr.Y. Friedman) and later to the District Commissioner of the Ministry of the Interior, to convince them of the need for the recommended change in the municipal system. The convincing findings of this proposal and elements such as the District Commissioner's dedication to the execution of the new council idea created the basis for the foundation of the Misgav Regional Council (about a year after the initial idea was raised).

Other than that, planners were rather remote from the region's institutional system, although they expressed high interest in it.

g. Patterns of public resource allocation

Patterns of public resource allocation are major indicators of the attitude of the public sector toward the issues of concern, and the extent of their integration into the entire political decision-making processes (assuming

that "integration" has clear implications in terms of allocations).

In this regard, the "settlement plans" implied the integration of regional processes into standard patterns of government intervention, and hence resource allocations. The Region 2000 strategy, in contrast, explicitly suggested changes in the nature of public intervention and allocation criteria.

In practice, an analysis of the expenditures of government ministries and budget reports (including specified planned and executed resources) during the relevant budgetary years does not provide a firm basis for discussing the relations between plans and allocations of public financial and land resources (as specified in the methodological appendix). Yet, although the contribution of such knowledge to our ability to evaluate the condition of Western Galil vis-à-vis other parts of the country should not be underestimated, the lack of this information does not prevent us showing links to the planning products. By implication, the fact that the settlement process of the late 1970s and early 1980s became an integral component of public resource allocation can be seen as satisfying the objectives of the "settlement plans". In contrast, the fact that traditional patterns of resource allocation have been maintained implies complete rejection of the principles expressed in the Region 2000 strategy.

Summary

Western Galil underwent various changes, of which spatial distribution of settlements and industrial development are most notable, although one should not underestimate the foundation of the Misgav Regional Council, the construction of the Segev-Karmiel road, or other changes. We focused mainly on the links between these changes and the plans, although indirect reference was made to features of the entire planning practice, as specified in the following section.

An analysis of the links between these changes and the planning process in light of the discussion in Chapter 7 suggests direct relations with RSD activities (i.e., the settlement process of the late 1970s and early 1980s). Impact on the functional elements of the socio-economic system was limited to the immediate environment of the new settlements. In contrast, changes in region-wide processes, industrial development in particular, but also the growth of Karmiel, took place in complete separation from the processes in which the RSD and the planners were involved. In fact, the regional components and processes with which the planners were concerned, and which fell within the scope of RSD intervention, were for the most part directly related to the physical distribution of land uses (including its immediate functional consequences). Moreover, in areas where the RSD lacked the appropriate executive machinery and norms (and thus was unable to cope with arising needs, e.g., the industrial process), or was unwilling to change the scope of

its activities (e.g., investments in communication infrastructure), planning recommendations got no further than the written planning product.

Nevertheless, the importance of the "settlement" process and its associated planning activities stems not only from the establishment of a whole new set of socio-economic elements, but also from the subsequent chain-reaction effect by which their impact extended beyond the specific newly constructed areas. Insofar as a "decreased uncertainty effect" (Chapter 3) can be associated with the activities of the RSD and its planning body, we may note, for example, the attraction of skilled labour and the incentive to increase local job opportunities for incoming population, the opportunity to live in small communities with high-quality services, and the opportunity to establish private settlements, all of which were due to the RSD's establishment of procedural and normative conditions for non-government settlements (Kefar-Havradim in Western Galil, Timrat and Givat-Ela outside Western Galil). An interesting example of the wide range of effects is the change in Western Galil's statutory land use system introduced during these years.[11] Until the late 1970s, the Mandatory Regional Plan ("P50") was the major tool guiding the statutory system; the initial building permits for the "mitzpim" were given on the basis of this plan. These, however, were marked as a dot on the map, and amounted merely to approval of their initial site and all sites as one bloc. The need to approve additional settlement sites and their land use plans, and to grant specific uses (e.g., housing, public facilities) with building permits, required revision of the

North District master plan for the first time since the establishment of the State. This in turn resulted in updating of the functional national and district sectoral plans (e.g., the national master plan for roads), and had various implications for different activities elsewhere in the Galil. An analysis of the different land use plans indicates that they were updated not only in order to include the actual changes imposed by the settlement process, but to express a different attitude toward the area: until 1980, the Western Galil was perceived as one of the "dumpers" of the country; it was to be the site of various functions usually located in unpopulated areas, such as industrial waste disposal collection areas, quarries, and prisons. During the 1980s the national planning system's (Ministry of Interior) idea of locating "unfriendly" land uses in the Western Galil was abandoned and was replaced by an emphasis on designated industrial zones, high roads, and recreation areas.

The following sections describe the various activities planners engaged in that facilitated the above changes, and discuss the close links between the scope of RSD activities and planning impact.

8.2 The Planning Function - Decision-Making Links and the Dimensions of Planning Practice

The planners discussed in this dissertation viewed their role in terms of producing plans and promoting their realisation. This perspective was not necessarily shared by the administrators and politicians. A general agreement on the function of producing plans can be traced, but other planning functions were not equally treated. One director of the RSD North Region office (Mr. Y. Friedman) suggested he "could not manage many issues of the office's affairs under my (his O.G.) responsibility without planners' assistance and a close working relation with them".[12] In contrast, another director of the RSD North Region office (Mr. M. Cohen) disagreed with this assessment of the planners' role, and thus made a distinction between plans' production and their implementation - although stating that "after you left, we did not know what to do",[13] he previously "complained" about "planners' attempts to manage the regional office's affairs, rather than concentrating on writing plans and detailed programs which other people should materialise".[14]

A fairly clear perspective on the planners' role was expressed by the Katzir Committee, which stated that "planners should tell us what, how and when to do".[15] Acknowledging its lack of executive power, this committee suggested that the RSD should support its planners' involvement in the project since "planning was deemed necessary in order to make sure that work commences soon".[16] In other words, in a distinction between "plan-making" and

"implementation", the former's guidelines are essential for the execution of public policy.
Yet another attitude was expressed by political decision-makers such as the Minister of Communication, the Mayor of Karmiel, and the RSD directors. These emphasised the "professional" qualities of planners, expecting them to "formulate plans and be able to consult with others who deal with actual work in the region, while their not being directly involved in execution permits them to see processes in the right perspective".[17] These decision-makers distinguished between "planning and consultation" functions on the one hand, and implementation on the other hand. This distinction was of special importance in cases where professional justification was required for decisions that had already been taken. It should be noted, however, that in the case of Mr. N. Zvili (the RSD co-director), there are several examples of actions that followed planners' recommendations (e.g., proposals regarding the Ta'anach area, provided in 1985 by the same planners involved in Region 2000).

The actual planning experience during the years 1975-1986 can be divided into three dimensions:

1. **Production of plans** - a process that resulted in two different types of written product, described in Chapter 6. As noted, when the different planning perspectives are put in their historical context, it is possible to identify a continuity of links between types of issues treated by planners and the conditions under which plans were formulated.

2. **Marketing the planning product** - the process through which information about a planning initiative is distributed, meant to generate commitment to plans and increase general awareness of them. Planners may not always be aware of the importance of this function, nor of their actual association with it. In the specific planning experience discussed here, awareness of this dimension developed in the course of the planning process, through the implementation of certain plans, actual involvement in regional processes, and attempts to promote the implementation of other plans.
3. **Contributions to implementation** - referring to the actual role planners played in the regional processes, and the regional processes that can be linked to specific planning initiatives.

The different planning experiences are therefore discussed according to these dimensions.

8.2.1 Production of plans

Chapter 6 described the basic characteristics of the two "blocs" of planning products, the "settlement plans" and Region 2000, emphasising the apparent links between their time horizons and specifity of recommendations on the one hand, and their accommodation to prevailing institutional decision-making processes on the other hand. Among the aspects that were discussed, the following require further elaboration:

a. All plans resulted from the planners' own initiative.

None of them was a result of some direct instruction from other administrators or professionals "to formulate a development plan". The difference between the planning initiatives, however, lay in their relation to their institutional contexts.

The initiation of the "settlement plans" was rather obviously a task for the RSD Planning Section of the North Region office, which plans for RSD purposes. Accordingly, the production of the plans embodied prevailing RSD procedures and working standards.

The formulation of Region 2000, although it accorded with the principle tasks of the RSD Planning Section, is a case in which planners disregarded a basic working principle, i.e., the need for authorisation or permission to offer their services outside the RSD (to Fellowship 2000, in particular). Acknowledging this problematic aspect, planners chose to be satisfied with the backing of Mr. Friedman, who initiated their involvement in the project and managed some of the contacts with the Katzir Committee. Mr. Friedman provided a certain official legitimacy by virtue of his two titles: vice-director general of the Planning Authority (refer to diagram 3), and vice-director general of the RSD. Indeed, the RSD management was not aware of the planners' involvement in Region 2000, and planners were not discharged from other missions. In practice, however, planners' promotion of the Region 2000 strategy and its approval by Fellowship 2000 resulted in a drastic change in the RSD's status in the project. As noted, during 1981-83, JAFI's role was

limited, the RSD had no connections with JAFI's allocations, and the Katzir Committee rejected (in 1983) the RSD's involvement in the project. Judging from these events, one can suggest that the full acceptance of the RSD by Fellowship 2000 and the Minister of Economics and Planning, and their subsequent attempts to encourage its active involvement in the project (evident from late 1984),[18] were motivated by the above planning initiative.

b. The next aspect is the relation of the content of the planning product with the prevailing institutional perspective and procedures. Previous discussion suggested that production of plans was an ongoing process, with plans being updated as implementation proceeded. This "updating" process, also referred to as "accommodation", is not as straightforward as was initially described. In light of our view of "implementation" as the process in which the planning perspective guides decision-making in relevant issues, the actual application of plans to concrete areas and issues and in a specific time context requires the maintenance of these plans' relevance vis-à-vis changing conditions: issues proven in the course of action to be irrelevant should be changed, recommendations revised, and future objectives updated. At the same time, however, accommodation should not be equated with full assimilation to any one organisation's conceptual and operational system, as this would lead to a loss of the planner's ability to perceive events in a larger perspective.

The "settlement plans"' experience shows that as planners became involved in the execution process, they gradually limited their concern with the long-run nature of the Segev area, concentrating, instead, on immediate needs (e.g., relocating public facilities when the planned sites were found to be physically unsuitable, problems related to settlers' absorption). Indeed, a comparison between the 1976 and 1983 development plans demonstrates a shift from a dynamic conceptual framework based on a firm vision of the area's future, to a static and somewhat "technocratic" approach that merely quantifies future demand for different land uses based on official RSD population projections. In other words, "accommodation" in the case of these plans was not merely a matter of adjustment to changing circumstances. Rather, it entailed full acceptance of the prevailing institutionalised "regional" perspective and executive mechanism, at the price of the planners abandoning their ability to provide any guidelines for future activities other than those found in the system's standard procedures for settlement.

Region 2000 challenged this state of affairs: it rejected the abandonment of concern with future processes, and the provision of solutions only in terms of the standards of the public apparatus machinery. It further challenged prevailing RSD execution standards (e.g., size of its planned settlements). In so doing, however, Region 2000 planners took "accommodation" to the opposite extreme. They not only introduced a

different perspective on what should be done and the issues the RSD should concern itself with (thus making it impossible that principles of standard treatment would be maintained), but also attempted to dictate the RSD's involvement in Region 2000 and restructure its traditional relations with Western Galil. In this way, they rejected the previous tendency to concentrate on solutions to emerging concrete problems, and likewise rejected the means to cope with such problems that are provided by the RSD apparatus.

c. The "anti-accommodation" attitude associated with Region 2000 was further reflected in the planners' attempts to translate the strategy into specific, implementable programs. In seeking to specify the strategic principles, planners required the contribution of experts in such areas as the changes in the telecommunication infrastructure and education. Professional input was also desired in areas where the planners had a greater familiarity with the issues concerned (such as the political and administrative structure of Region 2000, road construction, and industrial development), "to refresh our minds and integrate non-institutionalised perspectives into the process".[19] Contacts with non-RSD professionals were initiated for two additional purposes: first, to acquire services that could not be provided within the RSD, such as legal advice regarding the opportunities for establishing the Region 2000 firm; and second, as a means of establishing "contacts and interactions with large industrial firms and businesses related to the

area, through the utilisation of professionals' relations with these bodies".[20]

This direction of work, which planners believed was important for promoting issues unfamiliar to them and the RSD, and the prevention of traditional RSD perspectives from dominating concrete proposals, made this planning product susceptible to external effects. As it depended on both the work of experts and on RSD budgeting procedures (the latter required to finance the experts' work), the production of the planning product fell partially outside of the planners' control; the planners could not proceed on their own until the experts had completed their jobs and the budget for their salaries was obtained. These tactics also rendered the experts and their expected recommendations vulnerable to pressure from the RSD. Examples include the case of D. Gayer, an economist whom the head of the North Region office (M. Cohen) wished to employ while dictating his areas of concern,[21] or the attempt of the head of the RSD Computer Unit to force the cooperation of Berenstein, Ltd., telecommunication experts who manage the telephone system of the JAFI offices in Jerusalem.[22] Consequently, planners failed to make the Region 2000 strategy specific, and thus failed to provide manageable and implementable measures that could be promoted within the RSD executive machinery. This was a crucial drawback in the planning process - although the planners challenged the prevailing perspectives and practices of RSD intervention, they did not succeed in

providing alternative guidelines for directing this intervention.

8.2.2 Marketing the planning product

Marketing, the distribution of information regarding a planning initiative, is meant to introduce plans to different decision-makers and generate their support for the initiative. In some cases, this is expected to lead to the plans' integration into the decision-making processes, and hence to their implementation. In other cases, expectations may be more moderate, such as contributing to the awareness of decision-makers. The "market" for plans can be found in different segments of the socio-economic system. The discussion in Chapter 3, for example, suggested the importance of the political decision-makers among whom the specific "partners" of the planning initiatives should be chosen. The "market" may also consist of the individuals and entrepreneurs expected to respond to planning initiatives.

Planners (and planning theory) tend to regard this function as an obvious aspect of the planning process, thus underestimating its potential contribution. In our case, although the specific planning experience indicates a growing awareness of this dimension of planning process, it is doubtful that planners exhausted this dimension. Indeed, "marketing" as a structured approach seeking means to generate commitment to the plans' principles and recommendations was nonexistent during the entire planning process concerned. Nonetheless, several activities in which

planners were involved can be classified in this dimension:

a. Initial approval of plans.

Obtaining approval of the "settlement plans" was regarded both by planners and RSD management as a necessary precondition for operating in the RSD, and was an element of the planners' institutional status. This task was defined as the first objective of the 1976 Segev plan (p. 14). Yet, the planners paid no attention to the way this approval was given, nor did they pursue approval. The "approval" was viewed as outside the range of the planners' activities.

In contrast, in seeking the Katzir Committee's approval of the Region 2000 strategy, the planners' presentation of the strategy (March, 1985) was based on a study of committee members, which led to a determination of the strategic aspects to be emphasised in this forum and those members who particularly should be addressed. The presentation resulted in approval of the RSD Region 2000 strategy. As expressed by one of the committee members: "we invited planners of the RSD to present their planning proposal in order to secure further JAFI funding of the project. Being introduced to the strategy, however, the Committee is now faced with an unexpected problem: the choice of the real alternative".[23] Planners took a similar tack in presenting the strategy to the JAFI Assembly (June, 1986) and to several ministers. Each target group was provided with a slightly different paper, emphasising aspects of the strategy that seemed to the planners most suitable to the target groups' areas of interest. As noted, however, approval of the Region 2000 development strategy was not straightforward: the previous

commitment of the Katzir Committee to the Lichfield & IDC planning group prevented the committee from making an official declaration of its decision to follow the RSD proposal (on which matter Prof. Katzir refused to be interviewed); instead, they issued a letter stating that "from now on, we expect the planning section of the North Region office to guide the work".[24]

Furthermore, although the method used to obtain Fellowship 2000 approval achieved its expected results, it was not very useful in the search for RSD approval at a later stage (opposition to the strategy did arise; see Chap. 6). In the latter case, although planners attempted to market the strategy, they did not manage to direct discussion in the RSD Executive away from such issues as the timing of the strategy's presentation and the previous approach to Fellowship 2000 (Chap. 6). In other words, although planners correctly judged that RSD approval of the strategy was impossible unless Fellowship 2000 approval was attained, they did not take advantage of RSD sensitivity to issues related to the new settlements' future, and thus failed to exploit potentially vulnerable components of the RSD decision-making process.

In addition, RSD approval was accompanied by a major conflict at the level of departmental management regarding the question of who was to lead RSD activities in this project. This conflict was exposed in the Director General's attempt to form a departmental cooperative committee, which was jeopardized by the co-director of the department (N. Zvili) and the vice-director general of the Planning Authority (Y. Friedman).[25]

b. Distribution of plans.

This "classic" measure - the distribution of basic information regarding the planned issues, is meant initially to promote a wide awareness of the plans' existence.

In the case of the "settlement plans", the distributed information included details such as the specification of settlements' sites, their planned population and populating stages, the estimated demand for public facilities (telephone lines, electric capacity, quantity of public buildings), and, sometimes, copies of the available plans (land use structure of settlements, architectural design, etc.). Plans were distributed to the professional sections of public bodies, mainly those that were expected to take part in establishing the new settlements. Distribution of plans to political decision-makers was managed by the RSD director (Mr. Weitz), who published selected and minimal details of the plans, changing their content as events required.

In the case of Region 2000, distributed information included the concept's specification, the proposed development stages, and the allocation of responsibility to each public organisation. Plans were distributed to politicians (e.g., ministers, mayors, elected representatives of the area), directors of public companies, directors of the major industrial firms located in Western Galil and Haifa, and to libraries.

In both cases distribution was accompanied by attempts to create personal relationships by initiating meetings with

professionals in other organisations for the purpose of discussing the planning initiative. As will be further discussed, however, whereas contacts related to the "settlement plans" were taking place while the "bulldozers of the RSD were already in the area",[26] contacts regarding Region 2000 were based on "a mutual theoretical understanding of the need to develop Western Galil".[27]

c. Marketing in the form of Personal relations.

Marketing can also be associated with actions meant to create personal relations and generate a "favourable" attitude to specific issues. The measure applied most often by all planners over the years was the "sight-seeing" tour of Western Galil, during which the person(s) invited was introduced to the region's specific character and the issues tackled in the plans.

During the first period, the "targets" were always professionals from other public organisations, whereas for Region 2000, the targets were mainly politicians and their personal assistants. The contribution of personal relations to the realisation of plans was made evident in such cases as the development of telephone lines in the late 1970s (further specified), and the visits of the Director General of the Ministry of Economics and Planning (Mr. E. Gera) and the chief scientist of the Ministry of Communication (Mr. Y. Kela), during which the seeds of cooperation between these ministries and the RSD were planted. The Minister of Industry's (Mr. A. Sharon) refusal to accept an invitation to such a tour (December, 1986)[28] proves that such acceptance was regarded as "an actual declaration of

support" for the planning initiative.

d. "Aggressive" marketing.

A fairly "aggressive" approach toward motivating other organisations to operate according to the plans was reflected in three types of activities:

* The provision of RSD professional assistance to other organisations dealing with execution of the plans. This was the case (in the late 1970s) with the employee of the Planning Section of the RSD North Region office who dealt with land transactions on behalf of the Israeli Land Authority. The idea was suggested by planners of the Planning Section and approved by the director of the North Region office, who noted: "in this way we prevented the excuses of no budget or no staff available for this mission",[29] which was crucial for the establishment of new settlements.

* Discussions with professionals aimed at generating "a feeling of partnership and mutual responsibility" in specific projects.[30] The important initiative here was the discussion with the Director of the North District of the Ministry of Education concerning the development prospects of the Segev settlements, during which the Director was led to approve the Misgav school as a model for "community schools" (which did not exist until then) and as the structure most suited to the special community emerging in this area; construction of these schools thus was carried out by the Ministry of Education. It should be noted that the "community school" idea was formulated by members of the

Settlements' Committee (of Segev; see Chap. 5), and was executed by planners in the RSD North Region office, who saw satisfaction of the settlers' demands as part of their role.

* Furthering a planning proposal on Region 2000's development company (Gilat and Duchan, 1986) through the mayor of Karmiel (Mr. Vanger) rather than the head of the RSD North Region office (M. Cohen). Although both were members of the "Ya'akobi committee", Cohen's known opposition led to the attempt to use the Mayor's support of the proposal in presenting it to the forum. This unconventional channel proved inappropriate; had the mayor presented the proposal, it would have been regarded by Cohen as an act of disloyalty, and North Region office support of the project would have been diminished. As noted by Mr. Vanger, "it was unwise to take the risk of damaging official relations with the RSD".[31]

e. Professional legitimation of initiatives.

The case of the Misgav Regional Council is a good example of concern with advancing a planning initiative. Difficulties in convincing the director of the RSD North Region office of the need to establish a new regional council led planners to bring in a private consultant to provide a "professional" opinion on the subject. This indeed proved effective - the "Kipnis" Report (1982) resulted in the full support of the RSD management and the District Commissioner of the Ministry of Interior, thus, the Misgav Regional Council was established. Planners were not involved in the actual process of designating Misgav; this was done

by the North District Commissioner (Mr. Kening).

In contrast, reference to consultants by Region 2000 planners presumably (no written evidence was found) was linked to their need for some professional legitimation of the strategic recommendations. However, since they raised the possibility of long-term use of experts, the idea of "legitimacy" began to lose importance as the experts themselves were integrated into the executive machinery.

f. Marketing in the form of public relations.

* Region 2000 strategy specified several projects that "will be integrated into the overall planning process, improve the region's image, and create a base for trust between planners, organisations that function in the region, and the region's population" (Gilat and Duchan, 1985, p. 93). The proposed projects included distribution of "Region 2000 identity cards", establishment of an information centre, and construction of a "visitor's centre" (Iyur Einav, 1985). None of these proposals was carried out.

* Meetings were held with the secretaries of the Misgav settlements (October 1986) for the purpose of "presenting the idea of Region 2000, receiving feed-back from the region's population, and generating their enthusiasm".[32] The response to this initiative was mild; not only was no particular interest indicated, there was also an expression of a certain degree of mistrust: "first do something and then come back to us".[33]

* A few attempts were made to encourage public interest

in Region 2000 project through the newspapers. These resulted in the E. Kimmor article for the Jewish Chronicle (13.1.86), and Y. Tal's article for the Ha'aretz daily newspaper (13.4.85). Both initiatives were rejected by the director-general of the RSD on the grounds that "planners should not approach journalists".[34]

* Finally, in late 1986 some consideration was given to forming a political lobby for Region 2000 (headed by the Mayor of Karmiel), and applying for a "public relations" consultant "as a means to generate some public support for the Region 2000 conceptual perspective",[35] none of which gained the support of the director of the North Region office, who refused to allocate financial resources to such projects.

In all, marketing the plans was almost always done on a one-to-one, personal basis. The marketing initiatives for the "settlement plans" were directed toward professionals, never political decision-makers, and always in connection with concrete "missions". Nevertheless, available documentation indicates that such actions rarely were part of a pre-planned scheme on who should be approached, when and how. The task of generating commitment on the part of political decision-makers was basically left to the RSD management, whereas planners concentrated on promoting their ideas within their immediate institutional environment, i.e., the head of the North Region office. In fact, it was not until Region 2000 that planners realised that the above activities should be structured into a coherent program in which different aspects of the strategy (or the strategy as

a whole) should be "sold" to different decision-makers, be they political entities or individuals. In this case, the targets were political decision-makers.

Further, hardly any approaches were made to "citizens", and individuals in other parts of the country. Planners' contacts with settlers came by way of their involvement in the construction of the new settlements. The same applies to all other parts of the national economic system - no attempts were made to approach potential entrepreneurs and generate their interest in the planning initiatives. (Several attempts by Region 2000 planners to establish such personal contacts did not have enough time to develop.)

"Marketing" was, therefore, governed by two major approaches: the first, expressed in the implementation of the "settlement plans", regarded marketing as part of the coordination and management dimension. The second, expressed in Region 2000 strategy, regarded marketing as a distinct dimension of the planning process that required planners to deal with public relations, political lobbying, and creation of pressure groups (Gilat and Duchan, 1984). This, however, is not to imply that purposeful marketing attempts or the more sophisticated use of prevailing tools was more effective. Because of the lack of concrete products to market, the Region 2000 planning body had little opportunity to materialise its intentions.

8.2.3 Contribution to implementation

As argued, implementation is basically the execution of policy formulated on the basis of the plans' conceptual perception and concrete recommendations. Planners, therefore, depend on an institutional executive mechanism (which can be part of one or several organisations) to promote implementation. Accordingly, the planning process is largely a function of interactions between planners and those decision-makers with executive power. Planners may be an integral part of an executive mechanism (e.g., those employed by the RSD), or their status may be unclear in relation to such a system (e.g., the case of Region 2000). These vary with the organisation's internal structure and the practical implications of the planning initiative. Finally, implementation and execution policy should be adjusted to meet the new conditions and changing needs that emerge as a result of implementation. This assumes that although in most cases planners are not direct managers of implementation, in their association with policy implementation (its application to concrete situations, provision of ad hoc solutions to constantly emerging problems, and coordination of activities) they may influence the consequences of the principal policy.

The implementation of the "settlement plans" was unique in two major aspects.

a. It was a process in which their "implementation know-how" gave the planners an important role in the process at a scale and intensity the RSD never experienced. This knowledge was acquired as implementation advanced;

planners were gradually able to identify who should be incorporated in the process of settlement construction and how their authority was distributed. Equipped with this knowledge, planners directly influenced RSD activities, mainly at the level of the North Region office.[36] Two examples illustrate this: First, in describing the relations with the official land use system and the "mitzpim" project, the following statement was made: "luckily a member of our planning team (S. Lazar) was previously employed in the Ministry of the Interior, so the need for an official building permit as a prerequisite to the legal establishment of 'mitzpim' was brought to our attention, and we started to learn the ways to obtain building permits for the new settlements".[37] Importantly, this "knowledge" was acquired after the decision to establish "mitzpim" was taken. Second, in describing relations with the Israeli Land Authority (ILD), the above planner stated: "we suddenly realised that we needed permission to utilise national land, so we wrote a draft of an agreement (with the ILD, O.G.) in order to obtain the land owner's signature on our (i.e., the RSD's) land use plans - a prerequisite for their approval by the planning authorities"[38] (i.e., the Ministry of the Interior). In verifying this statement, a striking similarity between the initial draft and the final leasing contract was revealed.[39]

b. This process was distinguished by the close links between planners and the upper managerial positions of the RSD. As noted, these links were reflected in

information flows in both directions, in the relative freedom planners had in determining activities that were backed by the financial resources of the RSD, and in the clear distribution of authority within the entire system. In all, the role planners played in the "mitzpim" project and subsequent RSD activities can be linked to their direct acquaintance with the region and its related processes. As they were the RSD's chief source of immediate knowledge about the processes and the agencies involved in it, planners gradually took a greater part in most of the North Region office's decisions. This position of strength was built in the course of implementation: the accumulated information, the established relations with different agencies working and living in the region, and the familiarity with official procedures and legal arrangements were the results of working in implementation. It should be emphasised, however, that this particular case involved the implementation of a certain interpretation of plans (the 1976 plan in particular) with which the RSD was not familiar until then. The Region 2000 experience was different in the sense that actual implementation of the strategy did not take place. Instead, planners focused on two types of processes: the interpretation of the strategy into concrete and workable programs on the one hand, and constant attempts to obtain widespread approval of the development strategy, on the other hand. This process also can be classified in the category of "producing plans".

In practice, several important functions can be

classified under the management dimension of the planning process:

a. The identification of organisations that should be incorporated into specific processes.

This is a rather obvious planning function. One could expect that such organisations (at least most of them) would be identified during the initial stage of plan formulation, on the basis of some sort of regional analysis, and for the purpose of forming proposals in a relatively clear functional environment. This function, however, took place during implementation, and thus is discussed here. Planners prepared a list in which different government ministries and other public organisations were classified according to their authority for each type of action. This list was prepared during the first years of the "settlement plans" implementation, and particularly during the "mitzpim" process. The Region 2000 planning initiative, however, integrated this knowledge into the initial proposal. This enabled identification at early stages of work of those organisations most relevant for different actions to be taken during the planning process.

b. Impact on non-JAFI organisations.

An interesting example of active attempts to secure the integration of plans into the working programs of other organisations is the case of the telephone system. Having understood that the Ministry of Communication would not supply telephones to the forthcoming settlers unless actual requests were advanced (on official application forms), and

in view of the fact that the provision of telephones might be delayed for some time after the settlers' arrival because of the required construction of new exchange units, planners filled out application forms (about 50 per settlement) on behalf of the expected settlers. Unaware that the application forms were faked, the Ministry was forced to include the settlements in its planned projects, and invest in new exchange units and telephone lines.[40] Consequently, unlike in new settlements in other areas, Western Galil settlers were provided with telephones almost upon their arrival.[41] By contrast, an example of an unsuccessful attempt to integrate the Department's plans into other organisations' working programs is the case of the Electricity Company and Ministry of Communications. Attempts to introduce Region 2000 strategy and convince these entities to accommodate their working programs failed to overcome the barrier exemplified in the attitude of "first let the RSD do something and then come back to us".[42]

c. Establishing working relations with non-JAFI organisations.

These were created through routine meetings of planners with, for example, the District Commissioner of the Ministry of the Interior (Mr. Kening), in which both settlement master plans and other land use issues (such as fencing in areas for agricultural purposes) were discussed with. In fact, the result of such meetings was the establishment of working procedures and norms of conduct with public organisations that up to then (i.e., 1978) had no direct relations with the RSD. Such organisations included the

Ministry of the Interior, the Rural Building Authority of the Ministry of Housing, which became the official organisation approving architectural plans of the new settlements, and the Ministry of Education. These contacts were in addition to the traditional cooperation between the RSD and other organisations such as the Ministry of Agriculture and Mekorot. Still, cooperation with ministries such as Defense and Industry was generally out of the scope of planning function. The most interesting example here is the "leasing contract between the RSD and the Israeli Land Authority" (Menuhin, Ludmer and Eger, 1983). This was formulated on the basis of a draft prepared by one planner of the RSD North Region office (T. Duchan) and the director general of the ILA North District (Y. Dagan), as quoted above. Such contracts were not available until the "mitzpim" period. In contrast to this experience, planners' attempts to establish working patterns with the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the Ministry of Education were in vain; not even information flows could be established.

d. Coordination of execution.

This function refers to the coordination of activities between different private and public bodies actually working in the Segev area. RSD documentation indicates that coordination of actual execution (as opposed to coordination of policies with politicians and JAFI international institutions) was largely carried out by planners. During the years 1978-1982, this function covered a wide range of activities and organisations. Examples include notifying builders when JNF land development work would be terminated

so that they could be prepared in advance to enter into the area when JNF terminated its task; and ensuring that detailed plans of road construction would be transferred to subcontractors. During these years, there were even cases where planners took over some of the tasks of the Water Section of the North Region office, such as estimation of water demand and coordination of plans with TAHAL and Mekorot. This was justified on the need "to make sure that work proceeds at the required speed".[43] This function was gradually limited to traditional land-use issues, such as coordinating between settlements' master plans and the Ministry of the Interior, and coordinating the demands of the different bodies authorising construction.

e. Introduction of organisational changes.

This function refers to an initiative that resulted from involvement in the area's activities - the idea of Misgav Regional Council. As noted, the official act of the Ministry of the Interior resulted from mutual work between one planner and the head of the "settlements' committee" of the Segev area: "such an organisation suddenly seemed the most obvious requirement of the system that was developing in Segev. However, once we were capable of defining for ourselves this type of organisational structure, we were faced with the problem of convincing the director of the regional office of the relevance of the idea".[44] In practice, this idea reached fruition. In this regard, two actions associated with the Region 2000 experience should be mentioned:

* The attempt to integrate the planners' proposal for a development company that was not considered by the "Ya'akobi Forum".

* The attempt to establish a "forum of users", which never materialised. This forum, supposedly composed of representatives of the region's interest groups (i.e., industry, business, local authorities), was expected to form the initial basis for cooperation between the various economic and social forces in the area. This idea (first articulated in 12.4.1986) never advanced beyond the stage of one meeting between some of the above forces (mainly the representatives of local authorities), during which the Mayor of Karmiel was accused by the head of the Ma'alot-Tarshiha local council of attempting to "control the entire area".[45]

f. Consultation

This function is related to the status of planners in their functional environment, and to the attitude taken toward their recommendations. By definition, the "consultant" position is distinguished from the "decision-making" function, and implies potentially limited opportunities for consultants to pursue their advised actions within specific organisations. "Consultants" are, in a way, "outsiders" in their institutional system, partially as a result of the system's activities and internal processes. Accordingly, unlike the planning function during the late 1970s and early 1980s, which was an integral part of the RSD executive mechanism, planners in the mid-1980s were in a clear position of "consultants", remote from major

decision-making processes. Therefore, although consultation was practiced in a wide variety of cases and was related to many organisations, its overall impact on decisions related to Western Galil was very limited. Several examples illustrate this point:

* The relations of planners with Mr. B. Vanger (the Mayor of Karmiel, and a member of the Katzir Committee) were based on the latter's perception of planners as professionals, capable of advising him on issues related to Karmiel's internal affairs, such as the problems in allocating land reserves to industries (i.e., the case of Galram, whose land reserves, in view of its slow development, he wished to eliminate), the questions associated with the development of "Centre 2000" and the ways to attract technological educational institutions to it, and issues directly related to Region 2000, such as the question of whether or not to integrate the Minister of Industry and Trade, A. Sharon, into the project. Needless to say, as the Mayor of Karmiel, Vanger was under no constraint to accept the RSD planners' advice, nor to incorporate them into his considerations.

* The Minister of Economics and Planning, in his attempt to realise "Firm 2000", requested planners "to prepare a concrete proposal for organising the administrative structure of `Region 2000' and the foundation of the above firm, especially for the assessment of Selbst's proposal".[46] This proposal, however, was never discussed.

g. The "intermediate agents" between settlers and RSD management.

This was another aspect of the planning practice during the years 1978-1983. In their constant involvement with the construction of new settlements and the absorption of new settlers, planners grew familiar with settlers' needs and problems. At the same time, their actual presence in the area made them available to settlers who wished to make contacts with "the authorities", especially the RSD. Over time, this resulted in a situation whereby planners presented the settlers' interests and needs in the RSD system, while presenting the RSD's perspective to the settlers. Planners' involvement in local affairs gradually extended to include relations with the Settlement Movements (chapter 5), and with the RSD professional unit that was managing settler absorption and social life. In practice, contacts with settlers, and especially their elected representatives, were made on a permanent basis. Region 2000 planners did not serve such function, as many others which were exercised during the "settlement plans"' implementation.

To sum up, the nature of both regional systems and the planning process does not enable the above dimensions of planning to be ranked according to their relative importance in regional processes. Is production more important than marketing? Is the idea of settling an unpopulated area in the Galil more or less important than the idea of furthering its development? Are attempts to secure telephone lines for new settlers more or less important than attempts to

establish a modern telecommunications system? Is it possible to identify comparative criteria or measures? Probably not. In fact, ranking them is not very important since, as argued, it is the combined effect of all the dimensions that creates the planning process, or the implementation process through which the plans are produced and marketed and most planning functions come together to create a whole.

Nevertheless, the different planning functions described above, along with the changing emphasis placed on each planning dimension, enable us to identify several major characteristics of the planning process:

1. A distinction can be made between the period up to 1983, associated with the "settlement plans", during which the three dimensions of the planning process were integrated, and the period after 1983, associated with the Region 2000 planning initiative, during which the emphasis was on the "production" and "marketing" dimensions, leaving implementation to be carried out on a very narrow basis.
2. In fact, the planning process associated with the "settlement plans" was largely a matter of what to do and how to do it. Planners tackled such questions in a "trial-and-error" process, through which they learned how to cope with implementation as it advanced. The Region 2000 planning process, in contrast, was based on the question of whether or not to implement the planning initiative at all. Emphasis was put on attempts to generate commitment of political decision-makers to the specific planning recommendations, and to introduce some manageable programs.

3. Over the years, planners acquired important skills, stemming from their direct, intensive connections with Western Galil (its institutions, individual settlers, and private entrepreneurs). This proved an advantage in operating within the RSD machinery and in contacts with other institutions.
4. In the first period, involvement of planners in regional processes was based on personal relationships with professionals from public organisations related to the region, and with individuals. Region 2000 planners expected their counterparts to be politicians, different professionals, and businessmen. Minutes of meetings of the planning group involved in this project indicate that the planners assumed that their personal relations with politicians, for example, would be sufficient for generating their commitment to the project.[47]
5. Planning was largely motivated by individual planners, who were also influenced by individual decision-makers who were steering from "behind the scene" in order to convince their organisations to follow a certain initiative.
6. Attitude toward professionals. The "settlement plans" were mainly implemented by the RSD apparatus, with its different professional sections responsible for specific aspects. Region 2000 strategy excluded the RSD professional units, instead calling for the integration of outside professionals into the process. The planners needed outside experts to provide support for their ideas, which ran counter to prevailing institutional

planning perspectives and ideologies.

In all, some functions were a consequence of the extent to which planners were able to operate and the type of activities the RSD was engaged in (i.e., the "paternalistic" and aggressive attitude embodied in RSD activities [Lifschitz and Law-Yone, 1990] toward regional development issues and areas, which was adopted by professional planners); other functions resulted from the specific characteristics of the planners and the way they operated, as the following section attempts to reveal.

The planning functions associated with the "settlement plans" were closely linked to the RSD executive mechanism; in producing a planning product that was basically accessible to the RSD management in the context of growing concern with the Galil's "demographic problem", planners unknowingly took advantage of some vulnerable decision-making determinants. Thus, although the 1976 plan was a fairly general statement of the planning perspective, planners were encouraged to specify it further and produce guidelines for its implementation by the RSD. In turn, leaving the RSD with the responsibility for implementation was in accord with the planners' recommendations, which were built into this executive mechanism. Region 2000, on the other hand, was a case of planners "cutting off the branch they sat on"; they challenged the prevailing executive mechanism and acted in opposition to accepted norms and their official brief in the RSD, but did not provide alternative norms and procedures and failed to create the conditions for generating other "partners" for

implementation.

Finally, in accordance with traditional planning theories, one may classify the planning experience in the category of "planning-bureaucracy". However, whereas during the first period planners were maximizing their limited role within the RSD, Region 2000 planners attempted to utilise their advantages as employees of the RSD not only to serve outside organisational interests ("guerrillas"), but to promote changes in the RSD itself (Advocates?).

8.3 Putting Potential to Use

a. The region in question

Western Galil is not, as noted, an officially designated region, neither for administrative nor for electoral purposes. In practice, however, it is distinguished from other parts of the Galil and northern parts of the country by virtue of its demographics and its production processes that show a clear tendency to concentrate on "high-tech" industries (some labour-intensive, some R&D-intensive). Most of the latter's distinct characteristics developed since the late 1970s.

In the course of a history that has seen many planning initiatives (Chap. 6), Western Galil does not seem to have offered exceptional contributions or discouraging conditions to planning practice compared with other areas and regions - although the 1976 "Earth Day" was a major stimulus to the mass construction of the "mitzpim", which, in turn, stimulated some of the processes that are now credited for the region's distinctiveness.

Hence, explanations for the planning experience we are concerned with here and the implementation of some planning products should be sought in the combined effect of institutional and planning inputs, rather than in the regional characteristics themselves.

b. Input of the written planning products

The 1976 and 1978 Segev development plans created for the RSD an initial opportunity to settle those parts of the

Galil scarcely populated by Jews. This was stimulated by applying the Industrial Village concept, developed in the early 1970s, which permitted to abandon the until then necessary links between Jewish settlements and land-consuming agricultural activities. The evolution of these plans into the "mitzpim" idea resulted in a project whose scale and intensity were not predicted by planners, and possibly not even by the RSD management. Nevertheless, by presenting a conceptual framework for future development into which the RSD mechanism could fit (e.g., the planned volume of settlers, spatial structure of settlements, and relations with settlers all accorded with prevailing standards), the planning product proved a very useful tool for generating the commitment of the RSD management and for guiding different RSD activities.

Although they merely stated proposed actions and their priorities (referred to as "development stages"), the "settlement plans" essentially proposed a change that cannot, by any standard, be considered easy to accept and implement, in spite of the fact that the Israeli history has seen many massive settlement constructions within a short period. The establishment of new settlement clusters, even by a gradual process, is a very "demanding" process that impose a heavy burden on the organisation(s) involved. In light of that, it is all the more notable that the actual implementation of the plans can partially be credited to the nature of the planning product itself (and especially its conceptual standing vis-à-vis the RSD operating mechanism).

By contrast, the "grand" idea of Region 2000, which in some respects was less costly and less crucial in its

potential negative externalities, was presented as a large-scale, long-term, nation-wide program. In its articulation, planners were carried away with Prof. Katzir's point of view, emphasising, for example, the "innovative" nature of the project, the unique "high-tech" industries to be located in Region 2000, and the relatively large number of highly skilled and prestigious jobs that were to be available. In other words, they emphasised the challenge, the almost impossible to attain, and the drastic changes that were to be made primarily in Western Galil. Accordingly, proposed changes were presented in a such way that even fairly straightforward actions seemed complicated and somewhat "hostile" or frightening. For example, planners proposed the construction of a highway to connect the northern peripheries with the central parts of the country, which in the context of industrialising Israel should have been basically acceptable and feasible, especially since no special or unknown technologies were to be applied in its construction. In fact, a similar road had already been proposed in the national master plan for roads, although it had not yet been approved and was far from being built. Yet, by referring to the "north-south axis" the planners made this project look very complicated. Further, in doing so they emphasised the links to the central parts of the country and the fact that Western Galil was competing with other areas for the same Ministry of Housing budget. These areas do indeed compete with each other, but it is doubtful whether this was the right place to point this out.

Leaving aside this matter of the strategy's conceptual articulation, some of the proposed changes required to

promote Region 2000 were in themselves difficult to accept by the political system and difficult to implement. Among them was the creation of a "regional" elected body that did not exist in the Israeli government system. Thus, not only did the Region 2000 strategy propose "difficult" solutions, but in tackling more straightforward aspects of the regional system, it made them look complicated.

Above all, a strategy that by definition was abstract formed the major basis on which planners attempted to communicate with decision-makers. Unlike the "settlement plans", which presented concrete tasks and measures, the planning products of Region 2000 scarcely specified how to get from present conditions to the desired future, thus adding another obstacle to the acceptance of already problematic proposals.

In all, the translation of a planning product into specific actions, or bridging the "gap" between present and future conditions, is difficult. The "settlement plans", by leaving much of the "translation" to the prevailing RSD executive mechanism, paved the way not only for the implementation, but also for planners' abandonment of a long-run perspective on the area and their distinct role in the system as policy guides. The strategy, however, did not provide any guidelines for the RSD mechanism that was continuously working in the area, and thus in practice maintained the RSD's dominant role in the region. This suggests that a regional strategy is important insofar as it is accompanied by specific programs or sets of activities deduced from it. A strategy may indeed contribute to an

initial acceptance of ideas and the establishment of favourable conditions for the introduction of concrete actions. However, commitment to actions can be generated only on the basis of specified actions, limited in time, and their observable results. Should have Region 2000 planners themselves managed the strategy's specification? Yes, since this may have created suitable conditions for getting the execution started and enable experts' integration at a later stage. No, because in planners' perspective, their skills were insufficient for the strategy's specification in a way that permits to establish the conceptual breakthrough they meant to stimulate.

Bearing in mind the tools planners potentially had to promote implementation, we can see that the "settlement plans" unknowingly made use of vulnerable decision-making determinants, benefiting from the bursting of the "demographic problem" into public consciousness. The Region 2000 experience cannot be said to reflect a wise utilisation of these determinants on the part of planners, both in the formulation of the Region 2000 strategy and in the attempts to promote its implementation.

c. The nature of the RSD

As noted, the two blocs of planning products were formulated within fairly different institutional contexts; the "settlement plans" are associated with the period of "institutional integrity", during which planners were an integral part of a system that, in turn, was highly committed to the settlement process, and was notable for its clear policy guidelines and efficient executive mechanism.

Region 2000 was initiated in a divided RSD that lacked the ability to formulate a policy and promote its consistent execution. Both products were introduced into a fragmented and generally inefficient government institutional system. Further, unlike in the previous period, during which the planning function was integrated into the RSD decision-making mechanism, the Region 2000 period saw a change in planners' status: planners found themselves at the mercy of managerial conflicts, and had to cope with an unwillingness and inability to integrate them back into the decision-making mechanism.

Planning practice went in accordance with these conditions. For example, coordination of or contributions to the management of the settlement process were facilitated by planners' status in the system, their access to different sources of information, and their awareness of working procedures. This proved most effective when the RSD, with an integrated executive mechanism, was determined to attain its objectives. Furthermore, these planning functions were exercised when commitment to the settlement process was interpreted in terms of commitment to planning work; thus, planners had relatively broad authority to act on behalf of the director of the North Region office (and through him on behalf of the RSD).

That planners took on the task of "motivating" other public organisations to function according to the plans reflects, in this case, the fact that they worked with the full backing of their managers (this is also an aspect of authority imposed from above). Hence, the planners' ability to initiate actions and obtain support for ideas such as the

foundation of Misgav Regional Council (which required the RSD to deal with issues beyond its official scope) was the direct result of their status in the organisation. One can further argue that this service as the intermediate "agents" between public organisations involved in the settlement process and the settlers themselves, was most effective during the initial years of construction, when the dependence of both settlers and other non-JAFI institutions on the RSD was rather high.

Region 2000 represents the other extreme, a case in which planners functioned as nearly independent agents, occasionally backed by individuals in their direct institutional apparatus. In taking advantage of the chaos in the RSD, planners managed to obtain general approval for the strategy and mobilise Fellowship 2000's support in convincing the RSD to take over the project. Yet, each of the functions associated with this project was carried out on a very limited scope, and mainly on the basis of individual relations. "Consultation", which was the most important function in this period, was rarely accompanied by decision-maker commitment to incorporate planners into the overall decision-making process, not to mention the lack of commitment to apply recommendations.

Planners found they could not carry out functions associated with the management of implementation. The stage at which the project was, and the principal institutional attitude toward it, implied that "coordination" was required most between upper levels of the political decision-making system, i.e., ministers, the RSD Executive, and Fellowship 2000. The task here was to gear politicians toward agreement

on the project, and on the distribution of authority inherent in the development strategy. However, without any backing from the RSD and its financial resources, planners' attempts at coordination were fruitless; there were no concrete results, and meetings with politicians were merely "friendly personal contacts".

Functions related to marketing the strategy, addressed to different types of institutions and decision-makers, required skills and experience the planners lacked. Further, available tools, such as tours to the Galil and distribution of information, were not very effective in obtaining support at the first stage, and generating commitment at more advanced stages of the project.

In principle, the "ideal" conditions for promoting the "settlement plans" amounted to playing according to the rules of the game as determined by the RSD. Specifically, it was necessary to accept the RSD's focus on short-run processes and its ad hoc attitude toward problem-solving. It was also necessary to accept a limited regional perspective - concern with a small and specific segment of the Western Galil system. These principles found their expression in the adjustment of plans to changing conditions and RSD demands, and in a systematic disregard for the immediate functional hinterland of the Segev area.

Nevertheless, if we put the planning experience in the perspective of the regional system concerned, this "freedom to function" of planners gains an additional meaning: it was realised at the cost of contributing to the maintenance of the existing institutional system and political status quo regarding the role of Western Galil, and thus to the

maintenance of the region's relatively disadvantaged condition and its peripheral role in the national system. Did the addition of 30 new settlements really change the condition of Western Galil vis-à-vis other parts of the country?

Structural theoretical approaches suggest that by harmonising with the institutional perspectives and functional machinery, planners were fulfilling their role in the socio-economic system (and, indeed, the national and regional political, economic and social status-quo was not fundamentally affected by the large-scale settlement process). However, the fact that the Region 2000 strategy was initiated by most of the same planners who had worked on the "settlement plans" raises the possibility that they rejected this role, and sought for an alternative way to realise important changes in the regional system. One of the expressions of this change in planning perspective was the shift from serving the direct interests of the RSD, which is part of the state apparatus, toward an attempt to serve "business sector" interests by creating conditions for the maximisation of private profitability in the area (as the emerging public opposition proved, this change had a potential effect on prevailing socio-economic relations).

The planning function in relation with Region 2000 was exercised in totally different spheres from that of the "settlement plans", both in terms of institutional context and in terms of planners' will and ability to adjust the strategy to the "rules of the game". This complicated situation existed from the beginning of work on the project.

Difficulties in respecting the "rules of the game" stemmed from several sources: First, in terms of the RSD, the familiar "game" had changed - there was not much interest in the functional aspects of the area (and especially the spatial distribution of activities and population). Rather, there was concern with the specific components to which political parties were committed, regardless of their location and linkages with their functional hinterland. This was accompanied by a change in the "rules", expressed by a limitation of the authority given planners by the upper managerial levels of the RSD, and a growing involvement of these managers in specific issues which traditionally had been managed by the regional office. Thus, the actual act of initiating the regional strategy by planners created difficulties in integrating it into the RSD functional system. Second, in terms of the project as a whole, no organisation was dominant, so as to be able to dictate the "rules". Third, the "game" was played in an unfamiliar arena - at the political level of decision-making. Apart from the difficulties in functioning that were imposed on the planners, their point of view in the project created additional problems: the strategic perspective was based on establishing a new "game" with new "rules". The essence of the strategic perspective lies in the principle of restructuring patterns of public intervention, as previously specified. This "invited" immediate opposition from the public sector, stemming from personal interests (i.e., fear of losing power) and institutional structure (i.e., the difficulty of implementing such changes in complex structures). Planners also expected active support for this

principle from the private sector. However, this proved unrealistic in view of the nature of the "business sector" (i.e., it does not generally support "revolutions", and it is essentially a collection of individuals rather than a coherent group with an agenda), and the costs that would be incurred from taking a leading role in a project such as Region 2000. In any event, the evidence shows that planners lacked the skills to approach the "business sector" from their position in a public organisation.

In all, in the case of the "settlement plans", the nature of the planning initiatives and the functional environment within which they were exercised resulted in a situation in which the commitment of the RSD executive mechanism was virtually a foregone conclusion. Region 2000, on the other hand, required aggressive methods to generate commitment on the part of the RSD and other organisations; these proved ineffective for directing actual public intervention. This, however, does not negate the basic validity of a strategic approach toward regional processes, and the validity of the tools planners can apply to improve their performance in a concrete decision-making system.

Notes

(1) We shall avoid a thorough evaluation study and estimation of possible future impact, since this is not directly in our scope.

(2) No target year is stated. This objective refers to the full capacity of settlements, as can be attained when settlements, as initially planned, are fully consolidated.

(3) These estimations apply to the pre-Russian migration period - a trend which neither its scale nor its spatial distribution can be predicted at this stage (1990).

(4) Kipnis refers to the Mountainous Galil, whose physical boundaries are roughly equal to our definition of Western Galil.

(5) From 650,000 to 710,000 Dunams. Dunam = 1000 square meter.

(6) We shall refrain from discussing the question regarding the extent to which new settlements' development required to designate all Western Galil (and other areas) with specific land uses.

(7) In her study of the population of Mountainous Galil's new settlements, Carmon (1990) proposes several socio-economic indicators to support this argument: this population consists of young families, in which parents are relatively highly educated and work in highly paid, prestigious jobs. The majority is of European or American origin (a significant indicator in the segregated Israeli society), families live in "improved" (i.e., 4+ rooms) conditions, and a majority of the families owns at least one car. Carmon further states that most of the population have "high awareness of life quality, and a tendency to invest in its materialisation" (p. 36).

(8) A letter from Mr.Y.Cohen (Director of MA"ATZ - the ministry of housing road construction body) to Mr.B.Vanger (Mayor of Karmiel), dated 6.3.1986, which clearly states that "the Galil is not at high priority for road construction".

(9) A letter from Mr.Y.Kela (Chief scientist of ministry of Communication) to Ms.O.Gilat (RSD planner) dated 6.1.1986.

(10) Ms.T.Duchan, interview. Zicron-Ya'akov, August 1990.

(11) I wish to thank Mr.T.Duchan, who initially dew my attention to this example.

(12) Freidman, Interview, Tel-Aviv, September 1990.

(13) Cohen, interview, Tel-Aviv, September 1989.

(14) Minutes from meeting of RSD North region office Executive, dated 4.4.1986.

(15) Minutes from "Katzir committee" meeting dated 24.2.1982.

(16) Ibid., 25.11.1985.

(17) A letter from Mr.B.Vanger to Prof. Katzir, dated 21.3.1986.

(18) See, for example, minutes from meetings of "Katzir committee" dated 16.9.1982 and 28.10.1983, as well as a note written by Prof. Katzir dated 28.2.1984.

(19) A letter from RSD Planning Unit to the head of the North Region office, dated 12.4.1986.

(20) Ibid.

(21) Minutes of meeting between the head of the RSD North region office and representatives of the Planning Unit dated 2.5.1985.

(22) A letter from Mr.Z.Haimovitch to Ms.O.Gilat dated 17.3.1986.

(23) Mr.S.Naim, a member of Fellowship 2000, 15.3.1985.

(24) A letter from Prof. Katzir and the Mr. Ya'akobi the minister of Economy and Planning) to the JAFI dated 25.12.1985.

(25) A letter of RSD Director-General (Mr.Y.Dekel) to the head of RSD North region office (Mr.M.Cohen) that authorised the Vice Director-General (Mr.Y.Friedman) to determine the need to form a departmental steering committee, dated 2.2.1986; A second letter from this Director-General that appoints such committee, dated 9.2.1986; Internal memorandums between the above persons (separately), the vice Director-General (Mr.H.Zaban), and the co-Director of the RSD (Mr.N.Zvili) in the period between 28.1.1986-15.2.1986.

(26) Minutes from meeting between Mr.Y.Cohen (director of the ministry of Education - North District) and RSD North region office (the head of the office and representatives of the Planning Unit), dated 7.11.1985.

(27) Ibid.

(28) A letter from Mr.U.Shani (the minister's assistant) to Mr.B.Vanger, dated 2.12.1986, appologising for the busy schedule of the minister.

(29) Op.cit. note 12.

(30) Op.cit., note 10.

(31) Minutes from a meeting between Mr.B.Vanger and RSD North region office Planning unit, dated 29.3.1986.

(32) The RSD North region office - the Planning Unit. A paper distributed among participants of this meeting, dated October 1986.

(33) Mr.A.Raz (the head of Misgav regional council). Quoted from minutes of this meeting.

(34) Letters from Mr.Y.Dekel to Mr.M.Cohen (head of North region office) dated 13.1.1986 and 15.4.1986.

(35) A letter from Ms.T.Duchan (head of planning unit) to Mr.M.Cohen (the head of North region office), dated 12.4.1986, and a response of the latter, dated 18.4.1986.

(36) Beyond this office, some influence was attained by virtue of the credit planners received from Mr.R.Weitz and Prof. Katzir.

(37) Op.cit., note 10.

(38) Ibid.

(39) Source of first draft: RSD North Region Archives.

Source of the Leasing Contract: Menuhin, Ludmer and Eger, 1983.

(40) Op.cit., notes 10 and 12.

(41) Mr.A.Meir (Pifke), Monthly reports of new settlements' development during the "mitzpim" project.

(42) Op. cit., note 33.

(43) Op. cit., note 12.

(44) Op. cit., note 10.

(45) Minute from the Forum meeting, 24.11.1987.

(46) Gilat, O. and Duchan, T. (17.3.1985). **An Assessment of Region 2000 Organisational Alternatives.** (Hebrew)

(47) Region 2000 - the researcher's notes. Refer to the Methodological Remarks in the Appendix.

Chapter 9: CONCLUSIONS

The following example illustrates the problem planners often face, and which this dissertation was written to help solve. A few months ago, a friend (Mr. Yriv) who is the elected chairman of a regional council in the north of Israel (Ha'gilboa) "complained" that if I (the planner, O.G.) could have commanded him, back in the mid-1980s, to act in a certain case according to my perspective, "the regional council would have been much better off in the 1990s". He then explained that "your ideas seemed, at that time, so crazy that I could not afford adopting them. Consequently, we are still struggling with the same old, familiar problems that are becoming less and less manageable". Still, in the 1990s, there is a regional council that may or may not have been better off, and a planner whose proposals are in the regional council's archives. Could the planner have done better in persuading the system of the relevance of his idea? Perhaps.

In our attempt to understand previous planning experience and put the planning process in an operational framework that systematically locates aspects of this process along manageable components (although the actual planning process cannot be "rationalised" in the sense of the systems approach), it is taken for granted that planners cannot control "the world", that there are many elements of his functional environment that are beyond his control; political power distribution and social norms are only two

examples. Thus, the important matter is how planners integrate their ideas into the existing environment, how they evaluate the "working grounds" and apply personal characteristics to influence decision-makers.

This dissertation, accordingly, is based on the premise that the planning process is a function of how we promote the planning product, rather than merely of what is proposed by this product. The latter is not thereby less important, especially since it is integral to the planner's attempt to promote a particular process (and, as we noted, the issue of what principles should guide the "regional" planning perspective is a subject of extensive concern in planning theory). Accordingly, planning practice was elaborated in several stages.

Initially, we posed the question of how the "region" should be perceived, and concluded that this is basically a function of what planners want to see in the complex, flexible to the extent of unlimited possible boundaries system, and their normative expectations as to what should be changed and affected in this system. However, the discussion of the "region" and the issue of regional boundaries that forms the basis of this approach, contended that regions can be defined only in relation to a specific context of time, location, and purpose of concern. Therefore, any normative perspective on the region's future can be determined only in relative terms (by comparison with other areas). By implication, the region's relative condition may guide the determination of such a future perspective.

This perception exposes the "region" to a potentially large variety of criteria for determining its content. Nevertheless, the subsequent argument that production and socio-organisational activities are at the centre of regional operating structure, clarified the process of choosing relevant boundaries of concern. These boundaries may be further crystallised by identifying "key factors of development", which are the specific activities, among the above two categories of activities in this specific perception, that are of special importance in a given case.

We then discussed the functional environment within which the planners practice. In this regard we emphasised that in order to operate within the decision-making environment and determine their "niche" in it, planners can identify several decision-making determinants that are relatively vulnerable to planning practice by virtue of their being susceptible to context- and issue-specific elements. The fact that these determinants can affect specific responses to planning initiatives suggests that the way planners treat them is important, and may provide a basis for the promotion of almost any type of idea (most commonly a change-induced idea). Furthermore, in exploring those determinants that are potentially vulnerable to the planning process and their relevance in concrete contexts, planners may gain an insight into where efforts should be put and how their initiatives should be practiced. Accordingly, planners should focus their attention on the types of responses decision-makers make to the planning ideas. The question is, what type of response is required?

In view of the nature of the political decision-making system, the regional system, and the planners' role in these systems we suggested that commitment to the planning product is a major indication of where impact can be made. Commitment (i.e., an observable response that reflects both interests and wants) to some sort of long-run perspective on processes or concrete actions is therefore both important and desirable. Especially, it permits planners to choose "partners" for the implementation of the planning product, and specify the type of impact they can expect from each partner separately and from the process as a whole.

Since commitment entails a high degree of economic and social risk intrinsic to the uncertainty associated with future processes, we suggested that a regional strategy may be the most appropriate tool for generating the desired commitment, because such a strategy clarifies the future to the extent that it is possible to do so. A regional development strategy, therefore, was argued to be in the best interest of both the "region" and the forces that function within it. Notwithstanding, any concern with regional strategy requires answers to the question of how to cope with external organisational issues. A regional strategy whose formulation was stimulated by planners' creative, task-oriented ideas and analytic skills (and taking into account both vulnerable decision-making determinants and the region's relative nature), when coupled with the planners' active attempts to promote the planning product's integration into a specific decision-making environment (rather than handing over responsibility for the planning product's implementation to a specific executive

mechanism), may lead to a strategic breakthrough in the realisation of a planning initiative. Acknowledging that actual regional strategies and policies historically are implemented within the government system, we pointed out the possible contribution of the "business sector" to the realisation of a given strategy or planning product. Accordingly, we suggested that both sectors may in theory be important for the execution of a regional strategy, and concluded that their relative importance can be determined only with reference to a concrete region-planner-planning product context. Nevertheless, in acknowledging the nature of the functional environment of planning practice, we stressed that a strategy should be accompanied by concrete recommendations as to the actions (possibly presented as "packages of actions") that follow from it. Finally, in light of the nature of regions, we suggested that a strategy should enhance the region's competitive advantage (i.e., should encourage inequalities between regions).

The second part of the dissertation analysed the specific planning experience of the Rural Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency for Israel in Western Galil from 1975 to 1986. This analysis aimed to verify the relevance of the methodological framework for actual planning practice, and, indirectly, for the assessment of historical planning processes.

Starting with a description of the major parameters of Western Galil, we emphasised the peripherality of the functional and physical role of this area vis-à-vis other parts of the country, which is exacerbated by a very

fragmented institutional system (although this is not different from the rest of Israel), and the problem (identified by the political system and some scholars) of the Arab majority. Planning initiatives were, indeed, justified on the basis of Western Galil's peripherality.

This basic justification, however, led to two "blocs" of planning products that evolved in the course of planning practice. They were identified as the "settlement plans" and Region 2000 development strategy. These blocs are distinct in terms of their parameters of concern (settlement-centered vs. region-wide perspective), their levels of concern with regional parameters (specificity vs. abstraction), the expected "partners" of the planning process, the type of future region envisioned, and the sorts of expectations planners had with regard to implementation, insofar as these could be identified during the period prior to implementation.

These differences became crucial during the attempts to exercise these planning products. The response to the "settlement plans" from the planners' direct institutional environment (i.e., the RSD) was unique, resulting in a process it is doubtful the planners foresaw. They enjoyed the full commitment of RSD management to their activities, which in turn permitted them to become an integral part of the plans' execution, and influence the way their planning products were implemented. The Region 2000 initiative, although it took a more "sophisticated" approach toward plan-making, encountered fairly unfavourable operating conditions (the standard conditions, I would say). This sophisticated attitude, reflected in the way the strategy

was introduced to the political decision-making system, was nonetheless problematic, in the sense of overemphasising the "future" and the abstract desired condition, while neglecting to create a firm base for actual commitment to actions. Thus, in spite of the planners' will and active attempts to promote the integration of their written planning product into the prevailing decision-making system, the content of the strategy itself and its ineffective marketing created major obstacles in attaining this goal.

The planning experience studied in this dissertation is a specific case of planners struggling to make their planning initiative sound and get it implemented. It is a study of the planners' role in regional processes, their susceptibility to the institutional system affiliated with their initiatives, and their vulnerability to the possible discrepancies between their idea of what should be done and their skills in estimating what can be done. This study, which analyses the planning experience in light of the major methodological perspective presented in this dissertation, developed out of the question, what makes the product of a strategic mind-set be adopted by decision-makers and actually implemented? Accordingly, particular emphasis was placed on the relations between the planners' potential for operating and the extent to which their written product embodied this potential, thus establishing initial grounds for communication with decision-makers, the types of actions that accompanied the "planning" process, the actual choice of regional components and decision-makers as a cornerstone of the regional development perspective, and, finally, the

translation of their vision into actual working principles and procedures. In all, this planning experience occurred during a period in which important changes in Western Galil took place. Some of these changes can be directly related to this planning process; others seem to have little or no direct connection with the overall processes initiated by the RSD, of which planners were an integral part.

In view of this experience, several questions raised in the first part of the dissertation require modification.

* What is the validity of a regional strategy?
  We constantly emphasised that a regional strategy is required because of the different forces operating in the region, since it is the only way to set up a framework for coordinating their different interests in the region and encouraging them to function toward common future goals in a way consistent with the strategic principles. This allows commitment to be generated on the basis of clarified future and concrete actions.
  The Region 2000 experience, however, shows that the commitment of decision-makers to a strategy is, in general, insufficient for ensuring that actual decisions will be made in accordance with the strategic principles. Because of its abstraction, the strategy permits specific interpretations that can be combined to create a different "whole" from the one originally envisioned in the strategy. By implication, when the strategy does not make concrete recommendations that

can be translated into concrete actions, one's commitment to it merely signals the intent to operate according to one's own interests and wants, i.e., to maintain prevailing operational methods.
This raises the possibility that, in practice, in contrast to our initial expectation, a regional strategy is most useful to the planners, who should reduce it to measurable and manageable segments, to which the specific commitment of "partners" may be generated. In order to affect specific decision-makers, specification of the strategy is crucial.

* What are the tools available to planners in their attempts to promote a certain planning product?
This dissertation assumes that planners are equipped with sufficient tools to determine the types of change required, their objectives, and how to explain the regional processes. Our discussion emphasised the analytical tools that facilitate identification of the environment within which they wish to operate. These contribute to the planners' ability to identify the type of response the planning initiative might generate, and hence the "partners" most relevant for specific actions. A special emphasis was given to the decision-making determinants that were identified as vulnerable to planning practice.
However, the planning experience suggests that though they might be aware of vulnerable determinants, planners do not really know how to take advantage of them in such ways as, for example, articulating a

certain idea or stimulating their "partners'" interest. A clue as to the area where such knowledge might be acquired was provided in our discussion of the means for attaining a strategic breakthrough (Chap. 4), and the classification of planning dimensions, specifically in the reference to "marketing" a planning product (Chap. 8). The Region 2000 experience highlights the importance of "marketing" procedures, which, when integrated into the planning skills, may enrich the methodological basis on which planners construct their proposals.

This call for integrating marketing procedures into the planning process may seem totally inappropriate to some scholars, undermining the belief that any planning product is necessarily accepted insofar as it is desired and required by the environment within which planners operate and the social, economic, and political conflicts that make up this environment. We argued, however, that the promotion of a planning product should be treated like the promotion of any other idea or product; not without reason we referred to the "planning product" rather than merely to plans, strategies, schemes, or documents. I believe that it is primarily in the planner's interest to promote the implementation of his ideas. Since political decision-making is outside his direct control, a planner should take into account the way in which his product is "sold" in the market.

What is to be promoted and how? These are the questions addressed throughout the dissertation, although

admittedly, the tools offered by different business theories were not thoroughly discussed (on the assumption that planners are capable of acquiring such knowledge, we concentrated on proving their relevance). Accordingly, it is suggested that some modifications in planning education be made to allow planners to acquire appropriate knowledge from the area of marketing.I would further suggest that a study be conducted to show how planners can practice marketing strategies under conditions where they lack direct control over resources, a not uncommon situation. Although a fundamental aspect of planning practice, it is presently almost ignored by scholars and planners.

* A related aspect of the planning process has to do with the types of regional parameters that may be influenced by it.
Although generation of commitment was regarded as theoretically feasible for any aspect of the regional processes, the particular planning experience discussed here proves that it was easiest with regard to "land use" issues (i.e., recommendations as to what the land use structure should be). Issues that can be reduced to "land use", such as telecommunication infrastructure, also are manageable. Thus, as long as planners functioned under the "umbrella" of land-use issues, they had the tools and institutional backing to influence decision-making. In contrast, attempts to deal with administrative and organisational changes faced unexpected obstacles. As for economic processes,

which were almost totally ignored by planners, my belief is that they can be reduced to manageable measures.

As opposed to traditional "land use" issues, which political-administrative systems leave open to "penetration" by professionals and non-politicians, any attempt to deal with institutional structures and distribution of authority proved hopeless. The impact of planners in such cases was limited to individuals, with one exception (i.e., Misgav Regional Council) of an impact on a wider political and administrative system, and it does not matter that they were not alone in this process - cooperation with an executive mechanism is the essence of planning practice.

How then can planners address this difficulty without becoming politicians, as Region 2000 planners sometimes tried?

The answer is connected with the way planners see the scope of their activities. Some expect direct involvement in political processes; the Region 2000 experience shows that such a role is very hard to attain. This dissertation suggests that the "marketing" of concrete projects may be one direction along which planners can increase their potential influence. As previously proposed, a study of "marketing" the planning product should reveal the way in which this difficulty could be solved in practice: How can planners affect political and administrative systems (if this is considered necessary) as planners rather than by becoming, in effect, politicians? Which

indirect measures should be adopted?

* In this regard, the dissertation revealed an important problem that still is unsolved in practice, namely, how can planners cope with the problem of integrating both the public and the private sectors into the regional processes according to the planning product?
The planning experience discussed here provides an example of a rather aggressive solution to this problem, by which the RSD managed to pull the government executive system into the development of Western Galil and influence private business entrepreneurs and individuals. This provided planners with the "umbrella" for extending their functions beyond their immediate institutional environment. This kind of attitude is rather unique in the Israeli experience and in other parts of the Western world (although more common in Third World countries, where such roles are played by multinational organisations). Further, it was a consequence of the RSD management, rather than planners', practice.
The questions are, therefore, how can planners cope with the more conventional situations in which many organisations with similar political and executive capacities stretch regional parameters according to their own interests, and how can planners coordinate between the possibly conflicting interests of the different economic entities, especially in view of the fact that planning is commonly practiced within one, usually public, organisation? The answers, in my

opinion, lie in the way the planning product is presented to the different segments of the regional system, which brings us back to the marketing dimension of the planning process.

* Finally, in view of the nature of planning practice, that is, a process by which planners attempt to influence decision-making so as to induce changes in a given regional system (regional, in our case), it is relevant to raise the question of the difference between "incremental" versus "fundamental" changes. The literature distinguishes between these concepts, in many cases implying that the way changes are attained (i.e., incrementally) cannot yield desired results (i.e., fundamental changes).
I believe in incrementalism. A change is a process in which one adjusts to a different situation. The process may be short or long, the objectives guiding the process may be desirable or unacceptable. Accordingly, the actions formulating the change may be drastic or moderate, but the actual process through which the system accommodates to a new situation and absorbs new ideas is incremental. Even in the case of the Six Days' War, a drastic military action in itself, it took several years to absorb the new territories and to accommodate the entire Israeli socio-economic system to its consequences. Needless to say, the process in which many planners have been engaged over the last 20 years (at least) of formulating an "alternative" planning theory, will result in drastic changes in the planning

profession and its performance. Yet, this fundamentally different theory will be the outcome of a long process during which many different theoretical insights, research studies, and other contributions were brought together. Hence, planners are constantly involved in everyday affairs, and their influence is incremental. This, however, implies nothing about the content of their influence.

This dissertation concentrated, then, on a specific aspect of planning practice, and suggested that planning practice can be made more effective by virtue of the method planners adopt to formulate the planning product and advance its integration into the decision-making environment.

This dissertation calls for a planning process that is at odds with the conventional wisdom of plan production, and the more common perception among planners that they have accomplished their task by predicting a certain future (that cannot be fully predicted) and specifying the means to attain certain goals (which are not necessarily either feasible or acceptable within specific organisational contexts). Indirectly, one wonders at the fact that the "rational goals-means-end" attitude is the most common one among practitioners.

Planners must accept that the implementation of their plans does not necessarily follow from their initiation, their production (although someone pays for that), or even their official approval. Planners must therefore actively pursue implementation. The type of planning function envisioned here regards the production of plans as merely

one aspect of planners' active attempts to promote the integration of their ideas into the prevailing system in which they have chosen to operate. This requires, apart from professional skills, a sensitivity to political processes, administrative procedures, and the personal characteristics of actors in the relevant functional environment. Accordingly, planners should be concerned with interactions with individual decision-makers, public relation campaigns, lobby groups, etc. It follows that this perception restructures the expectations planners have about their profession, in terms of their potential strength in the planning process and its impact.

According to this rationale, any attempt to evaluate planning experience ("regional" and "urban" alike) must consider the way a plan responded to the concrete context within which it was produced, the means by which implementation was promoted, and the different planning products created or attempted throughout the planning process. By implication, the various reasons specified in the literature for the failure of plans' implementation should also include (in spite of the practical difficulties involved in such research) the means applied by planners to promote implementation, rather than implicitly assuming that they were irrelevant or at least appropriate.

Further contributions of this dissertation are in the following aspects:

* In determining the set of objects planners should concern themselves with: not merely with the region and its characteristics as traditionally treated and normally accepted in planning practice, but also with the institutional context within which the planning product is expected to unfold.
* In emphasising how to present ideas and recommendations, as a means to generate commitment to the planning product or the components being presented. Plan-making should therefore be viewed as a process of formulating certain visions and marketing the practical implications. In this regard, one suggested that skills that tend to be excluded from planning practice are very important, such as marketing expertise and individual capacities for interaction with decision-makers.
* Indirectly, one also suggest that the planning process should not be endless or unlimited. Planners who realise that a certain product is not going to be implemented should either seek for alternative ways to promote it, or stop planning for practical rather than academic purposes.

In sum, do I suggest a "super planner"? Is the planner who is competent in the production both of plans and the other products that must be evolved to promote implementation non-existent?

My experience proves that these proposed qualities of planners are not unrealistic; first of all because most of the required knowledge and skills are available and acquired

during the academic training of planners. Second, there are cases, especially among private practitioners, in which planners actually apply some of the principles proposed here (for example, they are constantly engaged in "selling" their ideas - attempting to convince an organisation to sponsor a plan and implement it), only they do not see such functions as part of their "planning practice" (just as some scholars might also regard them as completely outside of "planning" proper). So, we do not require a super planner whose professional skills are unattainable; as far as basic professional competence and personal attributes are concerned, the necessary prerequisites are potentially in place. Finally, planners are already engaged (in one way or another) in a continuous process of "improving planning" so as to make their proposals heard, so my proposals may well become elements in this process that planners could adopt.

Nevertheless, the proposed methodological framework, especially in the freedom it provides planners to determine the specific context within which they operate, may be criticised for being "contextless". Indeed, in the same sense that I do not believe there is a "right" regional plan or strategy and a prescribed structure that can be applied anywhere at any time, I do not think that a methodological framework should replace the planning theories or theoretical approaches that play such an important role in planners' determinations of such elements as the type of future regional system desired or the socio-political forces relevant to particular expectations and needs.

This dissertation did not attempt to discuss the relevance or suitability of the specific plans' content. For example, we did not question the need to establish new settlements in Western Galil, nor the validity of a regional development strategy that disregards a whole segment of the region in question (i.e., the Arab sector). Although I do care about the plans' content and their associated impact, this is a matter for a separate study. Such aspects should be elaborated in a study of the Israeli political and social system that questions the practice of assigning crucial importance to the actual construction of settlements, while largely disregarding the future development prospects of such settlements. Such a study should examine why it is relatively easy to populate new settlements scattered in peripheral areas, the role of "settlements" in the territory-based ideologies associated with the existence of the Israeli state, and reasons why the nation-wide social and economic externalities imposed by the continuous construction of new settlements rarely reach the level of public debate.

In fact, this dissertation did not discuss a whole body of normative questions, including the "should be" goals of regional planning, the regional components most crucial for stimulating changes, the common implicit assumption that regional inequalities should be eliminated, the way in which regional (sub-national) areas should be tackled from a national perspective, the question of "public interest" embodied in many planning products, and the issue of "public participation" in the planning process. There are some hints as to the direction of my thought on these questions (for

example, in the proposed analysis of a region, or the definition of a regional structure). Nevertheless, a real discussion would require an entirely different study in order to develop cogent arguments and perhaps generate new ideas.

To complement the principal approach and objective of this dissertation, I suggest that its continuation will be in the analysis of the way in which marketing skills should be integrated into the planning process, the way in which planners can improve interactions between the "public" and "private" sectors, and the way in which planning ideologies can be modified in accordance with the premise that plan-making is not a distinct profession, but rather a very straightforward exercise of knowledge, skills, and personal characteristics.

It is my hope that the methodological framework proposed here forms a coherent basis for future planning practice.

APPENDICES

Diagram 3: THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL



Source: R.S.D Calan

Table No.1: **Israel - Spatial Distribution Of Population**[1]

District	Size of Area			Population 1987	
	sq.km	%	Accu %[2]	(%)	Accu %
Total[3]	21,501	100.0	-	100.0	-
Jerusalem	627	3.0	3.0	12.3	12.3
Haifa	854	4.0	7.0	13.8	26.1
Central	1,242	5.8	12.8	21.4	47.5
Tel-Aviv	170	0.8	13.6	23.6	71.1
South	14,107	66.0	79.6	12.1	83.2
North	4,501	20.4	100.0	16.8	100.0
Galil	1,667	7.8		9.6	
Western Galil	610	2.8		4.4	

North	4,501	100.0		732.4	100.0
Galil	1,667	37.0		430.3	58.75
Western Galil	610	13.5		193.9	26.45

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1. Source: Israel Statistical Abstract, 1988, no.39, Central Bureau Of Statistics.
2. Accumulated percentage.
3. Land Area, within the "green line" (excluding 1.4% of population from the calculations).

Table No.2: **Western Galil - Population Size (1987)**

a. Population size according to main ethnic groups (Absolute numbers)

	W. Galil	Galil	N. Dist.	Israel
Total	195.3	430.3	732.4	4406.0
Jews	33.2	112.7	357.0	3612.0
Arabs	162.1	317.6	375.4	793.6

b. Population size according to main ethnic groups (Percentages)

	W. Galil	Galil	N. Dist.	Israel
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Jews	17.0	26.2	48.7	81.9
Arabs	83.0	73.8	51.3	18.1
Thereof:				
Moslems	53.4	68.4	67.5	76.6
Chris.	27.5	16.5	16.6	13.5
Druz & Others	19.1	15.1	15.9	9.9

c. Western Galil Ethnic Groups' Structure - size of each group as % of the same ethnic group in selected Statistical areas:

Statistical Areas	Galil	North District	Israel
Western Galil:			
Total	45.4	27.0	4.4
Jews	29.5	9.3	0.9
Arabs	51.0	43.2	20.4

Table No.3: **Western Galil - Demographic characteristics**

a. Comparative population growth trends

	Average annual growth rates (in %)		
	1972-1978	1979-1983	1984-1987
Western Galil	5.7	4.0	4.1
Galil	4.7	3.4	3.5
North District	3.6	2.8	2.9
Israel	3.1	1.6	2.3

b. Changes in ethnical composition

	1972	1978	1983	1987
Western Galil Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Jews	9.2	11.8	15.4	17.0
Arabs	90.8	88.2	84.6	83.0

c. Changes in size of major ethnic groups, measured in term of their relative size out of the same ethnic groups in selected Statistical Areas (%):

	Jews		Arabs	
Western Galil	1972	1987	1972	1987
Galil	14.5	29.5	49.6	51.0
North District	3.8	9.3	43.3	43.2
Israel	0.4	0.9	20.5	20.4

d. Age Structure (1987)[1]

Age Group	Israel			N. Dis.			Galil			W. Galil		
	Total	J	A	Total	J	A	Total	J	A	Total	J	A
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
0-14	32	30	42	38	34	42	41	35	43	42	35	43
15-24	17	16	22	20	17	23	21	15	23	21	14	22
25-44	27	28	23	25	28	23	24	30	23	24	32	23
45-64	15	16	10	12	14	9	10	13	9	10	14	9
65+	9	10	3	5	8	3	4	7	3	3	5	3

e. Natural Increase - Rates per 1000 (1987)[2]

Ethnic Group	1972	1987
Jews	17.0	13.1
Moslems	43.7	31.0
Christians	19.9	17.0
Druze	37.4	26.9

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1. **Western Galil Jews** - Generally younger population (larger 0-14 and smaller 45+ groups), mainly in comparison to Israel Jews. Composition of high rates of 0-14 and 25-44 groups - a consequence of migration trends of the past 10 years. **Arabs** - A similar structure is shared by all areas (young population). It is a consequence of similar socio-demographic determinants (dominant role to high natural increase rates). Total **Western Galil** figures - a major statistical impact of the Arab population (the majority). Accordingly, any comparison to other areas should take into account the relative sizes of Jews and Arabs.
2. Although a steady decrease of "natural increase" rates, most Arab rates are substantially higher than the Jewish rates.

Table No.4: **List Of Settlements Located In Western Galil**[1]

Jewish Settlements

Sub-Area and name of settlement	Period of establishment: pre-1977	1977-1982	1983+	Type of Settlement[2]	Planned size[3]
West Lower Galil[4]					
1. Avtalion			1987	coop. Moshav	200
2. Eshar			1986	community sett.	200
3. Gilon		1980		"	200
4. Hararit		1980		"	100
5. Kamon		1980		community sett.	70
6. **Karmiel**	1964			Municipality	
7. Koranit		1978		industial vg.	200
8. Lotem		1978		Kibbutz	100
9. Manof		1978		"	200
10. Michmanin		1980		community sett.	70
11. Miztpe-Aviv		1981		"	200
12. Moran		1978		Kibbutz	100
13. Moreshet		1981		"	325
14. Rakefet		1981		coop. Moshav	215
15. Schania	1976			indistrial vg.	200
16. Segev (Atzmon)	+[5]	1978		"	200
17. Shazor	1953			coop. Moshav	60
18. Shorashim		1980[6]		coop. Moshav	200
19. Tzurit		1981		community sett.	200
20. Ya'ad	1976			coop. Moshav	150
21. Yodfat	1960			"	80
22. Yuvalim		1982		community sett.	400
23. Zevia		1980		Kibbutz	100

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1. Source: The List of Localities - Their Population and Codes, the Central Bureau Of Statisttics, 3.12.1988.
2. "Type", i.e., their organisational structure, according to official classification.
3. Number of families, according to programs approved by the Ministry of Agriculture. Reference excludes New-Towns, andprivate and Arab settlements, all are much larger.
4. The list excludes Adi, a community settlement located at the south of the area, functionallly related to Nazareth area, and totally remoted (both physically and functionally) from our area of comcem.
5. First site deserted, new site (name marked in brackets) repopulated.
6. The permanent site was populated in 1984.

Sub-Area and name of settlement	Period of establishment: pre-1977	1977-1982	1983+	Type of Settlement	Planned size
West Upper Galil					
24. Abirim		1980		community sett.	70
25. Ein - Ya'akov	1950			coop. Moshav	60
26. Ga'aton	1948			kibbutz	80
27. Gita		1980		community sett.	100
28. Halutz			1985	community sett.	100
29. Hila		1980		community sett.	100
30. Harashim		1980			80
31. Hosen	1949			coop. Moshav	60
32. Kfar Havradim			1984	community sett.	500
33. Kishor	*[7]	1980		kibbutz	70
34. Klil		1979		community sett.	100
35. Lapidot		1978		industrial vg.	
36. Lavon		1980		kibbutz	70
37. **Ma'alot**	1957			local council[8]	
38. Manot		1980		community sett.	70
39. Me'ona	1949			coop. Moshav	60
40. Peki'in	1955			coop. Moshav	60
41. Pelech		1980		Kibbutz	100
42. Tal-El		1978		industrial vg.	100
43. Tuval		1981		kibbutz	100
44. Tzuriel	+			coop. Moshav	60
45. Yehiam	1946			kibbutz	80

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7. Founded in 1976 as a military camp.
8. Ma'alot is organized within a Jewish-Arab Ma'alot-Tarshiha local council.

Arab Settlements

Name of settlement	Religious Structure (%) Christians	Moslems	Druze
West Lower Galil			
1. Arabe	1	99	-
2. Bir El Machsur			
3. Baeine	20	80	-
4. Dir El Asad	-	100	-
5. Dir Hana	20	80	-
6. Iblin	53	47	-
7. Kabul	-	100	-
8. Kaoukab	-	100	-
9. Karaf Manda			
10. Madged El Krum	-	100	-
11. Nahef	-	100	-
12. Rama	66	10	24
13. Sagur	-	-	100
14. Sahnin	10	90	-
15. Sha'ab	-	100	-
16. Shfaram			
17. Tamra	-	100	-
West Upper Galil			
18. Beit Jan	-	-	100
19. Julis	-	-	100
20. Jat	-	-	100
21. Yanuah	-	-	100
22. Yarka	-	-	100
23. Kisra	-	-	100
24. Kafar Samia	25	-	75
25. Meilia	100	-	-
26. Tarshiha	50	50	-
27. Ein El Asad	20	80	-
28. Pki'in - Bukia	72	3	70
29. Sheih Danun	-	100	-

Table no.5: Western Galil Population Growth[1]

Year	Thousands			Percentages			Average annual growth rate (% of previous period)		
	Total	J	Non-J	Total	J	Non-J	Total	J	Non-J
1972	103.9	9.6	94.3	100	9.2	90.8	-	-	-
1978	139.4	16.4	123.0	100	11.8	88.2	5.7	11.8	5.1
1983	167.5	25.7	141.8	100	15.4	84.6	4.0	11.3	3.0
1987	195.2	33.2	162.1	100	17.4	82.6	4.3	7.3	3.6

(1) Source: The statistical Abstract of Israel, the Central Bureau of Statistics, annual reports.

Table no.6: Western Galil - Population Relative Growth Trend (% of same sector in other areas)[1]

		W. Galil (Absolute)	Galil	N.Dis (Precentages)	Israel
1972	Total	103.9	41.2	22.0	3.3
	Jews	9.6	14.5	3.8	0.4
	Non-Jews	94.3	49.7	43.3	20.5
1978	Total	139.4	43.2	24.2	3.7
	Jews	16.4	20.1	5.5	0.5
	Non-Jews	123.0	51.0	44.1	20.6
1983	Total	167.5	44.3	25.5	4.2
	Jews	25.7	25.8	7.9	0.8
	Non-Jews	141.8	51.0	43.0	20.6
1987	Total	195.2	45.4	26.7	4.4
	Jews	33.2	29.5	9.3	0.9
	Non-Jews	162.1	51.0	43.2	20.4

Table no.7: Jewish Population - Distribution according to type of Settlement [1]

Settlements in West Galil	1972	1978	1983	1987	% of total pop. 1987
Karmiel	3,798	9,750	15,629	19,400	58.4
Ma'alot[2]	3,200	3,879	5,200	5,770	19.5
Total New-Towns	7,000	13,629	20,829	25,870	77.9
Veteran Setts. (1950s-1960s)	2,477	2,468	2,759	2,758	8.3
New Setts.	125	203	2,112	4,572[3]	13.8
TOTAL REGION	9,600	16,300	25,700	33,200	100.0

(1) Source: The Settlement List, Central Bureau of Statistics for the relevant years.
(2) The data refers to the Jewish population, about 50% of Ma'alot-Tarshiha local council.
(3) About 20% of population is in Kfar-HaVradim (a private settlement).

Table No.8a: Western Galil - Number of Settlements[1]

Absolute numbers

Year / Area	1972 T	1972 J	1972 N.J	1978 T	1978 J	1978 N.J	1983 T	1983 J	1983 N.J	1987 T	1987 J	1987 N.J
Israel	905	802	111	903	795	115	1091	969	130	1151	1030	130
N.D.	309	243	69	306	238	70	385	305	83	399	320	82
Galil[2]	124	72	54	128	76	53	171	113	60	178	121	59
W. G.	40	12	29	39	11	29	71	42	30	75	46	30

(1) Source: The Statistical Abstract of Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics for relevant years.
(2) Some mixed Arab-Jewish settlements (e.g., Ma'alot-Tarshiha in Western Galil) are counted within each sector (one Jewish and one Arab), but only once in the total numbers.

Table No.8b: Rate of increase of Settlements (%)

Area	1972-1978 Total	1972-1978 J	1972-1978 N.J	1978-1983 Total	1978-1983 J	1978-1983 N.J	1983-1987 Total	1983-1987 J	1983-1987 N.J
W.Galil	-2.5	-8.0	0	82	280.0	3.5	5.6	9.5	0
Galil	3.0	5.5	-1.8	33.6	48.7	13.2	4.1	7.1	0
N.Dis.	-0.1	-2.0	1.4	25.8	28.0	18.7	3.6	4.9	-1.2

METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS

General Remarks on Data Collection and Calculation

The following sources of information were utilised for this dissertation:

The Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) - most data such as size of population, number of settlements, labour power characteristics, unless otherwise mentioned, were obtained from this source. Differences between various sources of information led to the use of CBS data as the major source of information and the basis for comparison with other sources. Officially restricted data regarding most new settlements' size (measured in households and/or individuals) were obtained from the settlements themselves. Yet, since this information is calculated into total CBS figures (e.g., total Jewish population in a certain "natural area"), the above data were verified with CBS numbers. Consequently, there is the possibility of small discrepancies (five families at most) in the actual numbers of inhabitants of each settlement. In the case of information regarding the industrial system (e.g., number of plants, employees), which was insufficiently specified in the CBS data-base, detailed information was obtained directly from industrial plants and local authorities (as specified below). This source affected the choice of the year 1987 as the basis for most of the data presented here concerning Western Galil and the planning process, as it is the year for which the most conclusive data are available (some 1987 data was made available only in 1989). After

1987, CBS data are based on sample data collection.

The North Region Office of the Rural Settlement Department provided data on settlements' establishment dates, organisational structure, and general information regarding Western Galil. As noted, population figures (that are provided in terms of households) were used in the calculation of the total regional population and its spatial-functional distribution (mainly by "natural areas" and type of settlement). Most of these data were obtained from the working files of the Planning Section. Access to this data-base was crucial for the analysis of the planning process. Almost all the relevant information was obtained before the administrative merging of this Region Office and the Galil Region Office (1990).

The Settlement Department Archive - this source provided access to minutes from RSD Executive meetings, Zionist Congress and JAFI Assembly Resolutions, official definitions of planning function, and letters and publications regarding the process analysed.

The Ministry of Industry - mainly the New Towns' Industrialisation Report (updated until 1983) and data collected from the North District office.

Vix Archive, The Weitzmann Institute of Science, Rehovot - working files of the "Katzir Committee".

Private working files of Prof. Katzir provided directly by him - this includes his documentation of meetings, notes on his conversations with different decision-makers, information given him, and his notes on intentions and expectations.

The Ministry of Interior - the national master plans,

statutory regional land use maps, and national sectoral plans.

The Institute for Urban and Regional Research, Rehovot - protocols of meetings regarding the Mitzpim project.

The Misgav Regional Council, Karmiel Municipality, and Ma'alot-Tarshiha Local Council - data regarding industrial plants and small businesses within their jurisdictions, as well as population counts and socio-economic characteristics.

Private notes of the researcher - documentation of selected meetings (of planners, RSD Executive and specific persons, Fellowship 2000 meetings, meetings at the Municipality of Karmiel, meetings with UJA Settlement Committee representatives, meetings in the Ministry of Economics and Planning) and of reports by different participants in various meetings the researcher did not attend (e.g., their impressions and opinions of the events). All of this documentation refers to the years 1985-1988.

A Questionnaire. Due to the unavailability of coherent and detailed information regarding industry in Western Galil and the discrepancies between the various official sources, a questionnaire was distributed by the researcher to all industrial plants and small businesses in the area investigated. The questionnaire was distributed in 1990.
Method of distribution: by mail.
Response: the response among the Jewish industrial plants was 97%. However, a low response (20%) was marked among small private businesses in Karmiel and Ma'alot. No response was obtained from the Arab sector.

Structure of questionnaire: the questions were cast in a relatively simple form, and an attempt was made to avoid controversial questions (e.g., financial situation, investments) or questions that require time-consuming answers that would have encouraged non-response. Even so, a large proportion (70%) of answers refused to specify the proportions of Jewish and Arab employees. This information was provided by the local authorities specified above.
The format of the questionnaire was as follows (translated from the Hebrew):

Information Regarding the Production System in Western Galil

a. Name of plant/business:

b. Year of establishment:

c. Number of employees:

	TOTAL		JEWS		ARABS	
EMPLOYEES	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN
NUMBERS						
YEARS OF FORMAL EDUCATION (-6;6-12; 13-15;18+)						

d. The location of home (or permanent address) of employees:

HOME LOCATION	TOTAL		JEWS		ARABS	
	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN
In the sett. where plant is located						
Segev or Tefen (specify)						
Other (specify)						

e. Is there an R&D activity in the plant? Yes/No

f. Is the plant related to a "mother firm"? Yes/No

If yes of "mother firm": _____

Is there an R&D activity in the "mother firm"?

Thank you for your cooperation.

On the whole, information regarding the planning process associated with the "settlement plans" was supported and enriched by interviews with planners directly involved in the process. By contrast, such information regarding Region 2000 was obtained from the substantial written documentation of the process; this documentation was managed by planners during the process itself.

Two problem in gathering information are important:

First, the available data of government ministries' expenditures and budget reports (including specified planned and executed resources) during the relevant budgetary years does not provide a firm basis for discussing the relations between plans and the allocations of public financial and land resources. This is mainly the result of several aspects: a. The way in which government and ministry budget reports are structured. Allocations are classified (and executed) according to several criteria: specific issues (e.g., housing, roads, transportation), territorial base (e.g., administrative districts which in most cases do not overlap), socio-economic characteristics of individuals and population quotas (health services, educational facilities), and individual firms. b. Since none of our projects was a specifically budgeted item, all allocations were structured within standard allocation procedures. Only three exceptional cases could be identified: allocations through the Ministry of Industry and Trade to the Katzir Committee and Fellowship 2000 (e.g., salary of Director General and other administrative expenses); Allocations from 1982-1984 by JAFI to Fellowship 2000; Allocations under the heading of "mitzpim", "new settlements" or "Region 2000" within the RSD North Region office, and partly in JAFI budget reports. Otherwise, resources were allocated through channels such as the "investment center" of the Ministry of Industry and

Trade, "development areas", liability rights for housing assistance to individual settlers, and population quotas with regard to facilities such as education and health. c. The nature of the projects concerned. The entire settlement process had not been a government initiative, although massive government allocations followed this initiative. Thus, it is a matter of speculation as to whether in the absence of this initiative similar budgets would have been allocated to Western Galil. In fact, the "mitzpim" project was based on an assumption that massive government allocations were not likely during the "mitzpim" period. In this regard, it should be emphasised that, as JAFI's project, the establishment of the "mitzpim" had been neither a "cheap" nor an efficient project, as is argued by various scholars in attempts to estimate the scale of expenditures generated by the project (Reichman and Oren, 1984; Chemanski, 1990). As for Region 2000, the project never reached the stage of fundamental allocations, and thus there is little ground to cover with regard to patterns of public resource allocation. The only examples are promised budgets (by the RSD) that were never executed, and the firm refusal of several ministries to allocate resources to this project (e.g., the refusal of the Israeli Land Authority to allocate land to the Region 2000 Company, and evidence that the Minister of Industry and Trade "refused to approve any project under the heading of Region 2000" - Mr. Eitan,

Ministry of Treasury). These deficiencies negate any discussion of the following issues: the volume of allocations to the projects concerned, changes in allocations to Western Galil throughout the years, and the volume of allocations in comparison to other projects and areas.

Second, obtaining data from the Arab sector in Western Galil, or indirectly through other sources, was obstructed by lack of comprehensive information in official data-bases and the absence of alternative sources of information. This problem must be solved if further attempts to deal with the development of Western Galil are made.

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